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Abstract
According to Behavioural Economics, consumer expenditures depend on not only
their financial conditions but also their attitudes, and the latter is reflected in con-
sumer sentiment (or confidence). In 1946, Katona developed the Index of Consumer
Sentiment to quantify sentiment measure through survey data. Since then, senti-
ment has received constant media attention and been studied by a long and rich
string of literature. However, researchers and analysts have yet to reach a consensus
on its determinants and implications. Moreover, although sentiment surveys are
regularly conducted in many countries nowadays, the important issue of sentiment’s
cross-country interaction is largely ignored in literature.
Nonetheless, one thing that existing studies seem to agree on is that sentiment
plays an especially important role during economic turning points. As a result, the
2008 Global Financial Crisis has brought the relationship between sentiment and
macroeconomic conditions back to the forefront. While it remains difficult to assert
whether the collapse of confidence was the cause or the consequence of the crisis,
most academics and policy makers agree that the erosion of confidence has ensured
the depth and longevity of the crisis regarded by many economists as the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Motivated by the global panic and fears
since the Global Financial Crisis, and the new and important role sentiment may
have played in triggering and prolonging the economic downturn, our study seeks to
address the following three interrelated issues: determinants, the underlying forces
behind the erosion of confidence; implications, its impacts on the real economy; and
interaction, the channels in which the sentiment shocks transmit across international
markets.
We focus on the role of Economic Policy Uncertainty when we study the deter-
iii
minants of consumer confidence. By doing a thorough data analyses with a VAR
(vector autoregressive) model, including performing Granger Causality Test, run-
ning Impulse Response test and studying Variance Decomposition results, we con-
firm the usefulness of economic policy uncertainty, and also discuss its implications
- consumer confidence, or sentiment, may be a measure of uncertainty.
We then move to international data on consumer confidence, and study its trans-
missions. We generated the spillover index, which is based on forecast error variance
decompositions from VAR models. We are able to discuss the direction of relation-
ships among consumer sentiment in different countries. Not surprisingly, we have
found that the consumer sentiment in the US plays a central role.
Finally, we study the implications of consumer confidence, focusing on its role
on house price changes. Again, we use a VAR model to study the dynamics of
consumer sentiment and house price. We find that consumer sentiment is very
powerful in explaining the percentage change in house price. Then we study and
compare consumer sentiment within different income tiers, age groups, and regions.
We find that the sentiment by mid-aged people, people with higher income, and
people who live in certain regions, has the biggest explanatory power on house price
change. it seems that the sentiment of people with better knowledge and experience
in housing market was more valuable in predicting house price change. This leads us
to wonder: in addition to consumer sentiment, by adding sentiment by professionals
who work in the housing market, we might be able to find a better sentiment proxy
that could have better explanatory power on house price change.
Therefore, we proposed a two-step approach to achieve this goal. The first step
was to construct a better consumer sentiment index, that is housing specific. We
looked into the survey questions by University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers,
and started with the questions that better represent peoples’ sentiment on housing
market. We then did a Stepwise Regression to select the set of variables that were
able to explain the most variance on house price. Afterwards, we finalised our choice
of questions by pairwise Granger Causality test results. We used the responses of
these questions to construct a housing specific consumer sentiment.
Our second step was to construct a sentiment of people who are the centre in the
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housing market. We aim at providing a sentiment measure that combines consumer
sentiment (using the housing specific one we constructed), builder sentiment, realtor
sentiment, and lender sentiment. Principal Component Analysis is used for the con-
struction of the sentiment measure. And the measure turns out to be very successful
in explaining house price change, compared with other sentiment measures.
In summary, we provide a thorough study on consumer sentiment and have
some interesting results. Our findings should be valuable for both researchers and
practitioners.
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Chapter 1
introduction
The recent 2008 Global Financial Crisis is regarded by many economists as the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression (Pendery, 2009). Researchers and
professionals have tried their best to untangle the underlining mechanisms behind
this severe and prolonged economic downturn, and identify the important lessons
that one should learn. Among these findings, most academics and policy makers
agree the erosion of confidence has ensured the depth and longevity of the crisis (See,
for example, Petev et al. (2011)). The problem of the role consumer confidence plays
in economy has been bought back to the forefront.
Consumer confidence (which is often referred to as consumer sentiment, and
these two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis) captures the
difference in consumer attitudes when making buying decisions, while her financial
condition and the surrounding business environment stay the same. Classical finance
theory assumes rationality of the consumers (Friedman, 1957). In other words, it
disregards the role consumer attitudes play, with the assumption that the differences
in individual attitudes would cancel out. However, the theory fails to explain many
economic phenomena, such as depressions (Colander et al., 2009). In Keynes (1936)’s
revolutionary work that explained the causes of the Great Depression, he proposed
the idea of “animal spirits”, suggesting that the change in consumer taste may
influence investment. In line with this notion, Katona (1953) proposed the theory
of psychological economics, and suggested that expenditures could depend on both
the “ability to buy” and the “willingness to buy”. While the former is an objective
1
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factor about the consumer’s financial condition, the latter captures the subjective
aspect about the consumer’s attitude.
Since the proposal of the concept of consumer confidence and the development
of its proxies, consumer confidence has been studied by a long and rich string of
literature and received constant media attention for more than 50 years. However,
researchers and analysts have yet to reach an consensus on many issues related to
consumer confidence, such as its usefulness in explaining economic phenomena, its
predictory power on future expenditure, its determinants and implications, and the
underlying mechanism. In this thesis, we will revisit and try to untangle these
important issues, by applying new research methods, using new data, and including
new variables.
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we will focus on the following research ques-
tion: what drives the changes in consumer confidence? In Katona (1972)’s opinion,
consumer confidence is a unique and complex variable constantly influenced by a
large range of variables, unique events, mass media, etc. For example, big events
such as the 1990 Iraq War and the 2001 September 11 attacks were believed to have
a large impact on consumer confidence. And these factors can only be identified af-
terwards. Similarly, Mueller (1963) summarised the reasons why data on consumer
attitude are needed: firstly, it combines many economic factors, therefore, measur-
ing it directly is easier and more reliable. Moreover, it is not merely a reflection of
financial development. For example, it can be influenced by news, and therefore,
same stimulus may be perceived differently. Finally, it shows the impact of political
or economic events. Obviously, Katona and Mueller are implying that it may be im-
possible to study the determinants of consumer confidence since they are too many
to list (with some of them nonquantitative) and too unique to study (with some of
them unable to be known beforehand).
However, we can still make several observations from their discussions. Firstly,
consumer confidence is probably not a subjective factor after all, but instead, it is
driven by information. In other words, the rational assumption of consumers still
holds. Consumer confidence is not “animal spirit” which captures short-term human
emotions, but an implication of the impact of all the subtle information (including
June 22, 2020
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information on economy, news, political events, etc) on consumers that are relative
to their buying decisions. Or in short, determinants of consumer confidence do exist.
This view is supported by an empirical study by Barsky and Sims (2012).
Secondly, after carefully reading their works, we can easily identify a few variables
that are good candidates as the potential determinants of consumer confidence,
such as unemployment rate, stock market index, interest rate, etc. For example,
in the essay “Theory of Expectations”, Katona (1972) stated that “income or price
expectations may be influenced by taxes, interest rates, ..., etc.”
But thirdly, Katona and Mueller believe that these few macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables are unlikely to determine consumer confidence constantly well. This
has been verified in literature. Since the change in consumer confidence precedes the
change in economic and financial variables, how can we expect the latter to explain
the former well all the time?
These three observations imply that if we find a leading variable that also con-
tains information related to consumers’ buying decisions, it may be a good candidate
as the determinant of consumer confidence. Motivated by this idea, in this chap-
ter, we propose economic policy uncertainty as a potential determinant of consumer
confidence.
In particular, the reasons that we choose economic policy uncertainty as our
main variable are as follows. Firstly, economic policy uncertainty contributes to
people’s expectation about government policy. And the expectation about govern-
ment policy is one important kind of expectation that may have a substantial impact
on consumer confidence, because it affects not only personal income expectations,
but also their economic outlook (Katona, 1972). Secondly, economic policy uncer-
tainty may reflect information on many aspects, such as political events, terrorist
attacks, and news, which are related to consumer confidence but not covered by
other so called “objective” economic variables. Moreover, it may play an extremely
important role in times of crises and recessions. Unlike the commonly considered
economic variables, economic policy uncertainty is a leading indicator that implies
the lack of confidence of the government. Thirdly and most importantly, we sug-
gest that economic policy uncertainty is linked with consumer confidence through
June 22, 2020
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a special channel: economic policy uncertainty leads to consumer uncertainty, and
higher consumer uncertainty implies lower consumer confidence.
Motivated by the theoretical evidence we discussed and aligned with intuition,
we have the following hypothesis: higher economic policy uncertainty leads to lower
consumer confidence. Through VAR models and thorough analyses of the US and
European data, we study whether and to what extent economic policy uncertainty
affects consumer confidence, controlling for other economic variables; and what the
underlying mechanisms that drive the relationship between economic policy uncer-
tainty and consumer confidence are.
The results in Chapter 2 clearly show that although the majority part of con-
sumer confidence can be explained by economic policy uncertainty as well as other
more “objective” economic and financial variables, there is always a part that re-
mains unexplained. What is more, the unexplained part is much larger at business
turning points. This implies that consumer confidence contains essential and unique
information, which is not captured by other variables.
While the model we built was quite solid and robust, and in line with previous
research on this area, there is one possible determinant of consumer confidence that
was left out of the equation intentionally: the consumer confidence in other coun-
tries. From the figures and discussions in the previous chapter, we can clearly observe
similar trends for consumer confidence in different countries. They all reached their
troughs during the Global Financial Crises, and reached their peaks at similar pe-
riods as well. This leads us to wonder: how does the consumer confidence in one
country affects that in another country? What can the transmission of consumer
confidence tell us? In Chapter 3, we aim at answering these questions. In other
words, instead of focusing on the relationship between other variables and consumer
confidence, in this chapter, we focus on the consumer confidence in different coun-
tries and regions.
We believe the international transmission in consumer confidence exists for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is due to the global financial interdependence, which has been
widely studied and proven (Cooper, 1985; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Corsetti et al.,
2005), and also due to the contagion and co-movements in financial markets, which
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also attracts research interests (Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2013). In-
tuitively, the interdependence and contagion of the financial market may lead to the
interdependence and contagion of consumer confidence among different countries.
Secondly, news has an impact on global financial market (e.g., Albuquerque and
Vega (2009); Apergis (2015)). In Chapter 1, we discussed the interpretations of
consumer sentiment, and suggests that it contains information such as news that is
not included in other financial variables. A property of news is that it spreads over
country borders quickly. Therefore, it provides a good channel for the transmission
of consumer sentiment.
Thirdly, there are also social psychological reasons for the transmission of con-
sumer confidence. There is rich evidence for “herd behaviour” of investors in be-
havioural finance literature (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). This implies that under
certain circumstances, investors simply mimic the investment decisions of others. We
can easily extend this idea to general consumers. It is reasonable to suspect that
when consumers form their attitude on the willingness to buy (which is measured
by consumer confidence), they sometimes simply mimic other people’s attitudes.
In summary, based on the existing literature in the interdependence of financial
markets, the contagion in financial markets, news effects on financial markets, and
herding behaviour in social psychology, we suggest that the consumer confidence
in one country is affected by that in another country. The level of co-movement
and spillover is affected by economic, political and geographic factors. In particular,
when consumer confidence changes dramatically in one country (especially a leading
one), consumer confidence in other countries may follow the same trend.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, consumer confidence is a leading variable.
By the discussion here, the large spillover of consumer confidence may even lead the
change in consumer confidence in the majority of countries. Therefore, it may have
some predictory power, too. Large spillover of consumer confidence has predictive
power for economy.
Following the approach in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), we generate the spillover
indices among G6 countries, which is based on forecast error variance decompositions
from VAR models. We are able to discuss the direction of relationships among
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consumer sentiment in different countries. Not surprisingly, we have found that the
consumer sentiment in the US plays a central roles. We also use a VAR model to
study the relationship between total spillover and economic activity, and confirms
its leading role in predicting the latter.
In Chapter 2, we study the determinants of consumer sentiment, focusing on the
role of a new variable, Economic Policy Uncertainty. In Chapter 3, we study its
interactions among different countries. From the results, we find that the economic
variables can explain part of consumer sentiment, and our new variables have extra
explanatory powers. Nonetheless, there is part of consumer sentiment that is left to
be unexplained by other variables. This implies the consumer sentiment may have
unique information in itself, and it may have unique explanatory power on other
economic variables that may interest us. Hence, in Chapter 4, we study the effects
of consumer sentiment on other variables, or specifically, on house price. With better
understanding of the underlying mechanism of consumer confidence that we find in
Chapters 2 and 3, we may be able to provide a thorough study on sentiment’s role
on house price.
There is wide literature on the effects of consumer sentiment. Some focus on
how consumer confidence affects expenditure of durable goods. Most researchers
agree that consumer sentiment do have some unique information that helps predict
future expenditure. And on the other hand, some focus on the relationship between
sentiment and stock market performance. The general finding is that investment
sentiment affects the investment.
However, There is limited evidence on the effects of consumer sentiment on
house price, possibly because of the unique characteristics of house purchase. It
can be regarded as both a durables/services consumption, as well as an investment.
Therefore, the relationship between consumer sentiment and house price becomes
more ambiguous and complicated, and is worth studying.
Researchers have been interested in finding the determinants of house price for
a long time. Apparently, the level of demand and supply determines price. Housing
market is not an exemption. House price is determined by the demand and supply
factors. Higher demand and lower supply lead to higher house price. Following this
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idea, researchers have confirmed that the housing market is influenced by the state
of the economy, interest rates, real income and changes in the size of the population,
etc.
In addition to these economic factors, people also agree that sentiment plays a
role in house price change. But what role it plays depends on how to interpret it.
Based on Ludvigson (2004), one economic interpretation is that it captures reduced
uncertainty about future, and therefore diminishes precautionary savings motives.
As a result, consumer will save less, and consumption growth will be lower in the
future. If it is the case, consumer sentiment might be negatively related to house
price. However, this interpretation is rejected by the economic evidence.
The second interpretation proposed by Ludvigson (2004) is that consumer sen-
timent captures the expectations of future income. It is founded on the rational ex-
pectations – permanent income hypothesis (REPIH). If consumer sentiment higher,
it implies that consumer expects higher income and wealth in the future. Consump-
tion expenditure might increase today, since consumers should be able to borrow
against their future income and wealth, and smooth consumption over time. Or, if
consumers follow a “rule of thumb”, i.e., consuming current income, or if they are
liquidity constrained, they might not be able to consume right away, but will be able
to consumer more as their income because higher. This interpretation is supported
by the analysis between consumer sentiment and consumption data.
However, Ludvigson (2004) also points out that although consumer sentiment
seems to imply future income expectations, it has unique information that is not
included in income data. This is related to our findings in Chapter 2. We also
suggest that consumer sentiment is not a measure of animal instinct, but a reflection
of information (such as news) people receive that is not included in other economic or
financial variables. Based on the information, people have a better understanding of
world news and big events, world economy, the economic environment around them,
and their future income expectations. If we interpret consumer sentiment this way,
it should have a positive relationship with both people’s willingness to buy, and the
willingness to invest. Moreover, its expectation component (the prediction part)
might even have a stronger prediction power, due to the liquidation constraint at
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the current stage. Nonetheless, when consumer sentiment is higher, not only do
consumers expect to have more money, they also expect other people to have more
purchasing and investment power. Hence, we make the following hypothesis: higher
consumer sentiment leads to positive change in house price.
We use a VAR model to study the dynamics of consumer sentiment and house
price. We find that consumer sentiment is very powerful in explaining the percentage
change in house price. Then we study and compare consumer sentiment within
different income tiers, age groups, and regions. We find that the sentiment by mid-
aged people, people with higher income, and people who live in certain regions, has
the biggest explanatory power on house price change. it seems that the sentiment
of people with better knowledge and experience in housing market is more valuable
in predicting house price change. This leads us to wonder: in addition to consumer
sentiment, by adding sentiment by professionals who work in the housing market, we
might be able to find a better sentiment proxy that could have better explanatory
power on house price change.
Therefore, we proposed a two-step approach to achieve this goal. The first step
was to construct a better consumer sentiment index, that is housing specific. We
looked into the survey questions by University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers
at a micro level, and through Stepwise Regression and pairwise Granger Causality
test, we are able to determine the set of questions to be used to construct a housing
specific consumer sentiment.
Our second step is to construct a sentiment of people who are at the centre of the
housing market. We aim at providing a sentiment measure that combines consumer
sentiment (using the housing specific one we constructed), builder sentiment, realtor
sentiment, and lender sentiment. Principal Component Analysis is used for the
construction of the composite sentiment measure. And the measure turns out to
be very successful in explaining house price change, compared with other sentiment
measures.
In summary, we provide a thorough study on consumer sentiment and have
some interesting results. Our findings should be valuable for both researchers and
practitioners.
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Chapter 2
The Determinants of Consumer
Confidence: The Role of Economic
Policy Uncertainty
The recent 2008 Global Financial Crisis is regarded by many economists as the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression (Pendery, 2009). Take the US as
an example, the following Great Recession officially began in December 2007 and
lasted for 19 months. The country experienced the most persistent and severe decline
in consumption since World War II (Chatterjee and Dinda, 2015). And the recovery
path was so weak, that consumption was still below pre-recession level 2 years after
the recession officially ended. The impact of the Financial Crisis was also profound
globally, spreading from developed countries to emerging economies. For the first
quarter of 2009, the annualised rate of decline in GDP was 5.7% in US, 14.4% in
Germany, 15.2% in Japan, 7.4% in the UK, and 9.8% in the Euro area (Baily and
Elliott, 2009). Researchers and professionals have tried their best to untangle the
underlining mechanisms behind this severe and prolonged economic downturn, and
identify the important lessons that one should learn. Among these findings, most
academics and policy makers agree the erosion of confidence has ensured the depth
and longevity of the crisis (See, for example, Petev et al. (2011)). The problem of the
role consumer confidence plays in economy has been bought back to the forefront.
Consumer confidence (which is often referred to as consumer sentiment, and
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these two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis) captures the
difference in consumer attitudes when making buying decisions, while her financial
condition and the surrounding business environment stay the same. Classical finance
theory assumes rationality of the consumers (Friedman, 1957). In other words, it
disregards the role consumer attitudes play, with the assumption that the differences
in individual attitudes would cancel out. However, the theory fails to explain many
economic phenomena, such as depressions (Colander et al., 2009). In Keynes (1936)’s
revolutionary work that explained the causes of the Great Depression, he proposed
the idea of “animal spirits”, suggesting that the change in consumer taste may
influence investment. In line with this notion, Katona (1953) proposed the theory
of psychological economics, and suggested that expenditures could depend on both
the “ability to buy” and the “willingness to buy”. While the former is an objective
factor about the consumer’s financial condition, the latter captures the subjective
aspect about the consumer’s attitude.
Since the proposal of the concept of consumer confidence and the development
of its proxies, consumer confidence has been studied by a long and rich string of
literature and received constant media attention for more than 50 years. However,
researchers and analysts have yet to reach an consensus on many issues related to
consumer confidence, such as its usefulness in explaining economic phenomena, its
predictory power on future expenditure, its determinants and implications, and the
underlying mechanism. In this thesis, we will revisit and try to untangle these
important issues, by applying new research methods, using new data, and including
new variables.
In this chapter, we focus on the following research question: what drives the
changes in consumer confidence? In Katona (1972)’s opinion, consumer confidence
is a unique and complex variable constantly influenced by a large range of variables,
unique events, mass media, etc. For example, big events such as the 1990 Iraq
War and the 2001 September 11 attacks were believed to have a large impact on
consumer confidence. And these factors can only be identified afterwards. Similarly,
Mueller (1963) summarised the reasons why data on consumer attitude are needed:
firstly, it combines many economic factors, therefore, measuring it directly is easier
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and more reliable. Moreover, it is not merely a reflection of financial development.
For example, it can be influenced by news, and therefore, same stimulus may be
perceived differently. Finally, it shows the impact of political or economic events.
Obviously, Katona and Mueller are implying that it may be impossible to study the
determinants of consumer confidence since they are too many to list (with some of
them nonquantitative) and too unique to study (with some of them unable to be
known beforehand).
However, we can still make several observations from their discussions. Firstly,
consumer confidence is probably not a subjective factor after all, but instead, it is
driven by information. In other words, the rational assumption of consumers still
holds. Consumer confidence is not “animal spirit” which captures short-term human
emotions, but an implication of the impact of all the subtle information (including
information on economy, news, political events, etc) on consumers that are relative
to their buying decisions. Or in short, determinants of consumer confidence do exist.
This view is supported by an empirical study by Barsky and Sims (2012).
Secondly, after carefully reading their works, we can easily identify a few variables
that are good candidates as the potential determinants of consumer confidence,
such as unemployment rate, stock market index, interest rate, etc. For example,
in the essay “Theory of Expectations”, Katona (1972) stated that “income or price
expectations may be influenced by taxes, interest rates, ..., etc.”
But thirdly, Katona and Mueller believe that these few macroeconomic and fi-
nancial variables are unlikely to determine consumer confidence constantly well.
This has been verified in literature. In fact, most research papers focused on the im-
pact of various macroeconomic variables (such as GDP and unemployment rate) and
some financial variables (such as the stock market index) in their models which pre-
dict/explain consumer confidence. Although the research methodologies and models
and variables differ from each other, they seem to agree that just a few economic
variables can explain consumer confidence fairly well during normal situation, but
may not work well at times of economic turning points. This is quite understandable,
as consumer confidence is considered as a leading economic indicator (Smith, 2009).
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the relationship between consumer confidence and reces-
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Figure 2.1
Relationship between Consumer Confidence and Recessions in US
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Note: consumer confidence is measured by University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer
Sentiment (ICS), and the start and end dates of the recessions are defined by National Bureau of
Economic Research.
sions from 1978 to 2016. Clearly, sentiment often led economic downturns. Recent
events proved the same tendency. During the Global Financial Crisis, ICS started
to fall before April 2007, while the Stock and Watson’s monthly GDP estimates
started to fall notably from May 2008 (Lahiri and Zhao, 2011). Since the change in
consumer confidence precedes the change in economic and financial variables, how
can we expect the latter to explain the former well all the time?
These three observations imply that if we find a leading variable that also con-
tains information related to consumers’ buying decisions, it may be a good candidate
as the determinant of consumer confidence. Motivated by this idea, in this chap-
ter, we propose economic policy uncertainty as a potential determinant of consumer
confidence.
In particular, the reasons that we choose economic policy uncertainty as our main
variable are as follows. Firstly, economic policy uncertainty contributes to people’s
expectation about government policy. And the expectation about government policy
is one important kind of expectation that may have a substantial impact on consumer
confidence, because it affects not only personal income expectations, but also their
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economic outlook (Katona, 1972).
Secondly, economic policy uncertainty may reflect information on many aspects,
such as political events, terrorist attacks, and news, which are related to consumer
confidence but not covered by other so called “objective” economic variables. More-
over, it may play an extremely important role in times of crises and recessions.
During the Great Recession and the years following it, many policymakers, aca-
demics and business leaders have asserted that levels of policy uncertainty had gone
up dramatically and contributed to the depth of the recession and the weakness
of the recovery (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012). Unlike the commonly considered eco-
nomic variables, economic policy uncertainty is a leading indicator that implies the
lack of confidence of the government. Therefore, by including this variable, we may
resolve the problem that other variables fail to explain consumer confidence well at
economic turning points.
Thirdly and most importantly, we suggest that economic policy uncertainty is
linked with consumer confidence through a special channel: economic policy un-
certainty leads to consumer uncertainty, and higher consumer uncertainty implies
lower consumer confidence. The first part of this proposal is not hard to compre-
hend. The uncertainty in economic policy adds ambiguity on consumers’ perspective
about the future, and results in uncertainty in consumer attitudes. The second part
of the proposal (i.e., higher consumer uncertainty implies lower confidence) requires
some explanations, which we will elaborate in the literature review. In short, in
support of Curtin (2007)’s view, we believe consumer confidence measures both op-
timism/pessimism (i.e., the guessed trend) and uncertainty (about the guess). As
a result, since higher consumer uncertainty implies higher uncertainty about the
guess, it also implies lower consumer confidence.
We would also like to point out that the discussion also suggests that economic
policy uncertainty has additional explanatory power to consumer confidence even
when economic variables have been taken into consideration, because while the
guessed trend in buying conditions can be estimated by economic variables, the
uncertainty about the guess can only be approximated by variables such as eco-
nomic policy uncertainty indirectly. ’ To better understand the underlying mech-
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anism driving the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and consumer
confidence, we suggest the following framework:
Consumer sentiment measures two components: the objective component – ex-
pected future income, and the subjective component – uncertainty about future
income. Therefore, there are two channels to influence consumer sentiment. One is
the objective channel. If a variable can change consumer’s expected future income,
it can influence consumer sentiment. The economic and financial variables (interest
rate, inflation, GDP, etc) mainly affect consumer confidence through this channel.
Ludvigson (2004) holds this view.
The other channel is the uncertainty channel (or we can call it subjective chan-
nel). When uncertainty increases, based on Leduc and Liu (2016), expected demand
decreases and also does not income expectation. Therefore, consumer confidence de-
creases. EPU explains ICS mainly through this subjective channel. This framework
also implies the special and unique role EPU plays in determining ICS. And it can
be used in discussing ICS’s effects and transmissions.
Motivated by the theoretical evidence we discussed and aligned with intuition,
we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Higher economic policy uncertainty leads to lower consumer con-
fidence.
This hypothesis has some theoretical support. For example, Summers (2000)
suggested that political and policy uncertainty might undermine investors’ confi-
dence. However, there does not seem to be much empirical evidence on the issue.
The relationship between these two, especially the impact of policy uncertainty on
confidence, remains to be studied. In this chapter, we aim at closing this gap in
literature by providing some reliable empirical evidence on the role economic policy
uncertainty plays on confidence. More specifically, we are aiming at answering the
following research questions:
1. Whether and to what extent does economic policy uncertainty affect consumer
confidence, controlling for other economic variables?
2. What are the underlying mechanisms that drive the relationship between eco-
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nomic policy uncertainty and consumer confidence?
We will analyse several econometric models in order to answer the first research
question, and do a series of additional analyses to answer the second one. Through
the thorough data analyses and novel approaches, we can better understand the
nature of the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and confidence. We
believe our findings will provide valuable insights to both researchers and practi-
tioners.
2.1 Literature Review
In this section, we give a thorough literature review on the determinants of consumer
confidence, uncertainty measures and their relationship with other variables, and the
relationship between consumer confidence and uncertainty. In particular, we focus
on the data analysis methods, the variables included in the models, the findings,
and economic implications.
2.1.1 Literature Review on the Determinants of Consumer
Confidence
As we discussed before, when Katona first constructed the consumer sentiment index
(ICS) in 1952 to measure consumer confidence, his assumption was that expendi-
tures depend on not only consumers’ ability to buy, but also their attitude. In
1960s, several dozens of entries (since ICS was quarterly available back then) had
been collected for researchers to make meaningful quantitative analysis on consumer
confidence’s role. Not surprisingly, most early research had been focused on the effect
of consumer confidence on consumption of durable goods. However, soon afterwards,
researchers started to study the relationship between consumer confidence and many
economic factors. For example, high unemployment rate should be likely to dampen
consumer optimism and hence impact ICS. They started to wonder: is consumer
attitude merely a reflection of financial factors, or does it include important unique
information? what are the main determinants of consumer confidence?
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In the 1990s, consumer confidence regained much research interest, motivated
by the recession caused by the Gulf War. Researchers and practitioners were in-
terested in the special role consumer confidence might play during crises, and what
caused its large swing. Again, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the following
Great Recession bought the studies in consumer confidence back to the forefront.
In order to untangle the role consumer confidence plays, researchers further studied
its determinants, and also looked for answers from international evidence.
In this sub-section, we discuss the major findings on the determinants of con-
sumer confidence.
Models and Choices of Variables
In the early days, most research on consumer sentiment involved the applica-
tion of time series regression models, with a certain proxy for consumer confidence
as the dependent variable, and several predetermined macroeconomic variables as
candidates for explanatory variables. However, the regression models suffer from
spurious regression results (i.e., high R2 value but actually low correlation) because
the variables are often autoregressive. To correct for possible serial correlation, some
researchers used Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to estimate with a correction for first-
order serial correlation (Mishkin et al., 1978). In 1980, the vector autoregression
(VAR) model in economics were made popular by Sims (1980), and it has been con-
sidered as one of the most successful and flexible models for analysing multivariate
time series. In the 1990s, researchers started to apply VAR models to financial prob-
lems (Hamilton, 1994). The study on consumer confidence is no exception. Starting
from 1990s, researchers rely on VAR models to study the same problem.
Katona always stressed the importance of unique events in the determination of
consumer sentiment. However, in his discussions, variables such as income, stock
prices, and the rate of inflation, seem to influence consumer mood systematically.
Until now, there is no consensus on the “best” set of determinants. This is because
firstly, a wide range of variables could influence consumer confidence, and secondly,
researchers may reach different conclusions when their models are slightly different
(for instance, use the level of variables or their first differences). Here is a discussion
on the most common explanatory variables. The definitions of variables are from
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investopedia (http://www.investopedia.com/).
Unemployment Rate
The national unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of unemployed
workers in the total labor force. Mueller (1963) used time series regression model
to study the relationship between ICS and the variables related to unemployment
and disposable income. She found that unemployment rate explained 17% of the
variability in ICS (with a negative coefficient). She explained that unemployment
impacted ICS by dampening of consumer optimism.
Adams and Green (1965) considered a much wider set of candidate variables
that might be useful in explaining ICS. From their regression results, change in
unemployment rate explained 52.8% of the variability in ICS. They suggested that
attitudes were highly correlated with indicators relating to employment conditions.
Unemployment rate has also been included in most of the more recent works,
and has been repeatedly proved to have a negative impact on consumer confidence
(Fuhrer, 1993; Ludvigson, 2004, for example). Unemployment rate is related to the
future business conditions and personal finance outlook. Higher unemployment rate
leads to lower consumer optimism on future business conditions. It also implies
higher possibility of unemployment of the consumer, which leads to lower income
expectation. As a result, it impairs buying intentions.
Stock Market Index
Stock market index is typically a weighted average of the prices of selected stocks.
It is used by investors and financial managers to describe the market. Hymans et al.
(1970) were the first to include stock market index in the model. They suggested that
stock prices change in the previous time period, income ratio, a variable related to
inflation rate, and the ICS value in the previous time period, are all useful predictors
for ICS, with adj-R2 being 0.796. Note that they did not find stock market index
level to be useful. However, Juster et al. (1972) found that stock market index level,
together with the change in the index, are both useful in explaining ICS.
Huth et al. (1994) used VAR and Cross-Correlations of ARIMA Innovations to
analyse the data, and found that the following variables Granger cause the confidence
index: CPI, Standard & Poors 500, Dow Jones Average, and Single Family Housing
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Starts. Surprisingly, they found Unemployment Rate is Granger caused by both ICS
and its component, not vice versa.
Jansen and Nahuis (2003) performed Granger causality tests on the model con-
taining log of the stock price index and the consumer confidence index in eleven
European countries. They found that stock returns generally Granger cause con-
sumer confidence, at a very short time horizon (the results were significant in 8
countries when considering a 2 week lag, and only 4 remain significant when the lag
is a month).
Allis and McCallig (2007) studied the regression of Ireland’s consumer sentiment
on stock market returns only, and found the coefficients were positive and significant.
To summarise the common findings, stock market index is expected to have a
positive impact on consumer confidence. Stock market index is related to invest-
ment returns (and hence income), and moreover, it is an indication of investment
sentiment. Directly, higher stock market index reflects higher investor sentiment,
and investor sentiment and general consumer sentiment are often highly correlated.
More fundamentally, higher investor sentiment implies optimism on the state of its
economy, which indicate more income, and therefore, boosts consumer confidence.
Inflation Rate and Consumer Price Index
In economics, inflation is a sustained increase in the general price level of goods
and services in an economy over a period of time. Clearly, based on this definition,
different measures are available. Hymans et al. (1970) used the ratio of implicit
price deflator for personal consumption expenditures and the average deflator of the
eight previous periods in their regression model, and found a negative relationship
between this variable (which is related to inflation) and consumer confidence.
Juster et al. (1972) studied the similar model with a more extensive choices of
inflation measures. The dependent variable is the level of ICS, and the explanatory
variables include the lagged value of the dependent variable, stock market index,
change in stock market index, and various inflation measures, and their model gen-
erated R2 = 0.903. They found that inflation impacted consumer confidence. How-
ever, they also found that the results were sensitive to the selection of an inflation
measure, and the effects of inflation might be different in different time periods.
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One limitation of Hymans et al. (1970) and Juster et al. (1972) is that they
did not include unemployment rate in their model. Lovell (1975) chose a more
standard measure of inflation: the annual percentage change in the consumer price
index, and their model covered a wider selection of explanatory variables, including
annual inflation rate, unemployment rate, the annual percentage change in the stock
market index, and the lagged value of ICS. They also calculated the influence on
ICS when inflation rate and stock market index changed using real data in 1974,
and concluded that ICS was much more sensitive to inflation than to fluctuations
in the stock market.
Later, with the development of methodology, Lovell and Tien (1999a) followed
the similar approach, but used a first order autoregressive process to correct for
autocorrelated error terms. His model considered inflation rate, change in inflation
rate (not significant), unemployment rate, change in unemployment rate, change in
GDP, stock market index, and the error correction term. they reached the same
conclusion as before.
Abeele (1983) dealt with the autocorrelation problem in the residual, by consid-
ering Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure. He used lagged values of the following
variables: the stock exchange index, the unemployment rate, disposable income, and
the consumer price index. He found that variables related to consumption prices
and stock prices yield the best regressors, while the income and unemployment are
less important. He also observed that the findings were consistent among several
countries.
High inflation may signal a business cycle expansion, and high growth in the
consumer price index can be simply one manifestation of high growth in aggregate
demand. Therefore, higher price is likely to lead to lower consumer confidence. And
the increase in inflation rate, which can be calculated as the change in consumer
price index, is also likely to lead to the decrease in consumer confidence. Actually,
the summation of the unemployment rate and the annual rate of inflation is defined
as “economic discomfort index” by Arthur Okun. It approximates the impact of
economic conditions on the consumer. Clearly, we expect a negative relationship
between economic discomfort and consumer confidence.
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Interest Rate
Throop (1992) used an expanded Error Correction Model (ECM) to find the
causes of ICS. He started from Mishkin’s model, and then added some more vari-
ables, such as oil price and interest rate. He also disintegrated the ICS to the current
condition component (CIND) and the expectation component. He found that the
change in short-term interest rate and the change in unemployment rate are impor-
tant predictors of CIND, but only the change in interest rate are important for main
ICS.
Fuhrer (1993) also considered a first-order ECM model, in addition to a separate
Cointegration Model. The independent variables he considered include disposable
income, unemployment rate, inflation rate and interest rate, and the large fraction
of the information in sentiment is explained and predicted by these variables. He
also found that “the largest errors in predicting sentiment occur around business
cycle turning points”.
Acemoglu and Scott (1994) selected variables lagged dependent variable, interest
rate, inflation rate and current change in housing wealth, and were able to explain
as large as 82% of the variation in ICS. Olowofeso and Doguwa (2012) considered a
wide range of macroeconomic variables, and found exchange rate and interest rate
are negatively affecting consumer confidence.
In summary, short term interest rate has additional explanatory power on con-
sumer confidence in some models. In general, changes in interest rates have different
effects on consumer spending. On one hand, lower short term interest rate implies
lower incentive to save, as the future net benefits are discounted with a lower dis-
count rate. Therefore, it encourages consumer spending and stimulates investment.
On the other hand, lower interest rate implies the government’s effort to promote
consumption and investment, hence it is an implication of lower willingness to buy.
But how well the incentive works remains unknown. Generally speaking, the in-
centive often successfully promotes spending, and hence lower interest rate leads to
higher consumer willingness to buy.
Gross Domestic Product or Industrial Production Index
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary value of all the finished goods
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and services produced within a country’s borders in a specific time period. It is
a broad measurement of a nation’s overall economic activity. Since GPD is only
calculated on a quarterly basis, the monthly Industrial Production Index (IPI) is
often used as its proxy. In particular, IPI is an economic indicator that is released
monthly by the Federal Reserve Board, which measures the amount of output from
the manufacturing, mining, electric and gas industries. In the recent years, several
research papers have included GDP or IPI in their models as potential determinants
of consumer confidence. For example, Lovell and Tien (1999b) found that the growth
rate of GDP, together with the change in stock market index and the unemployment
rate, explain consumer confidence. In theory, higher GDP implies better business
conditions, and hence higher consumer confidence.
Disposable Income
Disposable personal income is the amount of money that households have avail-
able for spending and saving after income taxes have been accounted for. Intuitively,
consumer confidence should be closely linked with consumer’s financial conditions
and financial outlook. However, from the early days, researchers had found that
income alone was not a very good predictor of the ICS (Mueller, 1963; Abeele, 1983,
for example). This is because income is more related to people’s ability to buy, not
the willingness to buy. On the other hand, the ratio of deflated personal disposable
income in survey quarter to highest previous quarterly level (or to the average of
previous levels) was found to be a better explanatory variable (Mueller, 1963)(Hy-
mans et al., 1970). Nonetheless, many researchers still included disposable income
or its change in their models on the determinants of consumer confidence (Throop,
1992; Van Oest and Franses, 2008, etc.).
Other Variables
Researchers also considered many other variables that are potentially useful in
determining consumer confidence. Some are related to employment conditions, such
as length of average work week in manufacturing industry, new hiring rate, etc
(Adams and Green, 1965), some are related to personal financial conditions, such
as household liabilities and financial-asset holdings (Mishkin et al., 1978)
Golinelli and Parigi (2004) compared the results for more regions, including
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France, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Japan, Canada and Australia. They considered
the following explanatory variables: GDP change, inflation rate, interest rate, change
in stock market index, unemployment rate, lagged consumer confidence, exchange
rate against the US dollar, employment-population ratio, and output gap, etc. They
found that the results were country specific. The driving force of consumer confi-
dence cannot be simply summarised. Moreover, Özerkek and Çelik (2010) studied
the role of government spending on consumer confidence in six emerging market
countries (Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Turkey), and
confirmed the causal relationship.
Dées and Brinca (2013) searched for variables that Granger cause consumer
confidence in the US and Europe. Among the variables they considered, the real
consumption expenditures and real equity prices cause consumer confidence change
in the US, while logged income, unemployment rate, and foreign confidence cause
consumer confidence change in the Euro area.
We have discussed the economic variables (such as unemployment rate and in-
flation rate) and financial variables (such as stock price) that are often considered
as determinants of consumer confidence. Researchers have also considered several
variables that are related to news, political events, etc. For example, Ramalho et al.
(2011) discussed the variables that influence consumer confidence in Portugal. In ad-
dition to the economic variables commonly used in previous papers, they added the
variable electoral cycle into consideration, and confirmed its influence on consumer
confidence.
Intuitively, news may also affect consumer sentiment. Pruitt et al. (1988) pro-
posed an novel approach to studying the effect of media presentation on people’s
attitude. They asked 120 students to read news on the same issue from different
resources, and then asked them to do a survey similar to the questions for calculat-
ing ICS. Their finding was consistent with the intuition. Van Raaij (1989) provided
some theoretical analysis on this issue. Blood and Phillips (1995) found that reces-
sion headlines influenced consumer confidence. Doms and Morin (2004) pointed out
that the news media affects consumers’ perceptions of the economy through several
channels. Later on, Horner (2008) examined the role of mass media on consumer
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confidence in his PhD thesis. He claimed that attention to news about the econ-
omy was a significant predictor of individual consumer confidence. Hollanders and
Vliegenthart (2011) studied the influence of negative newspaper coverage on con-
sumer confidence in Netherland, through a computer-assisted content analysis and a
VAR model. They provided a very interesting insight: the effect of media coverage
seems to change in time. The influence is bigger during a boom and bust cycle.
Nguyen and Claus (2013) considered not only the bad news, but also the good
news. They found that their effects are asymmetric: “consumers react to bad but
not to good news”. On the contrary,Lahiri and Zhao (2013) noted that sentiment
measures do not seem to be direct reflections of political and business news. Most
recently, Igboayaka (2015) tried to use a data extraction tool called NetBase Insight
Workbench to mine data from the social media networks, and measure consumer
confidence from the results.
There were not many papers focused on this most recent Global Financial Crisis.
Petev et al. (2011) looked into data for different income groups when studying
consumption in the Great Regression, and discovered that ICS recovered sharply
for the top income group, but not for the bottom one. Hollanders and Vliegenthart
(2011) also studied the special role of media coverage in the most recent credit-crisis,
and found that it seems to have much more impact than before.
In summary, while there are no consensus on which economic variables are the
most important determinants of consumer confidence, there seem to be some agree-
ments on the following points of views:
• A small set of macroeconomic and financial variables (such as personal dis-
posable income, unemployment rate, inflation rate, interest rate, stock price,
etc) are normally able to explain a huge part of variability in the consumer
confidence index (with R̄2 > 90%) , and predict a relatively large part as well
(with R̄2 > 50%).
• Under normal circumstances, consumer sentiment often bears a stable rela-
tionship to these economic and financial variables.
• However, at times of major economic or political events, the prediction may
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divert from the true consumer confidence levels, and consumer confidence pro-
vides useful and unique information (Berry and Davey, 2004; Fuhrer, 1993;
Throop, 1992). Moreover, Fuhrer (1993) and Souleles (2004) both pointed out
that sentiment might behave differently in different business cycles.
• News also have an influence on consumer confidence.
2.1.2 Literature on Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a broad topic. For economic related uncertainty, researchers have
proposed concepts such as policy uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty, and
studied their relationships with other economic variables. For instance, Antonakakis
et al. (2012) studied the dynamic co-movements between stock market returns and
policy uncertainty, and concluded that Increased stock market volatility increases
policy uncertainty and dampens stock markets returns. Moreover, Kang and Ratti
(2013) concluded that oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty are interre-
lated and influence stock market returns. On the other hand, Li et al. (2013) found
there were weak causal relationship between Economic Policy Uncertainty and stock
returns in China and India.
Bhagat and Obreja (2013) found empirically that uncertainty had a strong neg-
ative impact on corporate employment and investment. Istrefi and Piloiu (2014)
used structural VARs to show that both long- and short-term inflation expectations
are sensitive to policy-related uncertainty shocks. On the contrary, Jones and Olson
(2013)’s multivariate DCC-GARCH model revealed that the sign of the correlation
between macroeconomic uncertainty and inflation changed from negative to positive
during the late 1990s, whereas the correlation between uncertainty and output is
consistently negative.
Ever since the publication of Economic policy uncertainty index (Baker et al.,
2015), researchers have studied its relationship with stock market (Baker et al., 2013;
Antonakakis et al., 2012), recessions and business cycles (Baker et al., 2012; Benati,
2013; Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014), unemployment (Caggiano et al., 2013; Bakas
et al., 2016), volatility, macroeconomic uncertainty and other uncertainty measures
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(Bailey et al., 2012; Amengual and Xiu, 2014; Creal and Wu, 2014), etc. There is
some evidence that shows that economic policy uncertainty has a negative relation-
ship with the stock market performance, a positive relationship with unemployment
rate, and contributes to the prolonged recessions.
2.1.3 Relationship between Consumer Confidence and Un-
certainty
While many researchers (Tobin (1972), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) among
others) view consumer confidence as a measure of optimism/pessimism on business
conditions, many others suggest that consumer confidence measures uncertainty.
For example, Juster and Wachtel (1972) claimed that “ the sentiment index really
stands for uncertainty”. Similarly, Mishkin et al. (1978) suggested that “sentiment
measures consumers’ perceptions of the probability of financial distress”, and Car-
roll et al. (1994) also concluded that sentiment is, in part, a measure of uncertainty.
Throop (1992) and many others are also supporters of this view. There are also
many studies that did not distinguish these two concepts. For example, Katona
(1951) made the following tentative generalisation: “pessimism, insecurity, expec-
tation of income declines or bad times in the near future promote saving”. Here,
insecurity probably stands for uncertainty. However, there is actually a clear dis-
tinction between optimism/pessimism and uncertainty. To put it simply, the former
refers to the “expected value” of the assessment and prediction on personal financial
and general economic conditions, while the latter refers to the “variance” of such
assessment and prediction. We think consumer confidence measures both. This
view is shared by Curtin (2007). He suggested that the forecast of the future buying
conditions has two components – the guessed trend, and the uncertainty about the
guess.
There are limited research on the relationship between consumer confidence and
economic policy uncertainty. Probably the closed one was Baker’s paper, which
points out the similarity of the two indexes (Baker et al., 2015).
However, from the existing literature we discussed in the previous two sections,
we can conclude that there are at least some indirect links between consumer con-
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fidence and uncertainty: for instance, both consumer confidence and uncertainty
have a close relationship with stock market index. Higher uncertainty leads to lower
stock market index, which leads to lower consumer confidence. And similarly, they
are both correlated with unemployment, inflation, and other variables. On the other
hand, consumer confidence is closely linked with media coverage. Uncertainty can be
measured by counting the words “uncertainty” on newspapers. Therefore, through
the media channel, uncertainty can impact consumer confidence. These findings
provide some theoretical support to our hypothesis.
However, the limitations of the literature are also obvious. In the existing models
that study consumer confidence, the researchers often focused on a few macroeco-
nomic and financial variables. The only exception was that in a few studies, they
also examined the role of media data. Nonetheless, the relationship between uncer-
tainty and consumer confidence is yet to be studied. There are no empirical evidence
on this issue. Moreover, most studies were based on the US data only. Whether
their findings are country specific or universal is yet to be examined. Our study
will fill in these gaps in literature by examining the relationship between economic
policy uncertainty and consumer confidence directly through a thorough empirical
study in two largest economies in the world, US and Europe.
2.2 Data
Our main focus is to study the influence of economic policy uncertainty on consumer
confidence when other economic variables are controlled for. To do this, we first need
to introduce what control variables we decide to include in our models, and how
the two main variables, which measure economic policy uncertainty and consumer
confidence, respectively, are calculated.
Unlike most existing studies, which focus on the US data only, we analyse data
for two largest economies in the world, United States and Europe, respectively. By
comparing the similarities and differences in the findings between these two areas,
we can better understand the role economic policy uncertainty plays on consumer
confidence.
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2.2.1 Measurements of Consumer Confidence
US Consumer Confidence Measure
For the US, University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (ICS) is used as
a proxy for consumer confidence in this study. Although there is no consensus
on how to measure consumer confidence, ICS is the most widely used proxy for
consumer confidence in literature. It is the first survey based index that aims at
measuring consumer confidence, and has been proven useful in serving this goal.
The index has been generated based on at least 500 consumers’ phone responses to
five questions about current and expected personal/overall economic conditions. It
was first introduced in 1946 and provided annually. It became quarterly available
from 1952 to 1977, and monthly available since 1978. The data and methodology are
available from the Survey Centre’s website (data.sca.isr.umich.edu). In brief,
ICS is calculated based on answers to the following five questions:
Q1 = “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.
Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse
off financially than you were a year ago?”
Q2 = “Now looking ahead–do you think that a year from now you (and your
family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the
same as now?”
Q3 = “Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole–do you think
that during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad
times, or what?”
Q4 = “Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely–that in the country
as a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so,
or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or
what?”
Q5 = “About the big things people buy for their homes–such as furniture, a
refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you
think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?”
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Questions Q1 through Q5 (expect for Q4) are multiple choice questions, whose
choices include favourable, unfavourable, neutral, and uncertain opinions. On the
other hand, Q4 is an open-end question. But still, the interviewers group the answers
as favourable, unfavourable, neutral, and uncertain replies.
First, for each of the five index questions, the relative score is calculated, by
taking the percent giving favourable replies minus the percent giving unfavourable
replies, plus 100. We denote the relative scores as y1, y2, ..., y5. Clearly, Q1 and
Q5 are related to the current situation, while the rest three questions are related
to future expectations. Officially, the Index of Current Economic Conditions (ICC)
and the Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) are calculated as follows:
ICC =
y1 + y5
2.6424
+ 2.0, ICE =
y2 + y3 + y4
4.1134
+ 2.0.
In other words, ICC is the current component of ICS, and ICE is the expected
component of ICS. Similarly, ICS is calculated using the following formula:
ICS =
y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 + y5
6.7558
+ 2.0.
We can observe that all the related questions are given equal weights when ICS and
its current/expected components are calculated.
The questions and components are summarised in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
US Consumer Confidence Measure (ICS) and its Components
Aggregated Index Decomposition Further Decomposition
Current Component Personal Finance Current (y1)
Index of Consumer ICC ∼ (y1 + y5) Buying Conditions (y5)
Sentiment ICS ∼ (y1 Expected Component Personal Finance in 12 Months (y2)
+y2 + y3 + y4 + y5) ICE ∼ (y2 + y3 + y4) Business Condition in 12 Months (y3)
Business Condition in 5 Years (y4)
Note: xi denotes relative scores of question Qi (i = 1, 2, ..., 5).
European Consumer Confidence Measure
For Europe, Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) by European Commission is used
as the measurement of consumer confidence in this study. The harmonised surveys
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are carried out at national level by partner institutes for different sectors of the
economies (including consumers, industry, services, retail trade and construction) in
the European Union (EU) and in the applicant countries. The surveys are conducted
according to a common methodology, which consists essentially of harmonised ques-
tionnaires and a common timetable. EU aggregate replies to the questionnaires are
calculated as weighted averages of the country-aggregate replies. The weights are
the shares of each of the Member States in an EU reference series.
The survey on consumers was launched in 1972. The sample sizes differ by
country, but for the whole EU, around 41060 consumers are interviewed monthly.
the index is calculated from the answers to four forward looking questions. The
data are available from European Commission’s website (ec.europa.eu). In brief,
for each country, CCI is calculated from the answers to the following four questions.
Q1 = “How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over
the next 12 months?”
Q2 = “How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to de-
velop over the next 12 months?”
Q3 = “How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to
change over the next 12 months?”
Q4 = “Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money?”
The relative score (which is called “balance” in the official guide) of question i
is calculated as follows:
xi = PP +
P
2
− (N
2
+NN),
where PP, P, N, and NN denote the percentages of respondents having chosen re-
spectively the option “very positive”, “slightly positive”, “slightly negative” and
“very negative”. And CCI is the arithmetic average of the balances, i.e.,
CCI = (y1 + y2 − y3 + y4)/4.
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Note that the sign before y3 (unemployment rate) is negative.
Obviously, unlike ICS, all the four questions used to calculate CCI are forward
looking. Since CCI is the most commonly used consumer confidence measure in
Europe, we will use use it in our main analysis. However, in the additional analyses
section, in order to compare the effects of EPU on current and expected components,
we collected balance data for the following additional questions included in the same
consumer questionnaire, which are quite similar to the US questions on current
situation.
Q5 = “How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12
months?”
Q6 = “In view of the general economic situation, do you think that now it is the
right moment for people to make major purchases such as furniture, electri-
cal/electronic devices, etc.?”
Therefore, we can construct the US-equivalent current component of consumer
confidence, the US-equivalent expected component of consumer confidence, and the
US-equivalent ICS as follows:
ICC = y5 + y6, ICEequiv = y1 + y2, ICSequiv = y1 + y2 + y5 + y6.
We would like to point out that in the European survey, there is no equivalent
question to US Q4. The questions used to calculated CCI and the questions that
are similar to the ones used to calculate ICS, are summarised in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
European Consumer Confidence Measure (CCI) and its Components
Aggregated Index Decomposition Further Decomposition
Consumer Confidence Current Component Personal Finance Current (y5)
Index CCI ∼ (y1 ICC ∼ (y5 + y6) Buying Conditions (y6)
+y2 + y3 + y4) Expected Component Personal Finance in 12 Months (y1)
ICE ∼ CCI Business Condition in 12 Months (y2)
ICSequiv ∼ (y1 Unemployment Rate in 12 Months (y3)
+y2 + y5 + y6) ICEequiv ∼ (y1 + y2) Saving Money in 12 Months (y4)
Note: xi denotes balance scores of question Qi (i = 1, 2, ..., 6), which can be found in the Data
section.
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Finally, we would like to point out that the names of the two components could
be a bit misleading. In fact, the “current” component is like the more “objective”
component, which is based on the known facts or expectations (such as the current
income, or the current business condition). On the other hand, the “expected”
component does not provide an unbiased expectation. In fact, it is more like the
“subjective” component, which is based on consumers’ predictions and guesses (such
as future income, etc). Therefore, after studying the determinants of ICS and CCI,
it is worth studying the determinants of their current and expected components,
and compare the results. We will do this in section 2.5.1.
2.2.2 Measurements of Economic Policy Uncertainty
We use the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) as a proxy for economic
policy uncertainty in this study. EPU is proposed and provided by a group of
scholars from Northwestern, Stanford and University of Michigan monthly for many
countries. The data and methodology are available from the EPU website (www.
policyuncertainty.com).
US Economic Policy Uncertainty Measure
To measure policy-related economic uncertainty in the US, the above mentioned
scholars construct an index from three types of underlying components: newspaper
coverage, disagreement among economic forecasters for the US, and the number of
federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years.
The first component, news coverage about policy-related economic uncertainty,
has the highest weight of 0.5 when calculating the overall index. It is an index of
search results from 10 large newspapers. Month-by-month searches of each paper
is performed, starting in January of 1985, for terms related to economic and policy
uncertainty. In particular, they search for articles containing all the following three
types of terms: the term related to uncertainty (‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertain’), the
term related to the economy (‘economic’ or ‘economy’) and one or more of the
terms related to policy (‘congress’, ‘legislation’, ‘white house’, ‘regulation’, ‘federal
reserve’, or ‘deficit’). Results are normalised to an average value of 100 from January
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1985 through December 2009.
There are two components drawn on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s
Survey of Professional Forecasters, each with a weight 1/6. The second component
is the dispersion in the forecasts of purchase of goods and services by governments,
and the third component is the dispersion in the forecast of consumer price index
(CPI).
Finally, the fourth component is the temporary tax measures, also with a weight
1/6, which are a source of uncertainty for businesses and households because Congress
often extends them at the last minute, undermining stability in and certainty about
the tax code.
For the US, the overall EPU index is a weighted average of the four components.
Both the EPU index values and the component values are provided for free monthly.
In addition, categorical data are also available, which include a range of sub-indexes
based solely on news data. Each sub-index requires our economic, uncertainty,
and policy terms as well as a set of categorical policy terms. In other words, the
searched results from a certain category are a subset of the results from the news-
based component. However, the searched results from two categories may (partially)
overlap with each other. The US EPU, its components, and categorical data, are
summarised in are summarised in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3
US Economic Policy Uncertainty Measure (EPU), its Components, and
Sub-categories
EPU EPU Components News Based Categories Category Keywords
News Based Policy Economic Policy Uncertainty (c1) economic, policy, uncertainty
Uncertainty Index Monetary policy (c2) c1+ the fed, central bank, etc
(x1 ∼ c1) Taxes (c3) c1+ tax, taxation, etc
EPU = Fed/State/Local Government spending (c4) c1+ government spending, etc
Purchase Health care (c5) c1+ health insurance, etc
1
2x1 +
1
6x2 disagreement (x2) National security (c6) c1+ terrorism, war, etc
Entitlement programs (c7) c1+ welfare reform, etc
+16x3 +
1
6x4 CPI disagreement (x3) Regulation (c8) c1+ regulation, etc
Trade policy (c9) c1+ import/trade duty, etc
Sovereign debt, currency crises (c10) c1+ currency crisis, etc
Tax expiration (x4) Financial Regulation (c11) c1+ banking supervision, etc
Fiscal Policy (c12) c1+ fiscal stimulus, etc
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European Economic Policy Uncertainty Measure
For countries other than the US, the EPU indexes are all news based only. The
calculation method is in the same manner as the news based EPU index for the US
(i.e., x1). For the European-wide EPU index, results from 10 European newspa-
pers (two newspapers per country, for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and UK) are
averaged with equal weights.
2.2.3 Control Variables
If we only consider two variables (i.e., ICS/CCI and EPU) in our model, we are
disregarding the possibility that the information contained in uncertainty is already
contained in other variables. Therefore, we also include macroeconomic and financial
variables that are most widely used in the models on the determinants of consumer
confidence (as discussed in the Literature Review section). In particular, we carefully
choose the following variables:
• Disposable Personal Income (INC): seasonally adjusted monthly data of dis-
posable personal income per capita at constant price. Unfortunately, the In-
come data for Europe is only available quarterly. We obtain monthly estimates
by taking weighted averages between two values in adjacent quarters (i.e., by
linear interpolation method).
• Industrial Production Index (IPI): monthly data that measures the real pro-
duction output of manufacturing, mining, and utilities. It can be used as a
proxy for gross domestic product (GDP), which is only available quarterly.
• Consumer Price Index (CPI): monthly data that measures changes in the
price level of a market basket of consumer goods and services purchased by
households. Its first difference denotes inflation rate (INF). Note that this is
different from the third component of EPU, because in the EPU, the dispersion
(or variance) of CPI instead of the value is used.
• Interest Rate (INT): monthly data of the 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate for the
US, and European Central Bank’s 3-month Interbank offered rate for Europe.
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• Stock Market Index (STO): month-end S &P 500 Composite Price Index for
the US, and S &P EUROPE 350 INDEX for Europe.
• Unemployment Rate (UNE): monthly data that measures percentage in labour
force that are unemployed.
Data for all the six control variables are downloaded from DataStream.
2.2.4 Summary Statistics
At this stage, we focus on the aggregated main variables (ICS/CCI, and EPU)
only, but not their components. For both US and Europe, we collect monthly data
(including two main variables, ICS/CCI and EPU, and six control variables) from the
earliest date when all data became available, to the most recent possible date. The
dataset starts in January 1985 and ends in May 2016 for the US (377 observations in
total), and from January 1991 to April 2016 for Europe (304 observations in total).
Before we provide summary statistics, we first explain how we process the data.
Our first step is to take the natural log for INCOME and IPI. There are many reasons
for this. Firstly, it makes perfect sense Intuitively. An income increase from 0 to 1,
and an income increase from 10000 to 10001, should have different effects. Similarly,
the impact scale of the change in IPI is not linear as well. On the other hand, it is
a better approximation that IPI (and GDP) changes multiplicatively than that it
changes additively. Secondly, in a technical point of view, these variables are likely
to be heteroskedastic, and not normally distributed. Taking the logs might resolve
these issues, and hence make regression results believable. Thirdly, it is a common
practice in econometrics. Many elasticity models (log-log models), linear-log models,
or log-linear models have become a standard. In these models, variables such as
income, expenditure, GDP are logged. In literature regarding consumer confidence
in particular, many research papers also chose to take logs of these variables.
Then, we determine whether to use the level or the first difference of each vari-
able. Since there is no consensus among the researchers, we decide to make our
decisions based on both the variables’ stationarity, and their actual meanings. If
a series is not stationary, indicated from the unit root test results, the regression
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results may be spurious (i.e., apparently high degree of fit but actually low correla-
tion) (Granger and Newbold, 1974). However, there are also arguments on whether
each series has to be stationary in regression or vector autoregression models, be-
cause the meaningfulness of the equations is also very important. Therefore, for
each non-stationary variable, we will only use its first difference in our models if it
makes sense.
The unit test results for both US and Europe are shown in Table 2.4. From the
results, we can see that the results for US and Europe are quite consistent. At test
critical value 10%, all the control variables except for the unemployment rate are
nonstationary, while EPU, ICS and UNE are stationary. The first differences for all
the variables are stationary. We have tried the model with levels of all variables,
and the results are indeed spurious (adj-R2 >> Durbin-Watson stat d, see Granger
and Newbold (1974); Min (2019)). Among the nonstationary control variables, for
some of them, it makes sense to use their change to explain the level of ICS. For
example, income itself has an increasing trend in a long run, but it does not imply
ICS should have the same trend. The change in income shows how it derives from
the ordinary (increasing) trend, and this value should have an influence on the value
of ICS. The same is true for CPI, IPI and Stock Market Index, which all have an
increasing trend in the long run. On the other hand, we do not expect interest rate
to have a monotonic trend in the long run (although the data for our chosen period
seem to show a decreasing trend). Based on the stationarity results and the nature
of the variables, we finally decide to use the first differences for these four control
variables (CPI, logged Income, logged IPI, and Stock Market Index), and use the
levels for four other variables (EPU, ICS, unemployment rate and interest rate).
In summary, our model includes the following seven variables: ICS/CCI, EPU,
INF (∆CPI), ∆ log(INC), ∆ log(IPI), INT, ∆STO, and UNE. We plot the time
series for all the variables in Figure 2.2. The summary statistics are reported in
Table 2.5. From the figures, we can see that for both countries, after taking the
first differences, variables INF, ∆ log(INC), ∆ log(IPI), and ∆STO no longer seem
to be autocorrelated, have a monotonic trend, or be nonstationary. Some control
variables have large Kurtosis. This is often due to the fact that the majority of the
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Table 2.4
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results
Panel A: ADF Unit Root Test Results for US
Null Hypothesis: There is a unit root.
ICS EPU CPI log(INC) log(IPI) INT STO UNE
p-value for the levels of variables:
0.019 0.008 0.85 0.61 0.42 0.50 0.93 0.058
p-value for the first differences of variables:
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: ADF Unit Root Test Results for Europe
Null Hypothesis: There is a unit root.
CCI EPU CPI log(INC) log(IPI) INT STO UNE
p-value for the levels of variables:
0.098 0.0008 0.75 0.75 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.077
p-value for the first differences of variables:
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
Note: ICS = Index of Consumer Sentiment for US by University of Michigan. CCI = Consumer
Confidence Index for Europe by European Commission. EPU = the Economic Policy Uncertainty
Index. CPI = Consumer Price Index. (INF = inflation rate, or first difference of CPI.) INC =
disposable personal income. IPI = Industrial Production Index. INT = 3-Month interest rate.
STO = Month-end Stock Market Index. UNE = unemployment rate. All are monthly data from
Jan 1985 to May 2016 for US and from Jan 1991 to April 2016 for Europe. Automatic lag length
selection based on Schwarz information criterion: 0 to 16.
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values are concentrated around the mean and there are occasional values far from
the mean.
Based on the information from the Data Section, we can calculate the theoretical
range of ICS for US. The relative score of a question can range from 0 (100%
unfavourable answers) to 200 (100% favourable answers). According to the equation
in which ICS is calculated from the relative scores, ICS can range from 2 to 150, when
neutral value 76 (when the favourable and unfavourable replies are equal). From
Table 2.5 (Panel A), we can observe that the actual ICS ranges from 55.3 (indicating
28% more unfavourable answers to favourable ones) to 112.0 (indicating 48.6% more
favourable answers to unfavourable ones), with average value 87.4 (indicating 15%
more favourable answers than unfavourable ones). This implies that in general, more
consumers have a positive opinion. The Skewness is -0.47 (comparing with Skewness
of 0 for normal or other symmetric distributions), indicating the left tail is longer
and flatter. This implies that in cases when ICS is lower than average, people can
be quite pessimistic, and ICS can be really low (note that the lowest value is 32.1
points below average). These extremely low ICS values often correspond to crises
or big events. On the other hand, when ICS is higher than average, it tends to be
slightly higher than average (note that the largest value is only 24.6 points above
average). This means that unlike crises, there are not “golden times” during which
consumers are extremely optimal. Its Kurtosis is 2.88, close to that of a normal
distribution (which is 3).
Based on the discussion in the Data Section, EPU does not have a clear range.
On one hand, the more news articles on related issues, the higher EPU is. It does not
seem to be bounded. On the other hand, the normalisation process is complicated,
which makes the discussion on the range impossible. What we can know from the
calculation process is that 100 seems to be a reference point as an average EPU
value. In fact, it shows in Table 2.5 that EPU ranges from 57.2 to 245.1, with mean
107.6. The positive Skewness (0.98), indicating a much long and flatter right tail.
This implies that when uncertainty is high, the data takes larger range. This means
that in certain cases, the economic policy is extremely uncertainty, deviating from
the average. These cases probably correspond to crises or big events that result in
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huge uncertainty about economic policies. Its Kurtosis, 3.80, is also not quite far
from a normal distribution.
For all the data, the Jarque-Bera statistic results did not reject the hypotheses
of normal distributions.
Table 2.5
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics for US
ICS EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
Mean 87.4 107.6 0.36 0.0014 0.0016 3.57 4.99 6.10
Median 90.4 100.4 0.40 0.0016 0.0019 3.96 6.86 5.70
Maximum 112.0 245.1 2.70 0.0462 0.0203 9.20 177.33 10.00
Minimum 55.3 57.2 -3.84 -0.0669 -0.0440 -0.01 -284.86 3.80
Std. Dev. 11.9 32.0 0.50 0.0080 0.0062 2.65 46.63 1.46
Skewness -0.47 0.98 -1.75 -1.19 -1.68 0.03 -0.90 0.84
Kurtosis 2.88 3.80 19.74 24.96 12.44 1.78 8.27 3.09
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Europe
CCI EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
Mean -11.9 122.1 0.13 0.0010 0.0006 3.73 5.97 9.71
Median -11.6 108.4 0.14 0.0010 0.0012 3.36 15.02 9.90
Maximum 1.6 304.6 1.27 0.0280 0.0238 11.82 451.03 12.10
Minimum -32.5 47.7 -1.54 -0.0126 -0.0415 -0.25 -396.49 7.20
Std. Dev. 7.2 48.7 0.33 0.0027 0.0096 2.99 114.41 1.27
Skewness -0.47 0.96 -0.79 2.37 -0.72 0.88 -0.41 -0.11
Kurtosis 2.81 3.43 8.85 42.92 5.26 3.19 4.72 1.99
Note: Refer to Table 2.4 for variable notation.
For the main variable ICS, we can observe from Figure 2.2 that it dropped
sharply in around 1990 (due to Gulf War) and from 2007 to 2009 (due to the Global
Financial Crisis). Among the sharp drops, the most recent Global Financial Crisis
seems to have the largest and the most prolonged impact. ICS reached its historical
low in November 2008 (at value 55.3) after over a year’s almost monotonic decrease.
Around the same time, economic variables such as IPI and STO also suffered from
large drops. ∆IPI reached its historical low in September 2008, and ∆STO, in
October 2008. Apparently, we should be able to explain the low value of ICS in
November 2008 by economic variables such as ∆ log(IPI) and ∆STO.
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Figure 2.2
Time Series for all the Variables
(a) Time Series for US
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(b) Time Series for Europe
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
CCI
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
EPU
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
INF
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
D(LOG(INC))
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
D(LOG(IPI))
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
INT
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
D(STO)
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
UNE
Note: Refer to Table 2.4 for variable notation.
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Figure 2.3
Time Series for Main Variables
(a) Normalised ICS and EPU for US
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The recovery of ICS is also quite slow, which takes more than five years. Inter-
estingly, ICS dropped again to a nearly historical low value in August 2011 (at value
55.8), when the Great Recession was already officially ended (according to NBER’s
Business Cycle Dating Committee, the Great Recession started in December 2007,
and ended in June 2009). This shows that consumers were as pessimistic about the
US economy as they were in the middle of the Great Recession. Unlike the Septem-
ber 2008 case, we do not find STO and IPI to decrease rapidly around August 2011.
Therefore, we can no longer explain the extremely low value of ICS in November
2008 by economic variables such as ∆ log(IPI) and ∆STO. Instead, among the time
series of all the variables, we find that EPU reached its historical high in August
2011, which makes it a very useful candidate as an explanatory variable for ICS.
To visualise the relationship between ICS and EPU, we rescaled their values
linearly to [0, 1] (let ŷ = y−min(y)
max(y)−min(y)), and plot them in the same graph (Figure
2.3 (a)). Apparently, they tend to move in opposite directions. A large swing in
ICS often corresponds to a large swing (in the opposite direction) in EPU, and
sometimes, the latter leads the former slightly (for example, a local high in EPU in
September 1998 corresponds to a local low in ICS in October 1998).
The summary statistics of the European data are reported in Table 2.5 (Panel
B). The values of CCI are not directly compatible to ICS in the US due to different
benchmarks and calculation methods. Concerning the range of CCI, the possible
values it can take ranges from -100 (100% strong unfavourable answers) to 100 (100%
strong favourable answers), with neutral value 0 (same percentage of favourable and
unfavourable answers). The actual index ranges from -32.5 to 1.6, with average -
11.9. Unlike ICS for US, CCI for Europe is below the neural value most of the time,
and has lower variance. When we check the answers to the individual questions, it
can be confirmed that more people chose “slightly negative” and “very negative”
answers than positive ones most of the time (except for Q4, where more people
expect a saving). This implies that on average, the European consumers might
be more pessimal about the economic and buying conditions than US consumers.
We also checked the country specific answers, and found that the results differ from
countries. For example, CCI of Denmark is much higher (with average 5.7) than CCI
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of Greece (with average -37). The diverse results were also discussed in Lemmens
et al. (2007). The Skewness and Kurtosis of ICS and CCI are quite similar. In
Figure 2.3 (c), we rescaled European CCI and US ICS to [0, 1], and plotted the
two time series on the same graph. Interestingly, it clearly shows the similarity of
the two series, and CCI for Europe tends to change in the same direction as ICS
for US (sometimes with a small lag). The similarity of the two time series shows
that although European consumers are generally more pessimal than US consumers,
the change in their confidence still provides similar information to the change in US
consumers’ confidence.
On the other hand, EPU for Europe ranges from 47.7 to 304.6, with average
122.1. It has higher average and variance than the EPU for US. In other words, the
uncertainty level in economic policy tends to be higher in Europe than in the US.
The Skewness and Kurtosis are similar to that of US data. After rescaling the EPU
time series for both areas and plotting them together (In Figure 2.3 (c)), we can
clearly see that these two time series tends to move in same directions, and unlike
ICS/CCI, there are no obvious lags between the movements for US and Europe.
Figure 2.3 (b) plotted the rescaled European CCI and EPU together. Similar to the
US data, they tend to move in opposite directions. However, the relationship is not
as clear as the US one shown in Figure 2.3 (a).
Finally, from Figure 2.2, we may notice some similarities in EPU and UNE.
It is quite intuitive, because both higher EPU and higher unemployment rate are
likely to be associated with worse economy. However, EPU is much more fluctuated,
and the distinctions are clear. Therefore, it is interesting to study the additional
explanatory power of EPU on ICS/CCI controlling for UNE.
2.3 Methodology
Our objective is to test the hypothesis about the relationship between economic
policy uncertainty and consumer confidence: higher EPU leads to lower ICS. In
the Data Section, we already found some evidence. In this section, we explain the
complete data analysis procedure we shall take in search for the empirical evidence,
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which includes calculation of correlation, regression analysis, and Vector Autoregres-
sion (VAR) model analysis. Under the VAR model, we performed granger causality
tests, impulse response analysis, and variance decomposition. Our choices of ap-
proaches were based on the characteristics of the data and the existing literature.
2.3.1 Correlation
We first calculate the correlation matrix for all the variables. We are especially
interested in the correlation between two main variables corr(y, x), where y is a
consumer confidence measure and x is an economic policy uncertainty measure. At
this stage, y=ICS/CCI, and x=EPU. Based on our hypothesis, we expect their
correlation to be large and significantly negative.
The correlation does not tell us how well several lags of EPUs can explain
ICS/CCI, nor can it tell us the extra explanatory power of EPU on ICS/CCI given
control variables. Therefore, we move to a regression model.
2.3.2 Regression Model
We then focus on the following regression model in Equation 2.3.1. In the equation,
t denotes the time period (monthly), and T ∗ denotes the optimal number of lags
according to Akaike information criterion (with maximal number of lags for con-
sideration being 10). Z denotes the controlled variable vector, {INF, ∆(log(INC)),
∆(log(IPI)), INT, ∆STO, and UNE}. Again, at this stage, dependent variable
y=ICS/CCI, and the main variable x=EPU.
yt = α +
T ∗∑
i=1
βixt−i + γZt−1 + ε (2.3.1)
We are interested in the sign of the coefficients of the lagged values of EPU, or∑T ∗
i=1 βi. We expect it to be negative and significant. We are also interested in the
(extra) explanatory power of EPU. To do this, we further consider the following two
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regression equations:
yt = α + γZt−1 + ε (2.3.2)
yt = α +
T ∗∑
i=1
βixt−i + ε (2.3.3)
We will calculate the change in adj-R2 from Model 2.3.2 to Model 2.3.1, and this
value shows the extra explanatory power of EPU on ICS/CCI. We will also record
adj-R2 of Model 2.3.3, which implies how much variance of ICS/CCI can EPU alone
explain.
The regression models help us test our hypothesis in several angles. However,
there are several limitations: firstly, they suffer from autocorrelation problem. Sec-
ondly, they do not tell us whether the relationship is causal. Thirdly, they do not
allow us to check when there is a shock in EPU, how ICS/CCI would respond to it.
These limitations can be overcome by a vector autoregression model. Therefore, we
proceed to the vector autoregression model.
2.3.3 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model
Our VAR model is similar to the regression model. We regard all variables (a
consumer confidence measure, an economic policy uncertainty measure, and six
other variables) as endogenous variables. The model has the following format:
Yt = A0 +
T ∗∑
i=1
AiYt−i + ut,
where Yt denotes the endogenous variable vector, ut denotes the error vector that
satisfies certain criteria, Ai denotes the coefficient vector, and T
∗ denotes the optimal
number of lags. In particular, we consider the following three models: Model (1):
Y = {y, x, Z}, where Z is defined in the regression model. Model (2): Y = {y, Z}.
And Model (3): Y = {y, x}. Again, at this stage, y =ICS/CCI, and x =EPU.
Please note that since there is not enough knowledge and theory to suggest
restrictions to orthogonalizes the errors, we are not setting up a structural VAR
model. Using the reduced form VAR model is a common approach in literature
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(Barsky and Sims, 2012). We can still interpret results such as impulse response
functions in terms of the displacement of forecasts implied by unexpected movements
in the variables. Because once we know the reduced-form shocks and how they have
affected today’s value of the variables, we can use the reduced-form coefficients to
forecast.
Under the VAR model, we first record coefficient and adj-R2 values just as in
the regression model.
Once we have estimated a VAR model, we are also able to analyse its properties
using structural analysis, which includes three interdependent approaches. The first
approach is the Granger causality test. We do both pairwise Granger causality
test between the main variables, and Granger causality test for the complete model
(with control variables). In particular, to test whether EPU pairwise Granger causes
ICS/CCI, we consider the following model:
yt = a0(1) +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)xt−i + ut(1). (2.3.4)
And to test whether EPU Granger causes ICS/CCI in the complete model, we
consider the following model:
yt = a0(1) +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)xt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
Bi(1)Zt−i + ut(1). (2.3.5)
In both cases, we test the joint hypothesis:
a1(1, 2) = a2(1, 2) = ... = aT ∗(1, 2) = 0,
with Null hypothesis being x does not Granger cause y.
Secondly, under the VAR model, we also obtain the impulse response functions
(IRF). The IRF gives the jth-period response when the system is shocked by a one-
standard-deviation shock. We are interested in tracing the dynamics of ICS/CCI
to a shock to EPU. We expect that a shock to EPU causes ICS/CCI to change
negatively temporarily.
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Finally, we perform variance decomposition. While impulse response functions
trace the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable on to the other variables in
the VAR, variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable
into the component shocks to the VAR. Thus, the variance decomposition provides
information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting
the variables in the VAR. In particular, we focus on the decomposition of ICS/CCI.
The variance decomposition results tell us in the short run (for example, at the 2nd
month) and in the long run (say, in 60 months, or 5 years), shock to EPU accounts
for how much variation of the fluctuation in ICS/CCI. We expect that part of the
variance of ICS/CCI is explained by EPU.
2.4 Results and Discussions
2.4.1 Correlation
Table 2.6 presents the correlations among all variables used in our study. For the
US, the correlation between ICS and EPU is -0.628 (with p−value 0.0000). For
Europe, the correlation between CCI and EPU is -0.336 (with p−value 0.0000).
From the results, we can make two observations: (1), the correlations between
ICS/CCI and EPU are negative and significant. And (2), |corr(ICSus,EPUus)| >>
|corr(CCIeu,EPUeu)|.
The first observation implies that when EPU increases, ICS/CCI tends to de-
crease. It is consistent with our hypothesis. Here we provide two possible expla-
nations for the negative correlation:
1. EPU reflects current economic conditions (for example, the government may
be more uncertain about its economic policy making when unemployment
rate is higher and the business condition is worse), and the current economic
conditions influence consumer confidence.
2. As we discussed in Introduction and Literature Review sections, EPU causes
consumer uncertainty, and consumer confidence measures uncertainty.
June 22, 2020
2.4. Results and Discussions 48
Table 2.6
Correlation Matrices
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for US
Correlation ICS EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
ICS 1
EPU -0.628 1
INF -0.008 -0.101 1
∆ log(INC) 0.120 -0.083 -0.158 1
∆(log(IPI)) 0.236 -0.201 0.061 0.073 1
INT 0.501 -0.372 0.108 0.036 0.100 1
∆STO 0.100 -0.154 0.074 0.068 0.008 -0.011 1
UNE -0.683 0.681 -0.057 -0.066 0.007 -0.462 0.054 1
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Europe
Correlation CCI EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
CCI 1
EPU -0.336 1
INF -0.032 -0.029 1
∆ log(INC) 0.180 -0.210 -0.064 1
∆(log(IPI)) 0.258 -0.113 0.005 0.001 1
INT -0.180 -0.445 0.077 0.130 -0.106 1
∆STO 0.048 -0.171 0.053 0.054 0.172 -0.026 1
UNE -0.111 0.408 -0.096 -0.151 0.128 -0.406 0.154 1
Note: Refer to Table 2.4 for variable notation.
June 22, 2020
2.4. Results and Discussions 49
The first explanation implies that although EPU and ICS/CCI may be highly
correlated, the information in EPU may already be embedded in other economic
variables (such as unemployment rate, IPI, stock market index, etc). On the other
hand, the second explanation implies that EPU affects consumer confidence through
a new channel, and even other economic variables are included in the model, EPU
should still have some additional explanatory power.
There are several approaches that can be used to prove which explanation is
closer to reality. The first approach is to study the regression model. By adding
economic and financial variables as control variables, we are able to check the addi-
tional explanatory power of EPU.
The second approach is to decompose consumer confidence to the current com-
ponent and the expected component. Study the relationship between EPU and
the consumer confidence components. If it is more closely linked with the current
component, the first explanation works better. Otherwise, the second explanation
makes more sense. We will do it as the first additional test, and discuss the results
in Additional Analyses Section.
Finally, we can study the relationship between EPU and the percentage of con-
sumers who choose the “unsure” answers in the consumer confidence surveys. The
goal is to check the validity of the second part of explanation two, i.e., consumer
confidence measures uncertainty, or in other words, more uncertainty implies lower
confidence. In particular, we want to find out whether EPU leads to higher “un-
sure” rate, and hence more neutral consumer confidence, or as the second expla-
nation claims, EPU leads to more “negative” answers, and hence lower consumer
confidence. This will be the second additional test we do, and the results will be
discussed in Additional Analyses Section.
The second observation (i.e., the correlation of EPU and Consumer Confidence
is much higher in the US than in Europe) also has a few possible explanations and
research methods. For example, since different from ICS for US, CCI for Europe is
forward looking only, maybe EPU is indeed less correlated with the expected com-
ponent of Consumer Confidence. We can make use of the ICSequiv we constructed
for Europe, and study the relationship between decomposed consumer confidence
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components and EPU in the first additional test.
Secondly, since EPU for US contains four components, but EPU for Europe is
only news based, the difference in correlation may imply the EPU for US is more
effective. To prove whether this is the case, we study the relationship between
decomposed EPU components and consumer confidence in the third additional test
in Additional Analyses Section.
The third possible explanation is that since US is the largest economy in the
world, the European CCI may be influenced more by US variables, and less by
its own EPU and economic variables. The transaction/spillover problem is quite
interesting, and will be studied in a separate chapter.
Another difference is that the European variables are weighted averages of coun-
try specific data. Lemmens et al. (2007) found that the consumer confidences among
different European countries are quite diverse. Therefore, the aggregated index may
suffer from lower correlation with aggregated EPU. However, it still makes sense to
regard Europe as one region, so that it is more comparable with the US. In fact, we
have tried to study the country-specific relationships between EPU and CCI, and
the results are mixed up.
2.4.2 Regression
The regression results are summarised in Table 2.7. The regression results show
that for the US,
∑T ∗
i=1 βi in Model 2.3.1 is -0.068 (obtained at T
∗ = 1), and it is
significant at 1% level. According to the regression equation, when EPU increases
by 10, ICS decreases by 0.68. Adj-R2 of Models 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are 0.597 and 0.582,
respectively. By adding one explanatory variable EPU, adj-R2 increases by 2.6%.
EPU alone is able to generate adj-R2 of 0.406 (obtained at T ∗ = 3). These results
imply that EPU alone can explain ICS quite well. However, taking other control
variables into account, EPU only has a small additional explanatory power on ICS.
On the other hand, for the Europe,
∑T ∗
i=1 βi in Model 2.3.1 is -0.124 (T
∗ = 6).
According to the regression equation, when EPU increases by 10, ICS decreases
by 1.24. Adj-R2 of Models 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are 0.437 and 0.173, respectively. By
adding one explanatory variable EPU, adj-R2 increases by 153%. EPU alone is
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able to generate adj-R2 of 0.144 (T ∗ = 2). Comparing with the US result, the
European results show that although EPU alone has a lower explanatory power on
CCI, the control variables also have a much lower explanatory power, and EPU has
a much larger additional explanatory power when both EPU and control variables
are included in the model. In other words, EPU influences CCI through a channel
different from other economic variables.
The other interesting observation is that the optimal number of lags of EPU
in the regression model is much bigger for Europe than for the US. The result is
compatible with our observations from the plots of these time series. While the EPU
values from the two areas tend to move in the same direction at the same time, the
CCI values for Europe tend to move in the same direction with the ICS for US, but
with a few months of delays. This means that if it is the best to explain ICS by
EPU with one lag for the US, it might be the best to explain CCI by EPU with
several lags for Europe. In other words, the results and plots imply that for Europe,
the movements in EPU tend to lead the movements in CCI for a longer period (a
few months).
Based on the regression results, it seems that the first explanation discussed
in the previous section (i.e., EPU reflects current economic conditions) seems to
work better for the US, and the second explanation (i.e., EPU causes consumer
uncertainty) seems to work better for Europe. However, we still need more evidence
from the VAR causality test and the additional tests we discussed before to better
understand the relationship between EPU and ICS/CCI. In particular, for the US,
the similarity between the two time series, EPU and UNE (unemployment rate),
may be the reason for the low additional explanatory power of EPU. Therefore,
it is important to compare the causality results among EPU, UNE, and ICS, to
understand the dynamics among these variables.
2.4.3 VAR Model
The results from the VAR models are summarised in Table 4.4. Since lagged
ICS/CCI values are added, R2 is quite high for all the models, and the additional
explanatory power by adding EPU is small. However, the results still confirm a neg-
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Table 2.7
Influence of EPU on ICS/CCI from Regression Results
With EPU only With Z only With EPU and Z Incremental
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
US 0.406 -0.253 0.000 0.582 0.597 -0.068 0.000 0.015 (2.6%)
Europe 0.144 -0.060 0.000 0.173 0.437 -0.124 0.000 0.163 (153%)
Note: Models (1) - (3) are as follows, respectively:
ICS/CCIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiEPUt−i +
∑T∗
i=1 γiZt−i + ε
ICS/CCIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 γiZt−i + ε
ICS/CCIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiEPUt−i + ε
Here, T ∗ is chosen by Akaike information criterion. For US, T ∗ = 1 for model (1) and T ∗ = 3 for
model (3), and for Europe, T ∗ = 6 for model (1), and T ∗ = 2 for model (3).
Z = {∆ log(INC),∆ log(IPI), INT,∆(STO),UNE}. Refer to Table 2.4 for variable notation.
ative relationship with ICS/CCI (i.e., negative
∑
βi values) and a small additional
explanatory power. The results are consistent with our expectations. For US and
Europe, the optimal numbers of lags according to Akaike information criterion are
2 and 7, respectively. The optimal number of lags is much bigger for Europe than
for the US, similar to the regression results, and the reason was already discussed
in the previous section. In the subsections, we interpret the VAR model by three
approaches, which can not be done in the regression model.
Table 2.8
Influence of EPU on ICS/CCI from VAR Results
With EPU only With Z only With EPU and Z Incremental
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
US 0.900 -0.004 – 0.906 0.908 -0.007 – 0.003
Europe 0.969 0.0004 – 0.973 0.975 -0.008 – 0.002
Note: Models (1) - (3) have the following form:
yt = c+A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 + · · ·+AT∗yt−T∗ + et
For Model (1), y = {ICS,EPU,Z}, where Z is defined in Table 2.7.
For Model (2), y = {ICS,Z}. For Model (3), y = {ICS,EPU}.
Here, T ∗ is the optimal number of lags chosen by Akaike information criterion. For US, T ∗ = 2
for model (1) and T ∗ = 3 for model (3), and for Europe, T ∗ = 7 for model (1), and T ∗ = 7 for
model (3).
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Granger Causality
The Granger Causality results are summarised in Table 2.9. It shows that at test
critical value 5%, both pairwise or within the complete model, for the US, EPU
Granger causes ICS, but ICS does not Granger cause EPU. And for Europe, EPU
and CCI Granger cause each other. The reason why CCI Granger causes EPU
for Europe might be that the optimal length of lags is too big (7 months), and
the joint hypothesis for Granger causality test is too tight. From these results,
we conclude that for US and European Data, EPU Granger causes ICS/CCI, and
ICS/CCI normally does not Granger cause EPU. This implies that the lagged values
of EPUs have extra explanatory power on ICS/CCI, given its own lagged values,
but not the other way around. The result is consistent with our hypothesis. The
change in EPU leads the change in consumer confidence. On the one hand, EPU
may imply the current business condition, which may cause change in consumer
confidence. On the other hand, EPU may cause consumer uncertainty, which may
change consumer confidence. In contrast, consumer confidence might also lead EPU.
Consumer confidence implies consumers’ buying intention, and hence may cause
the government’s uncertainty on economic policy. However, this part is not quite
supported by the empirical results.
Previously, from the regression result, we pointed out that for the US, the limited
additional explanatory power of EPU on ICS may due to the similarity between EPU
and unemployment rate UNE. Here, we compared their Granger causality results
in Table 2.9 Panel C. The results show that UNE does not Granger cause ICS.
And for the complete model, although UNE Granger causes ICS, ICS also Granger
causes UNE. Compared wth EPU, UNE does not seem to lead ICS as EPU does.
Therefore, EPU seems to have its unique advantage in explaining ICS. Moreover, it
implies that EPU affects ICS through a different channel rather than just implying
current economic conditions. In other words, the results show some support on our
second explanation discussed in the correlation result section.
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Table 2.9
Granger Causality Results
Panel A: Pairwise Granger Causality
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
For US:
EPU does not Granger Cause ICS 7.71 0.0000
ICS does not Granger Cause EPU 2.55 0.055
For Europe:
EPU does not Granger Cause CCI 2.89 0.0063
CCI does not Granger Cause EPU 3.38 0.0017
Panel B: Granger Causality for the Complete VAR Model
Dependent Variable Excluded Chi-sq Prob.
For US:
ICS EPU 10.4 0.0056
EPU ICS 1.41 0.4931
For Europe:
CCI EPU 25.4 0.0006
EPU CCI 14.7 0.0401
Panel C: Granger Causality between UNE and ICS for US
Pairwise:
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
For Europe:
UNE does not Granger Cause ICS 1.99 0.1149
ICS does not Granger Cause EPU 12.0 0.0000
Complete Model:
Dependent Variable Excluded Chi-sq Prob.
ICS UNE 20.1 0.0000
UNE ICS 78.2 0.0000
Note: for Panel A, optimal number of lags from model (3) is used. In particular, T ∗ = 3 for US
and T ∗ = 7 for Europe. For Panels B and C, optimal number of lags from model (1) is used.
T ∗ = 2 for US, and T ∗ = 7 for Europe.
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Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2.4 (a) shows the impulse responses between EPU and ICS in the US. When
there is a one standard-deviation shock in ICS, EPU has a negative response imme-
diately, and the shock was absorbed slowly. Cumulatively, it has a negative impact.
On the other hand, when there is a shock in EPU, ICS has a negative response in
the second month, and then the shock was completely absorbed in the 4th month.
Cumulatively, it has a significantly negative impact in the short run, but an insignif-
icant negative impact in the long run.
Figure 2.4 (b) shows the impulse responses between EPU and CCI in the Europe.
When there is a one standard-deviation shock in CCI, EPU has a negative response
immediately, and the shock was absorbed within a few months. Cumulatively, it
has a negative impact. On the other hand, when there is a shock in EPU, CCI
has a negative response in the second month, and then the shock was completely
absorbed slowly. Cumulatively, it also has a significantly negative impact in the
short run, but an insignificant negative impact in the long run. Although the time
used to absorb the shocks is somewhat different for Europe and US, the trends of
the impulse responses for US and Europe are very similar. Both show that EPU
and ICS/CCI have a negative relationship, and EPU seems to lead ICS/CCI, which
are consistent with our hypothesis and the previous results.
The shock in EPU takes longer to be absorbed by CCI for Europe than for US,
probably because the number of lags is much larger for Europe (T ∗ = 7) than for
US (T ∗ = 2). It is also quite interesting that the accumulative impulse responses
of ICS/CCI by one standard-deviation shock in EPU are insignificant in accumula-
tively, for both areas. This is actually quite intuitive. The uncertainty on economic
policies implied by EPU can be resolved when new policies are proposed or an-
nounced, and this assumption is shared by all the customers. Therefore, it does
not affect consumer confidence under accumulated short-run effects. The impact
of shocks in the short run and the long run can be further analysed by variance
decomposition, which is discussed in the next section.
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Figure 2.4
Impulse Response Results
(a) Impulse Response Results for US
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(b) Impulse Response Results for Europe
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Variance Decomposition
Table 2.10 shows the variance decomposition results. For the US, in the short run
(i.e., at the second month), a shock in EPU explains about 2.66% of the variance in
ICS, largest among all the variables except for ICS itself. In the long run (i.e., after
5 years, or 60 months), a shock in EPU explains about 1.97% of the variance in ICS.
Meanwhile, ICS’s own shock still accounts for 77.93% of its variance. Among all the
other variables, a shock in ∆ log(IPI) causes the largest fluctuation in ICS, 11.53%.
On the other hand, for Europe, EPU explains about 3.93% of the variance in CCI
in the short run, also the largest among all the variables except for CCI itself. In
the long run, EPU explains as large as 15.19% of the variance in CCI. A shock in
CCI itself only accounts for 27.61% of its long run fluctuation, and many variables
make significant contributions to the variance in CCI.
The difference between the findings for US and Europe is partially due to the
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difference in the optimal number of lags. By adding more lags to the model, variables
are linked with each other in more dimensions. But still, it implies that for Europe,
a shock in EPU can explain the variance in CCI much better than for US, especially
in the long run. In other words, European’s EPU is more useful in determining its
consumer confidence. This finding is consistent with the regression results. To find
the reasons behind it, we will proceed to the additional analyses section.
Please note that the results are sensitive to variable ordering. And also, we should
use a structured VAR model to providing more meaningful results. Nonetheless, the
results provide us with some insights and grounds for comparison. And a more solid
discussion can be done in the future when the structured VAR is constructed.
Table 2.10
Variance Decomposition Results of ICS/CCI
Panel A: Variance Decomposition Results for US
Period S.E. ICS EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
1 3.61 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 5.09 92.26 2.66 1.50 0.03 1.48 0.98 0.96 0.15
3 6.15 88.15 2.45 1.62 0.04 3.78 1.39 2.12 0.44
... ......
60 12.19 77.93 1.97 0.75 0.02 11.53 2.14 3.95 1.70
Panel B: Variance Decomposition Results for Europe
Period S.E. CCI EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE
1 1.14 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.72 93.87 3.93 0.70 0.00 0.31 0.24 0.36 0.59
3 2.21 89.07 5.58 0.52 0.11 1.20 0.51 0.89 2.11
... ......
60 7.28 27.61 15.19 18.37 8.97 10.36 6.18 0.65 12.68
Note: Cholesky Ordering: ICS/CCI EPU INF ∆ log(INC) ∆ log(IPI) INT ∆STO UNE. Refer to
Table 2.4 for variable notation.
2.4.4 Summary and Discussions
Our results show that for the US, EPU and ICS have a large negative correlation.
The regression results show that EPU has a small negative (and significant) addi-
tional explanatory power in ICS, controlling for other economic variables. From the
VAR model, EPU Granger causes ICS, but not the other way around. The impulse
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response results also show that EPU seems to lead ICS. And the variance decom-
position results confirm the small explanatory power of EPU in ICS. Overall, the
results imply that EPU is closely linked with ICS. They often move in opposite di-
rections. However, other variables can explain most changes in EPU, and therefore,
the extra explanatory power of EPU is not that large. Nonetheless, unlike other
variables, the change in EPU tends to lead the change in ICS, which makes it useful
in the model, and also implies that EPU affects ICS through a different channel
rather than simply implying current business conditions. In summary, the results
imply that EPU affects ICS in two channels. Firstly, EPU implies information also
contained in control variables. And the control variables can explain ICS quite well.
Therefore, EPU alone can explain ICS well, but adding the control variables, it only
has a small additional explanatory power. But more importantly, EPU also leads
to consumer uncertainty. And consumer uncertainty is part of consumer confidence.
Therefore, EPU tends to lead ICS, and other control variables.
For Europe, EPU and CCI have a negative correlation, but smaller than that
for US. The regression results show that EPU has a large negative (and significant)
additional explanatory power in CCI, controlling for other economic variables. From
the VAR model, EPU Granger causes ICS. The impulse response results also show
that EPU seems to lead CCI. And the variance decomposition results confirm a large
extra explanatory power of EPU in CCI. Overall, the results imply that compared
to other control variables, EPU is closely linked with CCI, by moving in opposite
directions. The results imply that EPU mainly affects CCI through the second
channel we discussed in the previous paragraph, namely, EPU leads to consumer
uncertainty. And consumer uncertainty is part of consumer confidence. Therefore,
EPU tends to lead CCI, and explain CCI in the way that the control variables
cannot. Moreover, we have discussed the reasons why the control variables can not
explain CCI well. One possibility is that CCI in Europe is affected by the variables
in US. This will be studied in a future chapter.
The other possible reasons include the validity of EPU and CCI. For example,
the EPU for US has four components, but the EPU for Europe is only news based.
Moreover, ICS for US is calculated from survey results that contain two current
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situation questions and three forward looking questions, but CCI for Europe is
based on four forward looking questions only. Furthermore, the designs of questions
and choices are different. Therefore, in the next section, we try to find our answers
through several detailed decomposed data analysis approaches.
We have suggested two channels through which EPU determines ICS/CCI. One
thing that may need further explanation is: why control variables can explain
ICS/CCI, and in what aspect does EPU impact consumer uncertainty? To an-
swer this question, we further studied the relationship between categorised EPUs
and ICS, and compared the results with the one between categorised EPUs and
producer confidence. The results are also discussed in the next section.
2.5 Additional Analyses
In the previous section, we focused on the empirical evidence on the effect of EPU
on ICS/CCI. While the main research question has been addressed, we can still
dig into the data in order to better understand the relationship between the two
variables. In this section, we provide empirical findings on the following four addi-
tional tests: (1) the effect of EPU on decomposed ICS/CCI components according
to the survey questions, (2) the effect of EPU on the percentage of “unsure” an-
swers to the ICS/CCI survey questions, (3) the effect of decomposed/categorised
EPU components on ICS, and (4) the effect of EPU and its components on pro-
ducer confidence. The first test allows us to study whether and how EPU influences
consumers’ perception about the current situation and their expectations about the
future differently. The second test verifies whether uncertainty leads to more “un-
sure” answers, or as we have suggested, leads to more “negative” answers instead.
The third test identifies the components and categories of EPU that are more im-
portant in determining ICS. Due to the availability of decomposed EPU data, this
test is only done for the US data. And the last test replaces ICS/CCI with the
confidence on the supplier side. By comparing the similarities and differences in the
results for confidence on the supplier side (which we call “producer confidence”) and
the one on the demand side (i.e., consumer confidence), we can better understand
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the nature of the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and confidence,
and the uniqueness of consumer confidence. In the following four subsections, we
discuss the ideas, motivations, methods and results of these four tests respectively.
2.5.1 Influence of Economic Policy Uncertainty on Consumer
Confidence Components
As we introduced before, ICS and CCI are both calculated from the answers to
several survey questions within a larger survey. In particular, ICS is calculated from
the answers to five survey questions, two on current situations and three on future
expectations. On the other side, CCI is calculated from the answers to four survey
questions, all of which are forward looking. Obviously, there are clear similarity and
distinctions between the two consumer confidence measures. This motivates us to
study whether and how EPU influences the current component and the expected
component of consumer confidence indexes differently.
We think higher economic policy uncertainty may imply bad economy. This
effect is linked with lower current personal finance, lower current economic condition,
higher unemployment rate, less current buying intention, etc. This effect should be
quite strong and stable. However, the relationship may not be causal, as the logic
is simply that consumers’ current situation and economic policy uncertain are both
related to current economy. It also implies that the additional explanatory power
of EPU on the current component of ICS could be limited, when other economic
variables have also been taken into consideration.
On the other hand, higher economic policy uncertainty may lead to consumer
uncertainty about the future. This effect is linked with consumer’s pessimism about
the future, lower expectations, etc. Therefore, higher economic policy uncertainty
is likely to cause lower consumers’ future expectations. In other words, unlike the
impact on the current component, the impact of EPU on the expected component
through a unique channel. Therefore, it should have some additional explanatory
power on the expected component of ICS, even when other economic variables are
controlled for. Furthermore, when the issue is resolved (for example, when new
policies are announced), economic policy uncertainty no longer exists, and the pre-
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diction about the future will be adjusted accordingly. Since people are aware of this
when they make judgments, economic policy uncertain should not affect consumers’
long run expectations as much as it does for the short term ones.
From the discussion, we expect the following findings: economic policy uncer-
tainty has a negative relationship with both the current and the expected compo-
nents of consumer confidence through different channels. It is likely to cause the
change in the expected component of consumer confidence. In addition, it should
affect the near future expectations more than the long term ones.
Methodology
In the Data Section, we have discussed how ICS for US and CCI for Europe are
calculated, and explained for Europe how an index that is equivalent to the ICS for
US can be constructed. We can decompose ICS for US (or ICSequiv for Europe,
which we will omit the subscript in the rest of the section for simplicity) to two
components: the current component (ICC), and the expected component (ICE, or
ICEequiv). We can further decompose the expected component of US to question
level, which include short-term expectation (y3) and long-term expectation (y4). Our
objective is to find out whether and how EPU determines the current and expected
components of consumer confidence differently. We also would like to check whether
EPU determines the short-run expectation and the long-run expectation differently
for the US. To achieve these objectives, we use the same approach as in the previous
section. in particular, we take the following steps in our data analysis:
1: Correlation. Calculate the correlations of ICS components and EPU, and
in particular, corr(ICC, EPU), corr(ICE, EPU). For the US, also calculate
corr(y3, EPU), and corr(y4, EPU).
2: Regression model. Replace y =ICS in Equations 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 with
ICS components. We are still interested in the sign, scale, and significance
of the coefficients of the lagged values of EPU, or
∑T ∗
i=1 βi, and the change in
adj-R2 from Model 2.3.2 to Model 2.3.1.
3: VAR model. We focus on the (pairwise) Granger Causality results between
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EPU and ICS components.
We feel these steps are sufficient for us to compare the results between ICS com-
ponents. The regression forecast model, the impulse response analysis and variance
decomposition are omitted.
Results
The Correlation results are summarised in Table 2.11. For the US, the short term
expectation is more highly correlated with EPU than the long term expectation.
interesting, in the US, the current component has higher correlation with EPU than
the expected component, but the opposite holds for Europe. We will discuss the
possible explanations after we present the regression results.
Table 2.11
Correlations of EPU and ICS components
Correlation with EPU US Europe
aggregated index ICS -0.626 -0.380
decomposition ICC (current component) -0.655 -0.322
ICE (expected component) -0.571 -0.405
further decomposition y3 (12-month expectation) -0.565
on expected component y4 (5-year expectation) -0.494
The regression results are shown in Table 2.12. From the regression results, we
can see that for the US, EPU does not have additional explanatory power on the long-
run expectation (notice that p = 0.281 when the main variable is y4). Comparing the
ICC (current component) and ICE (expected component) results, we can see that
for both US and Europe, EPU has higher relative additional explanatory power (in
percentage) on ICE than on ICC. This is consistent with our assumption. EPU
influences the expected component by providing new information on the variance
of expectations. On the other hand, EPU influences the current component by
providing information about current economic condition, which is also included in
the control variables. Therefore, EPU should be more valuable in providing unique
information for the expected component. We would also like to point out that for
the complete model for the US, the coefficient values
∑
βi are the same for ICS,
ICC and ICE. This might imply that the model is quite robust.
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Table 2.12
Influence of EPU on ICS components from Regression Results
With EPU only With Z only With EPU and Z Incremental
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
US
ICS 0.406 -0.25 0.000 0.582 0.597 -0.068 0.000 0.015 (2.5%)
ICC 0.435 -0.255 0.000 0.663 0.677 -0.068 0.000 0.014 (2.0 %)
ICE 0.318 -0.217 0.000 0.474 0.487 -0.068 0.001 0.013 (2.7 %)
y3 0.310 -0.483 0.000 0.460 0.485 -0.205 0.000 0.025 (5.1 %)
y4 0.232 -0.249 0.000 0.403 0.403 -0.033 0.281 0.000 (0.1 %)
EU
CCI 0.129 -0.054 0.000 0.173 0.336 -0.074 0.000 0.163 (48.0%)
ICS 0.155 -0.050 0.000 0.166 0.303 -0.058 0.000 0.137 (45.3 %)
ICC 0.110 -0.045 0.000 0.171 0.238 -0.043 0.000 0.067 (28.0 %)
ICE 0.178 -0.056 0.000 0.150 0.353 -0.073 0.000 0.202 (57.4 %)
Note: Refer to Table 2.7 for model specifications. ICS is replaced by ICS components, noted in
the first column of the table. Refer to Table 2.11 for variable notation.
The results also explain why corr(ICC, EPU) > corr(ICE, EPU) for US, but
not for Europe. Why is EPU more capable of explaining current component in the
US, but more capable of explaining expected component in Europe? The regression
results tell us that economic variables can explain the current component for US
consumer confidence much better than for European consumer confidence. Since
the economic variables also influence EPU, the latter can also explain the current
component very well. It does not conflict with our expectations.
The Granger causality results are listed in Table 2.13. From the US results,
we observe that the current component Granger causes EPU, but the expected
component no longer causes EPU. In particular, the long term expectation do not
cause EPU. On the other hand, EPU Granger causes all the components. From the
European results, we observe that EPU Granger causes the expected components
(CCI and ICE) at significance level 0.1, but does not Granger cause the current
component (ICC). On the other hand, none of the components Granger causes EPU.
Although the results for US and Europe are different, the results are both consistent
with our analysis. EPU is more likely to cause expected component than to cause
current component. And EPU is more likely to be caused by current component
than by expected component. We have discussed that the current component is
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more “objective” and the expected component is more “subjective”. Apparently,
the objective part is better explained by economic and financial variables, while
the subjective part can not. Therefore, EPU can play a special and unique role in
explaining ICS and CCI, due to its use in explaining the subjective part.
In summary, the results are consistent with our main results, and provide new
supports to our discussions. The results here show again that for the US, EPU
affects ICS through two channels we discussed at the end of the previous section.
And they confirm the higher additional explanatory power of EPU on the expected
component of ICS, which provides supports on the existence of the second channel.
On the other hand, for Europe, it confirms that EPU mainly affects CCI through
the second channel.
Table 2.13
Pairwise Granger Causality Results for EPU and ICS Components
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
For US (number of lags = 3):
ICS does not Granger Cause EPU 2.55 0.0553
EPU does not Granger Cause ICS 7.71 0.0001
ICC does not Granger Cause EPU 3.86 0.0097
EPU does not Granger Cause ICC 10.11 0.0000
ICE does not Granger Cause EPU 1.86 0.1367
EPU does not Granger Cause ICE 5.11 0.0018
y3 does not Granger Cause EPU 2.86 0.0368
EPU does not Granger Cause y3 5.24 0.0015
y4 does not Granger Cause EPU 0.39 0.7575
EPU does not Granger Cause y4 3.31 0.0201
For Europe (number of lags = 3):
CCI does not Granger Cause EPU 1.11 0.3446
EPU does not Granger Cause CCI 5.87 0.0007
ICSequiv does not Granger Cause EPU 1.19 0.3129
EPU does not Granger Cause ICSequiv 2.91 0.0351
ICC does not Granger Cause EPU 1.12 0.3412
EPU does not Granger Cause ICC 1.76 0.1547
ICEequiv does not Granger Cause EPU 0.94 0.4204
EPU does not Granger Cause ICEequiv 2.62 0.0513
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2.5.2 Influence of Economic Policy Uncertainty on Percent-
age of Unsure Answers in Consumer Confidence Sur-
veys
As we discussed in the previous section, consumer confidence index is calculated by
the answers to several survey questions. For both ICS and CCI, the relative score (or
“balance”) of a question depends only on the percentages of consumers who selected
positive or negative answers. However, if we take a look at the options, there are
often two more options (at least) exist: neutral answer, and “do not know” or
“uncertain” answer (to simplify the notation and avoid confusion, we shall call it
“unsure” answers). Both answers are given weights zero in the index calculation.
The “unsure” rates gives us an opportunity to test our hypothesis: higher consumer
uncertainty leads to lower consumer confidence.
As discussed before, we believe that higher EPU leads to higher consumer un-
certainty. When consumers are uncertain about the future, would they be more
likely to choose the “unsure” answer? or would they be more likely to choose the
“negative” answer? If the latter holds, it proves that consumer uncertainty implies
lower consumer confidence. If the former holds, it implies that consumer uncertainty
pushes consumer confidence to neutral position, and therefore not necessarily lower.
To check which one is the case, we will study whether EPU determines “unsure”
answer rates, and how. We expect to find that EPU does not have a significant and
positive relationship with “unsure” rate.
Data
In this section, we focus on the relationship between EPU and unsure rate. We
will only focus on the forward looking questions, because the current condition is
already known to the consumers. Here, we list the options of each forward looking
questions that are related to ICS/CCI calculations.
US
Q2: (1) Better Off, (2) Same, (3) Worse, (4) DK; NA (U2).
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Q3: (1) Good Times, (2) Uncertain (U31), (3) Bad Times, (4) Don’t Know (U32),
(5) NA (U33).
Q4: (1) Good Times, (2) Uncertain (U41), (3) Bad Times, (4) NA (U42).
Here, we let U2, U31, U32, U33, U41, and U42 denote the percentages of certain answers
to a particular question. The design of the questionnaire is quite confusing. Some-
times, “don’t know” and “not available” are grouped together (Q2), and sometimes,
there are even three answers related to unsureness (Q3). We let
t = U2 + U32 + U32 + U33 + U41 + U42
to denote the total percentage of unsure answers to all the three forward looking
questions related to the calculation of ICS.
Europe
Q1: (1) get a lot better, (2) get a little better, (3) stay the same, (4) get a little
worse, (5) get a lot worse, (6) don’t know (U1).
Q2: (1) get a lot better, (2) get a little better, (3) stay the same, (4) get a little
worse, (5) get a lot worse, (6) don’t know (U2).
Q3: (1) increase sharply, (2) increase slightly, (3) remain the same, (4) fall slightly,
(5) fall sharply, (6) don’t know (U3).
Q4: (1) very likely, (2) fairly likely, (3) not likely, (4) not at all likely, (5) don’t
know (U4).
Here, Ui denotes the percentage of consumers who chose the answer “don’t know”
on Question i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4). Let
t = U1 + U2 + U3 + U4
to denote the total percentage of unsure answers to all the four forward looking
questions related to the calculation of CCI.
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Methodology
The objective of this section is to find whether unsure answer rate t increases with
EPU. Similar to the previous section on decomposed ICS, we take the following
three steps to achieve this goal: first, we take the correlation between U and EPU.
Then, we consider the following regression model:
Ut = α + βEPUt−1 + ε. (2.5.6)
We are interested in the sign and significance of β, and adj-R2 of the model. We
expect the sign is either nonpositive, or not significant.
Finally, we check the pairwise Granger causality between these two variables, U
and EPU. It is possible that EPU Granger causes U . If it is the case, our explanation
is that higher EPU leads to lower unsure rate and higher negative rate.
Results
The Correlation results are summarised in Table 2.14. For the US, the correlation is
positive but nonsignificant. On the other hand, for Europe, the correlation is quite
negative and significant. Both cases are consistent with our expectations.
Table 2.14
Correlations of EPU and Unsure Rate
US p−value Europe p−value
0.0735 0.15 -0.565 0.0000
The regression results are shown below. For the US, the estimation equation is
as follows:
Ut = 29.4 + 0.0169× EPU.
The coefficient of EPU is NOT significant (p−value = 0.15). And adj-R2 = 0.003.
For Europe, the estimation equation is as follows:
Ut = 27.4− 0.0547× EPU.
The coefficient of EPU is significant (p−value = 0.0000). And adj-R2 = 0.328.
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The results are quite similar to the correlation result: the relationship is ei-
ther positive but insignificant, or negative and significant. Note that the constant
term α is around 30. Since U is the summation of unsure answers to all forward
looking questions, the constant term means that when there is no economic policy
uncertainty, the average percentage of people who choose “don’t know”, “NA” or
“uncertain” answers is about 29.4%/3 = 9.8% for the US. And the average per-
centage of people who choose “don’t know” answers is about 27.4%/4 = 6.85% for
Europe.
The Granger causality results are listed in Table 2.15. From the US results,
we observe that EPU and unsure rate do not Granger cause each other. On the
contrary, EPU and unsure rateGranger cause each other for Europe.
Table 2.15
Pairwise Granger Causality for EPU and Unsure Rate
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
For US (number of lags = 1):
U does not Granger Cause EPU 1.79 0.1813
EPU does not Granger Cause U 0.41 0.5215
For Europe (number of lags = 1):
U does not Granger Cause EPU 15.06 0.0001
EPU does not Granger Cause U 4.52 0.0342
From the correlation, regression and Granger causality results, we notice that
the results for the US is clearly different from that for Europe. For the US, the
relationship between EPU and unsure rate is insignificant, which implies that the
unsure rate does not change with EPU. On the other hand, the relationship between
EPU and unsure rate is negative and significant, and the explanatory power of EPU
is as high as 32.8%. We think, one possible reason for the discrepancy lies in the
designs of questionnaires. We can easily identify these differences:
• There is no “NA” choice in the EU survey. This might imply that people must
make a choice. On the other hand, “NA” choice is available in the US survey.
Note that if “NA” mean people accidentally skip the question or an answer
fails to be recorded, its rate should be unrelated to EPU.
• There are more choices in the EU survey, including highly positive, slightly
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positive, equal, slightly negative, and highly negative. Maybe by distinguishing
the levels, people are less likely to choose “don’t know” when EPU is high (due
to the availability of the “slightly negative” choice).
• The questions in the US survey are as comparable to each other as the EU
one. For example, unlike the EU survey, the choices for the three questions
are quite different in the US survey. Moreover, Question Q4 is even an open
ended question. And the choice is not even made by consumers directly, but
by the interviewer who looks for good versus bad. This may make the US
“unsure rate” we constructed less reliable.
Nonetheless, for both countries, there are no significantly positive relationship
between EPU and unsure rate. At first glance, it may seem to be counter intuitive.
But in fact, it is quite promising. When EPU increases, we expect confidence to
decrease, or in other words, we expect more negative answers. We do not expect
more unsure answers, as more unsure answers simply make the confidence index at
a more neutral position (either decreasing from a positive value, or increasing from a
negative one). In conclusion, the analyses on the relationship between “unsure rate”
and EPU confirm that uncertainty leads to lower confidence. And the European
survey seems better designed to preserve the information due to uncertainty.
2.5.3 Influence of Economic Policy Uncertainty Components
on Consumer Confidence
We have been using EPU index as a proxy for economic policy uncertainty. For
Europe (and many other countries or areas), the EPU index is constructed based on
newspaper articles regarding policy uncertainty. But for the US, the EPU index is a
weighted average of four components: news-based index (x1), expert disagreement
(x2), CPI disagreement (x3), and tax expiration (x4). In this section, we study how
these four components influence ICS differently. Specifically, we are interested in
finding whether the news-based index is a good proxy for economic policy uncer-
tainty, which implies whether the EPU for Europe is trustworthy.
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How EPU is decomposed and calculated is already discussed in the Data Section.
The methodology is the same as in Section 2.5.1, which includes correlation results,
regression model analysis, and Granger causality test from VAR model. Here, we
only discuss the main results. All the results are for the US.
The Correlation results are summarised in Table 2.16. The aggregated EPU
has the largest correlation (negative) with ICS, which shows that it makes sense to
integrate the four components. ICS’s correlations with x2 and x3 are much smaller,
which implies that components 1 and 4 seem to contribute to the large negative
correlation between EPU and ICS.
Table 2.16
Correlations of EPU Components and ICS
Correlation EPU x1 x2 x3 x4
with ICS -0.626 -0.515 -0.213 -0.289 -0.527
Note: EPU = the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. x1 to x4 are components of EPU, which
are news-based index, expert disagreement, CPI disagreement, and tax expiration, respectively.
The regression results are shown in Table 2.17. From the regression results, we
can see that although x4 alone explains ICS well, it does not have any additional
explanatory power when the control variables are included. This means that the
information from tax expiration is already contained in other variables. On the other
hand, x2 and x3 alone only explains a small portion of the variance in ICS, but they
do have a little extra explanatory power when control variables are included. The
component that is the most useful is still x1, the news-based component. It alone
explains 28.9% of the variance in ICS, and with control variables, it still explains
1.6% of the variance in ICS.
The Granger causality results are listed in Table 2.18. Only the news component
(x1) Granger causes ICS. Components x2 and x3 and ICS do not Granger cause each
other at all. And ICS Granger causes x4, but not the other way around.
In summary, the correlation, regression and Granger causality results show that
the news component is the most useful component in explaining ICS. Only this
component Granger causes ICS, has large correlation with ICS, and has noticeable
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Table 2.17
Influence of EPU on ICS components from Regression Results
With EPU only With Z only With EPU and Z Incremental
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
EPU 0.406 -0.253 0.000 0.582 0.597 -0.068 0.000 0.015 (2.6 %)
x1 0.289 -0.188 0.000 0.582 0.598 -0.048 0.000 0.016 (2.7 %)
x2 0.034 -0.052 0.001 0.582 0.588 0.030 0.012 0.006 (1.0%)
x3 0.108 -0.149 0.000 0.582 0.592 -0.054 0.002 0.010 (1.7 %)
x4 0.273 -0.015 0.000 0.582 0.581 -0.000 0.655 -0.001 (0.0%)
Note: Refer to Tables 2.7 and 2.16 for model specifications and variable notation. EPU is
replaced by EPU components, noted in the first column of the table.
Table 2.18
Pairwise Granger Causality Results for EPU Components and ICS
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
EPU does not Granger Cause ICS 7.71 0.0001
ICS does not Granger Cause EPU 2.55 0.0553
x1 does not Granger Cause ICS 7.13 0.0001
ICS does not Granger Cause x1 3.53 0.0152
x2 does not Granger Cause ICS 0.20 0.8974
ICS does not Granger Cause x2 1.69 0.1690
x3 does not Granger Cause ICS 1.34 0.2608
ICS does not Granger Cause x3 1.13 0.3386
x4 does not Granger Cause ICS 1.69 0.1678
ICS does not Granger Cause x4 3.92 0.0089
Note: number of lags = 3.
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additional explanatory power on ICS. The results imply that using the news-based
economic policy uncertainty index instead of the aggregated one to analyse the rela-
tionship between economic policy uncertainty and consumer confidence should not
result in very different findings. Therefore, the differences in how EPU is calculated
for US and Europe should not be the reason for the different findings.
2.5.4 Influence of Categorised Economic Policy Uncertainty
on Consumer/Producer Confidence
In Section , we pointed out that it is also worth explaining why economic variables
can influence Consumer confidence, and in what sense EPU changes consumer un-
certainty. The two questions seem to be unrelated at the first glance. However, they
are actually asking the same question: what economic concept does consumer confi-
dence measure? One theory is that consumer confidence is related to precautionary
saving. However, Chatterjee and Dinda (2015) has used simple arguments to prove
this is not the case. Instead, they propose that consumer confidence is related to
the expectation on the real income (or more precise, “buying condition”). We would
like to examine the validity of this theory.
As we discussed in the Data Section, categorised EPUs are available for the US.
Therefore, through data analysis, we can find out which categories of EPU are more
important in determining ICS. If the categories that are related to consumers’ ex-
pected income or expense are the more important ones, the theory is supported. To
further verify the results, we also compare the results on the relationship between
categorised EPU and ICS, with the results on the relationship between categorised
EPU and producer confidence. We are interested in finding whether different cat-
egories of EPUs would play different roles on confidence on the demand side and
confidence on the suppler side, and whether it can be explained by our theory.
Data and Methodology
We focus on the US data, because of the availability of the categorised EPUs. EPU
values in 12 categories have been provided. The list of categories can be found
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in Table 2.3. For the consumer side, we study the relationship between each cat-
egorised EPU and ICS, to identify the most important categories in determining
ICS. And for the producer side, we use the Business confidence index (BCI) from
OECD. According to the official site (data.oecd.org), “BCI is based on enter-
prises’ assessment of production, orders and stocks, as well as its current position
and expectations for the immediate future. Opinions compared to a ‘normal’ state
are collected and the difference between positive and negative answers provides a
qualitative index on economic conditions.” It is a component of the bank’s business
survey, which covers hundreds of companies to assess the business conditions in the
country. It is published by the National Bank of their respective nations monthly,
and can be regarded as a leading indicator of future developments in the country.
Again, we study the relationship between categorised EPUs and BCI, to identify the
most important categories, and compare them with the results related to consumer
confidence. We expect that the categories related to consumer income expectations
or expense expectations should be more important in determining ICS, and the ones
related to business expenditures or profit should be more important in determining
BCI. In Table 2.19, we discuss the expected findings. We think some categories,
such as economic policy uncertainty on financial regulations, affect both consumers
and producers. On the other hand, certain categories should only have a big impact
on the consumer side (such as health care), while certain categories should only have
a big impact on the producer side (such as trade). Similar to the previous sections,
we analyse the results based on three aspects: correlations, regression model, and
Granger causality test of VAR model.
Table 2.19
Categorised EPUs and their Possible Relationships with ICS and BCI
Categories Category Keywords relationship relationship
with ICS with BCI
Economic Policy Uncertainty (c1) economic, policy, uncertainty
Monetary policy (c2) c1+ the fed, central bank, etc affect loans, etc affect loans, etc
Taxes (c3) c1+ tax, taxation, etc affect income affect profit
Government spending (c4) c1+ government spending, etc
Health care (c5) c1+ health insurance, etc affect expense
National security (c6) c1+ terrorism, war, etc affect stability
Entitlement programs (c7) c1+ welfare reform, etc affect income
Regulation (c8) c1+ regulation, etc
Trade policy (c9) c1+ import duty, trade treaty, etc if international
Sovereign debt, currency crises (c10) c1+ currency crisis, etc
Financial Regulation (c11) c1+ banking supervision, etc affect income affect profit
Fiscal Policy (c12) c1+ fiscal stimulus, etc
June 22, 2020
2.5. Additional Analyses 75
Results
Due to the space limit and the dimension of the data, here we omit the data analysis
results, but only discuss our main findings:
• The following categories have relatively large correlations with ICS: c8 (Regu-
lation), c5 (Health care), c11 (Financial Regulation), c12 (Fiscal Policy), andc3
(Taxes).
• The following categories have relatively large additional explanatory power
with ICS in the regression models: c11 (Financial Regulation), c8 (Regulation),
c2 (Monetary policy), c6 (National security), c12 (Fiscal Policy), andc3 (Taxes).
• The following category Granger causes ICS but not the other way around: c2
(Monetary policy). Many other categories Granger cause ICS and are also
Granger caused by ICS.
• The effects of c9 (Trade policy) and c10 (Sovereign debt, currency crises) can
be omitted.
Combining the results, we think the EPU in Regulation (especial Financial Regu-
lation), Health Care, Fiscal Policy and Taxes are the most important categories in
determining ICS. The result is consistent with our expectations. These categories
have a close relationship with consumers’ income expectations. And the categories
that are less important are not closely linked with consumers’ expectations on their
income.
Similarly, we obtain and summarise the results for BCI. We find that Monetary
policy, National security, Financial Regulation, and Taxes are the most important
categories in determining BCI. Indeed, these categories are closely linked with the
expected profit from businesses. Compared with the results for ICS, the results are
consistent with our expectation. Health Care is no longer important in determining
BCI. And National Security is more closely linked with business than with con-
sumers. The only exception is that trade is not important for BCI. This is probably
because most businesses surveyed here are local ones.
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In summary, the results support our theory: consumer/producer confidence mea-
sures expected income/profit. Therefore, the categories related to consumer income
expectations impact ICS the most, and the categories related to business expecta-
tions impact BCI the most.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provided empirical evidence on the role economic policy uncer-
tainty plays on consumer confidence through thorough data analyses. We not only
studied the impact of economic policy uncertainty on consumer confidence without
or with the presence of major economic variables, but also their dynamics through
VAR models. We showed that higher economic policy uncertainty leads to lower
consumer confidence, even when the other economic variables are controlled for.
We also found that the EPU for US can explain consumer confidence better than
Europe, but the additional explanatory power of EPU on ICS is actually smaller for
the US than for Europe, adding the control variables. We also did four additional
tests to further examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and
consumer confidence. The additional tests were also useful in showing that (1) un-
certainty implies lower confidence (through the analysis on “unsure” answers) and
(2) confidence measures income expectation (through the analyses on categorised
EPUs).
From all the results, we suggested that economic policy uncertainty affects con-
sumer confidence through two channels. The first channel is that economic policy
uncertainty implies current business conditions, and current business conditions af-
fect consumers’ income expectations, and therefore affect consumer confidence. On
the other hand, the second channel is that economic policy uncertainty causes con-
sumers’ uncertainty about their income expectations, and hence affect consumer
confidence.
We found that for the US, economic policy uncertainty mainly affects consumer
confidence through the first channel. Therefore, its additional explanatory power
is small. However, we also found evidence on the existence of the second channel.
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For example, economic policy uncertainty Granger causes other variables, and it
explains the expected component of consumer confidence better. On the contrary,
we found that for Europe, economic policy uncertainty mainly affects consumer
confidence through the second channel. It has very large additional explanatory
power on consumer confidence, compared with other economic variables.
However, unlike the US, economic policy uncertainty together with economic
variables only explain a smaller portion of the variance in European consumer confi-
dence. From the results, and the shapes of the consumer confidence times series for
the US and Europe, we suspect that the consumer confidence in Europe may also
be influenced by US confidence or variables. In the next chapter, we will study the
transactions/spillover effects of consumer confidence across different regions.
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Chapter 3
Transmission of Consumer
Confidence: International
Evidence
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied the determinants of consumer confidence. We
focused on the role of economic policy uncertainty, but also included a wide range
of economic and financial variables in the model. The results clearly show that
although the majority part of consumer confidence can be explained by economic
policy uncertainty as well as other more “objective” economic and financial variables,
there is always a part that remains unexplained. What is more, the unexplained part
is much larger at business turning points. This implies that consumer confidence
contains essential and unique information, which is not captured by other variables.
While the model we built was quite solid and robust, and in line with previous
research on this area, there is one possible determinant of consumer confidence that
was left out of the equation intentionally: the consumer confidence in other coun-
tries. From the figures and discussions in the previous chapter, we can clearly observe
similar trends for consumer confidence in different countries. They all reached their
troughs during the Global Financial Crises, and reached their peaks at similar pe-
riods as well. This leads us to wonder: how does the consumer confidence in one
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country affects that in another country? What can the transmission of consumer
confidence tell us? In this chapter, we aim at answering these questions. In other
words, instead of focusing on the relationship between other variables and consumer
confidence, in this chapter, we focus on the consumer confidence in different coun-
tries and regions.
We believe the international transmission in consumer confidence exists for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is due to the global financial interdependence, which has been
widely studied and proven (Cooper, 1985; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Corsetti et al.,
2005), and also due to the contagion and co-movements in financial markets, which
also attracts research interests (Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003; Ahmad et al., 2013). In-
tuitively, the interdependence and contagion of the financial market may lead to the
interdependence and contagion of consumer confidence among different countries.
Secondly, news has an impact on global financial market (e.g., Albuquerque and
Vega (2009); Apergis (2015)). In Chapter 1, we discussed the interpretations of
consumer sentiment, and suggests that it contains information such as news that is
not included in other financial variables. A property of news is that it spreads over
country borders quickly. Therefore, it provides a good channel for the transmission
of consumer sentiment.
In addition to economic and financial interdependence/contagion and news ef-
fect, there are also social psychological reasons for the transmission of consumer
confidence. There is rich evidence for “herd behaviour” of investors in behavioural
finance literature (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). This implies that under certain
circumstances, investors simply mimic the investment decisions of others. We can
easily extend this idea to general consumers. It is reasonable to suspect that when
consumers form their attitude on the willingness to buy (which is measured by
consumer confidence), they sometimes simply mimic other people’s attitudes.
But it is surprising that although consumer confidence has been used to measure
consumer’s attitude, the research in “consumer confidence” and the research in
“attitude” are quite distinct. While the former is studied under the area of finance,
the latter is studied in the area of social psychology. But are they really two different
concepts? By Hogg and Vaughan (2009), the definition and measurement method
June 22, 2020
3.1. Introduction 80
of attitude in social psychology study is as follows:
Attitude is viewed “as a construct that, although not directly observable, precedes
behaviour and guides our choices and decisions for action”. “Traditionally, attitudes
have been measured by using questionnaires.”
The concept of consumer confidence suits this definition perfectly. It is indeed
not directly observable, precedes people’s buying behaviour, and guides our choices
and decision when we purchase durable goods. Moreover, consumer confidence is
measured by using questionnaires, just as the traditional measurement method for
attitude.
Therefore, we think it is important to fill in the gap by linking the research
in consumer confidence with the existing findings in social psychology. By this
approach, we can better understand what influences consumer confidence, and how
consumer confidence affects behaviour. On the other hand, we can use econometrics
tools to examine the validity of theories in social psychology when they apply to
consumer confidence.
Social psychologists have found that “a crucial source of our attitudes is the
actions of other people around us”. This implies that a consumer’s confidence may
be affected by surrounding people’s opinions. In particular, group members play an
extremely important role in forming ones attitude. “Group norms are enormously
potent sources of social influence. They provide us with stable and predictable
guides for thinking and behaving.” This implies that within a group, group norm
may affect each one’s confidence as a consumer. They have also found that“the
mass media, in particular television, have a major influence on people’s attitudes
and those of their children - especially so when attitudes are not strongly held
(Goldberg and Gorn, 1974).” This finding suggests that consumer confidence is
affected by mass media. In a sense, media broadens the boundaries of groups,
within which attitudes are shared and influenced more. In summary, by research
findings in social psychology, the level of consumer confidence in one area is probably
affected by that in many other areas. In addition, the level of conformity is affected
by people’s status. “Those who conform tend to have feelings of inferiority, feelings
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of relatively low status in the group, and a generally authoritarian personality”. In
terms of consumer confidence, it seems to suggest that the consumer confidence of
smaller countries might be influenced by that in more powerful countries.
In summary, based on the existing literature in the interdependence of financial
markets, the contagion in financial markets, news effects on financial markets, and
herding behaviour in social psychology, we suspect that the consumer confidence
in one country is affected by that in another country. The level of co-movement
and spillover is affected by economic, political and geographic factors. In particular,
when consumer confidence changes dramatically in one country (especially a leading
one), consumer confidence in other countries may follow the same trend. As men-
tioned in the previous chapter, consumer confidence is a leading variable. By the
discussion here, the large spillover of consumer confidence may even lead the change
in consumer confidence in the majority of countries. Therefore, it may have some
predictory power, too. Large spillover of consumer confidence has predictive power
for economy. In particular, large spillover of consumer confidence collapse may lead
financial crises and recessions.
In other words, in this chapter, we aim at answering the following interesting
research questions:
1. (The direction of the spillover.) How does the change of consumer confidence in
one country affect that in another country? What factors affect the directions
of the relationships?
2. (The level of total spillover.) When is the relationship higher than normal
situations. What implications does it have?
In Section 2, we will discuss the existing literature in three areas: related findings
in social psychology, co-movement and spillover in finance studies, and spillover of
consumer confidence. In Section 3, we introduce the data set used for the research,
and present the basic statistics and preliminary analysis. In Section 4, we introduce
the method we use to answer the first research question, and present and discuss the
results. In Section 5, we explain the methods we use to answer the section research
question, which include two parts - the construction of spillover index that is used
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to measure the level of total spillover, and the applications of the spillover index,
to evaluate the role it plays in economy. Then we present and discuss the results in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the chapter.
We think our research findings can provide interesting insights on how consumer
confidence of different country affect each other, and what information it may con-
tain. The results will help us better understand the role consumer confidence plays,
and be of interest to both researchers and practitioners.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Literature Review on Financial Interdependence
There is a rich literature that studies international financial interdependence empir-
ically. In general, they analyse the co-movements and contagion between different
financial markets. To do this, they often focus on the correlation of asset returns
(Corsetti et al. (2005), for example).
It is a problem that is worth studying for several reasons, as listed in Albulescu
et al. (2015): it plays a crucial role in portfolios risk assessment, provides clues about
spillover effects, and is important for supervision authorities.
The research often focus on the relationship between global market and a specific
one, such as Asian or China’s stock markets (Morales and Andreosso-O?Callaghan,
2012; Shen et al., 2015), European stock market (Stoica et al., 2015; Tiwari et al.,
2016), and US credit market (Shahzad et al., 2017).
The results all confirm the existence of financial interdependence. Shahzad et al.
(2017) listed some possible channels of contagion: liquidity issue during crises, up-
dates of judgments, and herding.
Moreover, the co-movement of asset price seems to be higher during crises, and
lower during tranquil periods (Corsetti et al., 2005). This finding implies that the
level of transmission of financial shocks might be used to identify different regimes
(crises and tranquil periods). We will extend this idea to the transmission of con-
sumer confidence. We are going to study whether the level of transmission predicts
financial crises.
June 22, 2020
3.2. Literature Review 83
The research methods often involve factor model of returns (Corsetti et al.,
2005), wavelet transform (Albulescu et al., 2015), dynamic conditional correlation
(Sensoy et al., 2014), and generalized auto regressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012). A more detailed summary in table format
can be found in Shahzad et al. (2017).
In conclusion, global financial interdependence exists, which supports our hy-
pothesis on the interdependence of consumer confidence. Moreover, the level of
co-movement indicates different economic regimes, which prompt us to study how
the level of transmission of consumer confidence predicts crises. Finally, the research
methods can be adapted to our problem.
3.2.2 Literature Review on Attitude in Social Psychology,
and Herding
Herding is an important topic studied in the area of behavioural finance. There are
rational and irrational reasons behind it, such as the “sharing the blame// effect,
attempting to enhance own reputation, etc (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990).
While herding focuses on investors’ attitude and behaviour that is influenced by
other investors, the general topic of attitude formation and influence is studied in
the area of social psychology (Hogg and Vaughan, 2009).
In this area, there are a few topics that are closely linked with our research:
attitudes and persuasion, conformity, people in groups, and communication. For
example, Zimbardo and Leippe (1991) studied the psychology of attitude change and
social influence, and confirmed the social influence’s role in changing one’s attitude.
Cialdini and Trost (1998) also studied the role of social norms and conformity. On
the other hand, Bryant and Oliver (2009) focused on the media effects.
In summary, the research findings in herding, and in social psychology in general,
form a theoretical foundation for our research.
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3.2.3 Literature Review on the Contagion of Consumer Con-
fidence
While the majority of the researchers analyse the ICS or CCI of the US, research
results started to become available for other countries. Most of the studies were
country or region specific. For example, Olowofeso and Doguwa (2012) did a panel
data analysis to check the relationship between consumer confidence and selective
economic variables in Nigeria. Utaka (2003) studied the case in Japan, and con-
cluded that “consumer confidence has an effect on only very short-term economic
fluctuations”. Berry and Davey (2004) focused on the British CCI. They found out
that confidence is determined by economic variables, and non-economic events (the
residual element). And the “unexplained” residual term is not closely related to
spending. There are only a few papers considering multiple regions. Abeele (1983),
Pickering et al. (1983), Lemmens et al. (2007) and Jansen and Nahuis (2003) studied
consumer confidence in European countries. Abeele concluded that a few countries’
results were inline with that of the US. Pickering et al. observed that different
countries and surveys had similar factor structures. Lemmens et al. found that the
short-run fluctuations in consumer confidence are largely country specific. Jansen
and Nahuis found that “stock returns generally Granger-cause consumer confidence
at very short horizons (two weeks to one month), but not vice versa”. Özerkek and
Çelik (2010) studied the relationships between government spending, consumer con-
fidence, and consumption in six emerging market countries, including Brazil, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Turkey. They confirmed confidence’s
important role, and suggested that consumer confidence can influence consumption
by influencing government spending. Golinelli and Parigi (2004) assessed sentiment’s
predictive power in eight countries across the world (France, Germany, Italy, UK,
USA, Japan, Canada and Australia). Curtin (2007) provided a worldwide review of
consumer sentiment surveys for forty-five countries. Chatterjee and Dinda (2015)
discussed consumer confidence during post-crisis period through a panel data anal-
ysis across eleven selected developed or developing economies (USA, UK, France,
Germany, Greece, China, India, Japan, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand), and
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stated that consumers in these countries lost their confidence after 2008, which
impacted consumption.
The issue of contagion of consumer confidence is largely omitted in literature.
The only piece of work we found is Galariotis et al. (2017). They focused on the
impact of monetary policy on economic expectations. But in one section, they also
studied the sentiment spillover effects from the US to Core Eurozone countries during
the US financial crisis, by a standard variance decomposition (VD) approach. They
found that such effects existed. Since it was not the main focus of the research,
the results are subject to many limitations. Firstly, only the spillover from US
to Europe was studied. Secondly, the use of VD method was questionable, as it
was order sensitive. Thirdly, they included many control variables, and hence the
consumer confidence contagion problem was not addressed directly.
The contagion of consumer confidence is the focus of our chapter. We will provide
a much more complete and thorough approach to study this problem, which resolves
all the above mentioned problems in Galariotis et al. (2017).
3.3 Data
Our main focus is to study the contagion of consumer confidence worldwide. To do
this, we choose a dataset that contains consumer confidence indexes (CCI) of all
the G6 countries (USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom). We
focus on these countries because they are six major advanced economies, represent
more than 64% of the net global wealth ($263 trillion) (Shorrocks et al., 2013), and
they represent countries in three major continents: North America, Europe, and
Asia.
We focus on the monthly CCI data from January 1985 to May 2017. Therefore,
there are 389 data entries for each country. For CCI data that are only quarterly
available (i.e., Japan’s CCI before 2004), we take the weighted average of the two
adjacent quarters to estimate the monthly values. All the CCI series are downloaded
from DataStream.
We study the levels of consumer confidence instead of the first differences. Whether
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or not to use the differences has prompted controversy ever since Chris Sims in 1980
wrote “Macroeconomics and Reality”. According to Brooks (2019), he points out
that ?many proponents of the VAR approach recommend that differencing to in-
duce stationarity should not be done (because the model includes lags already)? Our
analyses require the data to be stationary, which the levels of consumer confidence
indices satisfy this requirement.
We also want to explain why we include no control variables. The first reason
is that the dimension would be too high. We are considering the relationships
between every pair of countries. Without control variables, it is already a n × n
matrix for any time point or duration (n = number of countries). But the foremost
reason is that studying the consumer confidence series alone would tell us how
consumer attitudes transmit among different countries directly. As discussed in the
Introduction Section, consumer confidence measures consumer attitude. We do not
need or want to decompose the attitude, when we study its transmissions.
In the Additional Analyses section, we also compare the results for G6 coun-
tries with the results for a more extended dataset, which contains the CCIs of G6
countries, plus Canada, China, Turkey, Begium, Danmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Hungry, and Australia. We show
that the results are consistent. In other words, the G6 countries are enough to
generate meaningful results for our research problem.
3.3.1 Measurements of Consumer Confidence
In the previous chapter, we already explained how consumer confidence is measured.
Here, we briefly summarise the key points.
As we discussed earlier, attitude is not directly observable, and is often measured
by questionnaires. Consumer confidence, or consumer attitude, is no exception.
In 1946, the first consumer confidence index, University of Michigan’s Consumer
Sentiment Index (ICS), was constructed based on answers to five survey questions,
and used as a proxy for US consumer confidence. It was at first provided annually,
then became quarterly available from 1952 to 1977, and monthly available since
1978.
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In Europe, in 1972, the European Commission started to design harmonised
surveys (which consists essentially of harmonised questionnaires and a common
timetable) to be carried out at national level by partner institutes for different
sectors of the economies, including the consumers sector. Consumer Confidence In-
dexes of the European Union (EU) and applicant countries are now calculated from
the answers to four of the survey questions. For major European countries, CCI has
been published monthly since 1985.
In Japan, the Consumer Confidence Index has been published by Cabinet Of-
fice as a part of “Consumer confidence survey”, aims to measure Japanese house-
holds’ sentiment toward consumption activities. The index consists of four sub-
categories: overall standard of living, income growth, employment and willingness
to buy durable goods. It was quarterly available from 1982 to March 2004, and
monthly available afterwards.
Similar consumer confidence surveys are now conducted in almost all developed
countries and many developing ones. Currently, the number of countries that publish
CCI’s regularly have reached at least 45 (Curtin, 2007).
We should point out that the survey questions and weighting methods used to
construct CCI indexes are not identical for all the countries. Nonetheless, the survey
questions are often related to consumers’ personal financial conditions and buying
intentions, forecasts on employment, and opinions on overall business conditions.
They are found to provide comparable results (Curtin, 2007).
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
The graphs of the CCI’s for the G6 countries are shown in Figure 3.1. The summary
statistics of the seven series are reported in Table 3.1.
Based on the information from the previous chapter, the theoretical range of ICS
for US is from 2 (lowest consumer confidence) to 150 (highest consumer confidence),
when neutral value 76 (when the favourable and unfavourable replies are equal).
From Table 3.1, we can observe that the actual ICS ranges from 55.3 (indicating
28% more unfavourable answers to favourable ones) to 112.0 (indicating 48.6% more
favourable answers to unfavourable ones), with average value 87.4 (indicating 15%
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more favourable answers than unfavourable ones). This implies that in general, more
consumers have a positive opinion. The Skewness is -0.47 (comparing with Skewness
of 0 for normal or other symmetric distributions), indicating the left tail is longer
and flatter. This implies that in cases when ICS is lower than average, people can
be quite pessimistic, and ICS can be really low (note that the lowest value is 32.1
points below average). These extremely low ICS values often correspond to crises
or big events. On the other hand, when ICS is higher than average, it tends to be
slightly higher than average (note that the largest value is only 24.6 points above
average). This means that unlike crises, there are not “golden times” during which
consumers are extremely optimal. Its Kurtosis is 2.88, close to that of a normal
distribution (which is 3).
The CCI data for other G6 countries have some similar characteristics. Except
for France, the CCI always has a negative skewness, indicating the existence of some
extremely low values. And the Kurtosis is always around 3, indicating the similarity
to a normal distribution.
The CCI data for other countries also show some differences. the theoretical
range of CCI’s for European countries is from -100 (100% strong unfavourable an-
swers) to 100 (100% strong favourable answers), with neutral value 0 (same percent-
age of favourable and unfavourable answers). The actual index ranges from -37 to
3.3 with an average of -18.7 for France, from -32.9 to 10.9 with an average of -7.1 for
Germany, from -41.5 to 2.5 with an average of -15.3 for Italy, and from -35.2 to 7.6
with an average of -8.6 for the UK. Unlike ICS for US, CCI’s for Europe are below
the neural value most of the time, and has lower variance. This implies that on
average, the European consumers might be more pessimal about the economic and
buying conditions than US consumers. On the other hand, the statistics of Cana-
dian consumer confidence index is quite similar to that of US. And the Japanese
consumer confidence has a much lower standard deviation (partly because part of
the original data were quarterly available).
From Figure 3.1, we can observe that US consumer confidence dropped sharply in
around 1990 (due to Gulf War) and from 2007 to 2009 (due to the Global Financial
Crisis). Among the sharp drops, the most recent Global Financial Crisis seems to
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have the largest and the most prolonged impact. ICS reached its historical low in
November 2008 (at value 55.3) after over a year’s almost monotonic decrease. The
recovery of ICS is also quite slow, which takes more than five years. Interestingly, ICS
dropped again to a nearly historical low value in August 2011 (at value 55.8), when
the Great Recession was already officially ended (according to NBER’s Business
Cycle Dating Committee, the Great Recession started in December 2007, and ended
in June 2009). This shows that consumers were as pessimistic about the US economy
as they were in the middle of the Great Recession.
In Figure 3.2, we rescaled all the consumer confidence data to [0, 1], and plotted
the seven time series on the same graph. Interestingly, it clearly shows some similar-
ity of the series, and CCI’s for other countries tend to change in the same direction
as ICS for US (sometimes with a small lag). For example, for most countries, the
consumer confidence reached historical low in early 2009, due to the Global Financial
Crises. They also drop in or around 2012, probably due to the Euro crises. More-
over, they reached their local minimum in 1990-1992, around the time of the Gulf
War. The similarity of the time series shows that although European consumers are
generally more pessimal than US consumers, the change in their confidence still pro-
vides similar information to the change in US consumers’ confidence. On the other
hand, the series also have some clear differences. For example, Japan’s consumer
confidence only follows the same trend loosely. Germany’s consumer confidence
reached its maximum in Nov 2011 - a quite different move from other countries.
And instead of 2009, Italy’s consumer confidence dropped to its global minimum in
June 2012, which is not quite surprising, because Italy was one of the countries that
was at the centre of the European debt crisis.
The similarities in the trend imply that the consumer confidence in different
countries are indeed connected with each other. The consumer confidence in one
country is likely to be influenced by that in another country. On the other hand,
the differences in the trend make the directions and magnitudes of the connections
unclear. In the next sections, we will use quantitative tools to untangle this problem.
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Figure 3.1
Consumer Confidence Indexes for G6 Countries
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Figure 3.2
Consumer Confidence Indexes of G6 Countries (Rescaled to [0, 1])
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics of Country Specific Consumer Confidence Indexes
US FR DE IT JP UK
Mean 87.6 -18.7 -7.1 -15.3 42.4 -8.6
Median 90.6 -17.9 -5.4 -14.0 42.0 -6.5
Maximum 111.4 3.3 10.9 2.5 51.0 7.6
Minimum 55.3 -37.0 -32.9 -41.5 27.5 -35.2
Std. Dev. 11.8 8.2 9.0 8.5 4.9 8.7
Skewness -0.52 0.13 -0.50 -0.82 -0.36 -0.44
Kurtosis 2.94 2.54 2.65 3.43 2.91 2.37
Jarque-Bera 17.27 4.42 18.42 46.33 8.47 19.25
Probability 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Note: US = United States; FR = France; DE = Germany; IT = Italy; JP = Japan; UK =
United Kingdom.
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3.4 Directional Spillovers of Consumer Confidence
This chapter is on the transmission of consumer confidence. In this section, we focus
on the “direction” of the transmission. In other words, we aim at providing answers
to our first research question: does the change of consumer confidence in one market
lead that in another market?
3.4.1 Methodology
In order to find empirical evidence for the research problem, we analyse the G6 coun-
try CCI data through Vector Autoregression (VAR) model analysis. In particular,
we consider a VAR model which only include the six main variables - the CCI series
of six countries, all as endogenous variables. The model has the following format:
Yt = A0 +
T ∗∑
i=1
AiYt−i + ut,
where Yt denotes the endogenous variable vector, ut denotes the error vector that
satisfies certain criteria, Ai denotes the coefficient vector, and T
∗ denotes the optimal
number of lags.
Once we have estimated a VAR model, we are also able to analyse its properties
using structural analysis, or in particular, the Granger causality test. We do both
pairwise Granger causality test between the variable pairs, and Granger causality
test for the complete model (with six variables). In particular, to test whether EPU
pairwise Granger causes ICS/CCI, we consider the following model:
yt = a0(1) +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)xt−i + ut(1). (3.4.1)
And to test whether EPU Granger causes ICS/CCI in the complete model, we
consider the following model:
yt = a0(1) +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)xt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
Bi(1)Zt−i + ut(1). (3.4.2)
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In both cases, we test the joint hypothesis:
a1(1, 2) = a2(1, 2) = ... = aT ∗(1, 2) = 0,
with Null hypothesis being x does not Granger cause y.
Under the VAR model, we also perform variance decomposition (VD), which
provides information about the relative importance of each random innovation in
affecting the variables in the VAR. Specifically, the variance decomposition results
tell us in the short run (for example, at the 2nd month) and in the long run (say,
in 10 years), shock to CCI in one country accounts for how much variation of the
fluctuation in CCI in another country. In stead of the standard VD approach, which
is sensitive to data ordering, we follow the approach in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).
They provide a novel approach to variance decomposition, so the results is invariant
to variable ordering (which they call “spillover”). Moreover, they propose measures
of directional volatility spillovers, which suits our research objective perfectly.
3.4.2 Results and Discussions
We first calculate the correlation matrix for all the six main variables.
Table 3.2 presents the correlations among all the six consumer confidence vari-
ables used in our study. The correlations between two countries are all positive
and significant. For most countries, CCI’s have the largest correlation with the US
CCI. And the correlations between the four European countries’ CCI’s are often
quite large. On the other hand, Japan’s CCI has a much lower correlation with
other countries’ CCI’s. The results seem to indicate the US’s consumer confidence
is closely linked with other countries’ CCI’s, and European countries are closely
linked with each other.
The correlation results do not tell us about the direction of the relationship. And
they only imply the level of co-movement among the consumer confidence data, not
the “leaded effect”. Therefore, we move to the VAR model to address these issues.
For the VAR model, the optimal number of lags according to Akaike information
criterion is 2. The pairwise Granger Causality results are summarised in Table
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Table 3.2
Correlation Matrices
Correlation
Probability |t| = 0 US GERMANY FRANCE ITALY JAPAN UK
US 1
—–
GERMANY 0.13 1
0.012 —–
FRANCE 0.48 0.53 1
0.0000 0.0000 —–
ITALY 0.59 0.28 0.48 1
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 —–
JAPAN 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.17 1
0.0000 0.0002 0.0064 0.0007 —–
UK 0.57 0.11 0.42 0.53 0.085 1
0.0000 0.028 0.0000 0.0000 0.095 —–
3.3. When only two variables are considered in pairs, at test critical value 5%, US
consumer confidence Granger causes the consumer confidence in all the other five
countries. France CCI Granger causes UK and Germany CCI’s. And Italy CCI
Granger causes Germany CCI. Japan and Germany’s CCI’s Granger cause each
other.
The Granger Causality results for the complete 6 variable VAR model are sum-
marised in Table 3.4. The results are similar to the pairwise one. It shows that at
test critical value 5%, US consumer confidence Granger causes UK, France, Italy
and Japan’s CCI’s. In addition, France CCI Granger causes UK and Germany
CCI’s. And Italy CCI Granger causes Germany CCI. Again, the results show the
US’s special role in consumer confidence transmission, and also indicate the higher
connection among European countries.
Table 3.5 and Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 shows the directional spillover (vari-
ance decomposition) results based on Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). The results clearly
show that US is the biggest generator of spillover, whose contribution is much higher
than any other country. On the other hand, the four European countries (France,
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Table 3.3
Pairwise Granger Causality
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
GERMANY does not Granger Cause US 2.1 0.12
US does not Granger Cause GERMANY 5.2 0.0061
FRANCE does not Granger Cause US 2.2 0.12
US does not Granger Cause FRANCE 8.7 0.0002
ITALY does not Granger Cause US 0.29 0.75
US does not Granger Cause ITALY 6 0.0026
JAPAN does not Granger Cause US 0.043 0.96
US does not Granger Cause JAPAN 5.7 0.0038
UK does not Granger Cause US 0.84 0.43
US does not Granger Cause UK 8.6 0.00023
FRANCE does not Granger Cause GERMANY 8.7 0.0002
GERMANY does not Granger Cause FRANCE 2.5 0.084
ITALY does not Granger Cause GERMANY 6.2 0.0022
GERMANY does not Granger Cause ITALY 2.3 0.1
JAPAN does not Granger Cause GERMANY 3.6 0.028
GERMANY does not Granger Cause JAPAN 3.5 0.03
UK does not Granger Cause GERMANY 1.6 0.21
GERMANY does not Granger Cause UK 1.5 0.23
ITALY does not Granger Cause FRANCE 1.6 0.21
FRANCE does not Granger Cause ITALY 1.7 0.18
JAPAN does not Granger Cause FRANCE 2.1 0.13
FRANCE does not Granger Cause JAPAN 1.1 0.33
UK does not Granger Cause FRANCE 2.9 0.054
FRANCE does not Granger Cause UK 5.6 0.0039
JAPAN does not Granger Cause ITALY 1.2 0.29
ITALY does not Granger Cause JAPAN 0.25 0.78
UK does not Granger Cause ITALY 0.59 0.55
ITALY does not Granger Cause UK 1.4 0.26
UK does not Granger Cause JAPAN 0.38 0.69
JAPAN does not Granger Cause UK 0.099 0.91
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Table 3.4
Granger Causality Results for the Complete VAR Model
Excluded Chi-sq Prob.
Dependent variable: US
UK 2.44 0.296
FRANCE 2.48 0.289
GERMANY 1.98 0.372
ITALY 1.35 0.509
JAPAN 0.437 0.804
All 10.4 0.409
Dependent variable: UK
US 10.5 0.00525
FRANCE 6.81 0.0332
GERMANY 0.632 0.729
ITALY 2.23 0.329
JAPAN 0.261 0.878
All 28.1 0.00173
Dependent variable: FRANCE
US 9.61 0.0082
UK 0.717 0.699
GERMANY 4.48 0.106
ITALY 0.198 0.906
JAPAN 0.801 0.67
All 23.8 0.00804
Dependent variable: GERMANY
US 1.69 0.43
UK 0.711 0.701
FRANCE 10 0.00662
ITALY 11.8 0.00271
JAPAN 4.32 0.115
All 37.5 4.69E − 05
Dependent variable: ITALY
US 6.45 0.0398
UK 0.248 0.884
FRANCE 0.718 0.698
GERMANY 2.37 0.306
JAPAN 0.657 0.72
All 16.2 0.0928
Dependent variable: JAPAN
US 10.1 0.00653
UK 0.227 0.892
FRANCE 0.512 0.774
GERMANY 4.05 0.132
ITALY 0.0598 0.971
All 17.9 0.0568
Note: optimal number of lags by Akaike information criterion is used. In particular, T ∗ = 2.
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Figure 3.3
Directional CCI Spillovers, FROM All Countries
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UK, Germany, and Italy) are the biggest receivers of spillover. Within these four
countries, they contribute to and from each other at different time points. These
results imply the role each country plays, which is consistent with our findings based
on the Granger causality test.
Table 3.5
Summary of Spillovers
US UK Germany FRANCE ITALY JAPAN From Others
US 87.95 3.78 2.26 1.75 3.42 0.85 12.0
UK 13.00 75.81 0.38 1.60 8.78 0.43 24.2
Germany 6.74 0.89 77.88 9.32 1.28 3.89 22.1
FRANCE 22.27 3.66 3.25 68.78 0.47 1.56 31.2
ITALY 13.58 4.07 0.65 1.57 79.56 0.57 20.4
JAPAN 5.23 0.57 1.25 0.18 0.06 92.70 7.3
Contribution 60.8 13.0 7.8 14.4 14.0 7.3 117.3
to others
Contribution 148.8 88.8 85.7 83.2 93.6 100.0 19.6%
including Own
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Figure 3.4
Directional CCI Spillovers, TO All Countries
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Figure 3.5
Net CCI Spillovers
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Figure 3.6
Net Pairwise CCI Spillovers
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3.5 Total Spillover of Consumer Confidence
3.5.1 Methodology
In stead of “Directional Spillovers” which focus on the transmission of consumer
confidence from a country to another country, in this section, we study the total
level of spillovers. Obviously, the total spillover can be obtained by adding the net
spillovers of each country together. In this section, we still follow the approach
in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) to obtain total spillover of consumer confidence. In
specifically, we choose a moving window of 120 months (i.e., nspan = 120) for a
meaningful results. To simplify the notation, we call this series Consumer Confidence
Spillover Index (CCSI).
In order to understand the role of total spillover of consumer confidence, we also
transform CCSI so that the periods with high, moderate, or below average spillovers
can be identified.
In particular, we follow the approach in Chau and Deesomsak (2014) to calculate
the scored spillover index Z, which measures how many standard deviations the
current CCSI is away from its time-varying mean. The value distinguishes four
distinct regimes of spillover severity. Mathematically, Z = how many standard
deviations (SD) the current CCSI is away from its time-varying mean. = (CCSI -
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Figure 3.7
Total Spillovers, All G6 Countries
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time varying mean) / (time varying standard deviation). Here, we choose 50 months
as the time window length.
When Z is larger than 2 SD above the mean, it is classified as “severe spillover”;
when Z is between 0.75 and 2, we consider the spillover as “moderate”; Z ∈
[−0.75,−0.75) is classified as normal spillover, and Z < −0.75 is classified as below-
normal spillover.
3.5.2 Results and Discussions
The CCSI series is shown in Figure 3.7. From the figure, we can see that the total
spillover reached its peak in early 2009, during the Global Financial Crises. There
was a large escalation from early 2008 all the way from a nearly historical trough
to this peak. This makes us wonder: does the high escalation in total spillover level
tell us something about economy? does it have any predictory power?
The transformed Z series is shown in Figure 3.8. The results show that during
the last 18 years, there are briefly two time periods that are classified as having
“severe spillover” (i.e., Z > 2): the beginning of 2007 (January 2007 and April
2007), and from June 2008 all the way to October 2009. The severe spillover seems
to be an indicator of severe problem, such as crises or recessions. In the next section,
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Figure 3.8
Transformed Total Spillovers, All G6 Countries
we will analyse the implications of total spillover levels in more detail.
3.6 Use Total Spillover of Consumer Sentiment to
Predict Economic Activity
In this section, we study the application of of Consumer Confidence Spillover In-
dex (CCSI). We think it is interesting to determine whether and to what extent
the transmission of consumer sentiment affects the economic activity. We use the
Chicago Fed?s National Activity Index (CFNAI) as a measure of the overall US
economic activity. It was developed by Stock and Watson (1999), using princi-
pal components of 85 monthly indicators for employment, production, etc, and has
been proven useful in providing information on the current and future courses of US
economic activity and inflation.
The graphs for both CFNAI and CCSI are plotted in Figure 3.9. The two indices
show a negative relationship, especially at their turning points.
We use a VAR model to further study the relationship between CCSI and CFNAI.
The research method is similar to that in Chapter One. Specifically, we followed
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Figure 3.9
CCSI and CFNAI
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
05
/19
93
05
/19
94
05
/19
95
05
/19
96
05
/19
97
05
/19
98
05
/19
99
05
/20
00
05
/20
01
05
/20
02
05
/20
03
05
/20
04
05
/20
05
05
/20
06
05
/20
07
05
/20
08
05
/20
09
05
/20
10
05
/20
11
05
/20
12
05
/20
13
05
/20
14
05
/20
15
05
/20
16
05
/20
17
Spillover and Economic Activity
Normalised CFNAI Normalised Total Spillover of Consumer Confidence
Note: blue line = Chicago Fed’s National Activity Index (CFNAI). orange line = Consumer
Confidence Spillover Index (CCSI). Both linearly normalised to range [0,1] for easier comparison.
June 22, 2020
3.7. Future Research 103
the approach in Chau and Deesomsak (2014). We regard CFNAI as the dependent
variable, CCSI as the main independent variable, and also included two control
variables: interest rate and CPI. For the data range, we include the monthly data
between August 1993 and Apr 2017 (which gives us 280 data points). The VAR
results show that CCSI Granger causes CFNAI (with F statistic = 4.01), but not the
other way around (with F statistic = 1.93). Moreover, it has significant additional
explanatory power (9%). As we expected, we can conclude that the total spillover
can be used as a good indicator of economic activity.
3.7 Future Research
3.7.1 Predict Financial Crises
The total spillover of consumer confidence can have other applications.
We can study the relationship between total spillover and financial crises. First,
we need to build a logit model in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator
for crises. Obviously, we do not have a universal rule to identify crises and their
durations. Therefore, we can use the time of recessions by NBER as an indicator.
On the other hand, the independent variable is the total spillover level. From the
results, we expect spillover to be a predictor for crises. Due to the limitation in scale
of the thesis, this part will be done in the future.
3.7.2 Spillover of Filtered Consumer Confidence Data
We can further process the consumer confidence data first, so that to focus on the
spillover of specific consumer confidence changes.
There are two approaches to “filtering” consumer confidence. The first approach
is the “residuals” approach. Under this approach, we can build a VAR model first,
having consumer confidence as the dependent variable, and a group of economic and
financial variables as independent variables. This is quite similar to what we did in
Chapter One. After we estimate the VAR model, the residuals will be used as the
filtered consumer confidence. The underlying reason is that this residual is the part
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of consumer confidence that is not explained by other variables.
The second approach is the “asymmetry” approach. Under this approach, we
can separate the downward changes in consumer confidence and the upward changes,
into two distinct series. And we will be able to study and compare the spillovers of
the two consumer confidence series.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the transmission of consumer confidence around the globe.
In particular, we focus on the G6 countries, and study two problems: the directional
spillover of consumer confidence, and the total spillover. The former focuses on the
“direction” of the relationship. We are able to identify each country’s role - who
are the receivers, and who are the contributors, and why. We have found that US
has by far the largest influence on the spillover of consumer confidence. This is not
surprising, given it being the largest economy in the world. We have found that
European countries, due to the close economic and geographic relationships, also
influence each other frequently. But each country’s role is time dependent, and is
worth further study.
The second problem focuses on the “magnitude” of the relationship, and its
applications. We find that spillover is the highest at the beginning of a financial
crises. Therefore, it has some predictory power on economic activities and economic
turning points. This is because a large drop in consumer confidence in one country
often leads large drops in consumer confidence in other countries, which in turn is
a warning sign to world economy.
In this chapter, our research is motivated by theories and findings in the area
of social psychology. Our research findings verify these findings, and hence provide
some proof on what consumer confidence measures - consumer attitude.
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Chapter 4
The dynamics of sentiment and
house price
4.1 Introduction
The focus of the thesis is consumer sentiment. In Chapter 1, we studied the deter-
minants of consumer sentiment, focusing on the role of a new variable, Economic
Policy Uncertainty. In Chapter 2, we studied its interactions among different coun-
tries. From the results in Chapter 1, we found that the economic variables can
explain part of consumer sentiment, and our new variable has extra explanatory
power. Nonetheless, there is part of consumer sentiment that is left to be unex-
plained by other variables. This implies the consumer sentiment may have unique
information in itself, and it may have unique explanatory power on other economic
variables that may interest us. Hence, in this chapter, we study the effects of con-
sumer sentiment on other variables, or specifically, on house price.
There is wide literature on the effects of consumer sentiment. Some focus on
how consumer confidence affects expenditure of durable goods, for instance, Leone
and Kamakura (1983); Bram and Ludvigson (1998); Ludvigson (2004); Özerkek and
Çelik (2010). Most researchers agree that consumer sentiment do have some unique
information that helps predict future expenditure. And on the other hand, some
focus on the relationship between sentiment and stock market performance, such as
Friend and Adams (1964); Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Jansen and Nahuis (2003);
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Baker and Wurgler (2006); Allis and McCallig (2007); Bollen et al. (2011); Baker
et al. (2013). The general finding is that investment sentiment affects the investment.
However, There is limited evidence on the effects of consumer sentiment on
house price, possibly because of the unique characteristics of house purchase. It
can be regarded as both a durables/services consumption, as well as an investment.
Therefore, the relationship between consumer sentiment and house price becomes
more ambiguous and complicated, and is worth studying.
Researchers have been interested in finding the determinants of house price for
a long time. Apparently, the level of demand and supply determines price. Housing
market is not an exemption. House price is determined by the demand and supply
factors. Higher demand and lower supply lead to higher house price. Following this
idea, researchers have confirmed that the housing market is influenced by the state
of the economy, interest rates, real income and changes in the size of the population,
etc.
However, in addition to these economic factors, people also agree that sentiment
plays a role in house price change. But what role it plays depends on how to inter-
pret it. Based on Ludvigson (2004), one economic interpretation is that it captures
reduced uncertainty about future, and therefore diminishes precautionary savings
motives. In other words, higher sentiment implies higher expenditure today, and
lower expenditure in the future. As a result, consumer will save less, and consump-
tion growth will be lower in the future. If it is the case, consumer sentiment might be
negatively related to house price. In Chapter 2, we suggest that consumer confidence
partially measures uncertainty, which is aligned with this explanation. However, this
interpretation is rejected by the economic evidence according to Ludvigson (2004).
The other interpretation proposed by Ludvigson (2004) is that consumer senti-
ment captures the expectations of future income. It is founded on the rational ex-
pectations – permanent income hypothesis (REPIH). If consumer sentiment higher,
it implies that consumer expects higher income and wealth in the future. Consump-
tion expenditure might increase today, since consumers should be able to borrow
against their future income and wealth, and smooth consumption over time. Or, if
consumers follow a “rule of thumb”, i.e., consuming current income, or if they are
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liquidity constrained, they might not be able to consume right away, but will be able
to consumer more as their income because higher. This interpretation is supported
by the analysis between consumer sentiment and consumption data.
However, Ludvigson (2004) also points out that although consumer sentiment
seems to imply future income expectations, it has unique information that is not
included in income data. This is related to our findings in Chapter 1. We also
suggest that consumer sentiment is not a measure of animal instinct, but a reflection
of information (such as news) people receive that is not included in other economic or
financial variables. Based on the information, people have a better understanding of
world news and big events, world economy, the economic environment around them,
and their future income expectations. If we interpret consumer sentiment this way,
it should have a positive relationship with both people’s willingness to buy, and the
willingness to invest. Moreover, its expectation component (the prediction part)
might even have a stronger prediction power, due to the liquidation constraint at
the current stage. Nonetheless, when consumer sentiment is higher, not only do
consumers expect to have more money, they also expect other people to have more
purchasing and investment power. Hence, we make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Higher consumer sentiment leads to positive change in house
price.
Consumers include a large group of people. In general, almost everyone of us
is a consumer. More specifically, the consumer sentiment represents the sentiment
of people who take the Survey of Consumers. These people belong to different
demographic subgroups. They are from different regions, at different ages, and with
different income. Obviously, consumers within different demographic subgroups do
not affect house price in the same manner. For example, people in a very young age
group are less likely to be potential home buyers. Hence, their sentiment may not
affect house price as much as middle-aged people do. On the other hand, very old
people are less likely to buy a new house as well, which also makes their sentiment less
important than middle-aged people’s one in determining house price. The discussion
leads to the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2(a): The sentiment of middle-aged people plays a better role in
explaining the change in house price.
Similarly, consumers with higher income are more likely to be potential home
buyers, and they tend to be more knowledgeable on the financial market. Hence,
their sentiment is likely to play a more important role in determining house price
change. This leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2(b): The sentiment of people with higher income plays a better
role in explaining the change in house price.
Whether and how the sentiment of consumers from different regions works differ-
ently is harder to discuss intuitively. However, there are clearly regional differences
in house price, income levels, population, etc. Therefore, we also make Hypoth-
esis 2(c) and we are interested in finding empirical evidence and discovering how
consumer sentiment works within different regions.
Hypothesis 2(c): There could be a region difference in the role of consumer
sentiment on explaining the change in house price.
In the previous few paragraphs, we considered the decomposition of consumer
sentiment into different demographic subgroups. On the other hand, the house price
can also be further decomposed. There are more expensive houses in the top price
tier, and more affordable houses in the bottom tier. While the latter are more likely
to be a “necessity” for people, the former is more of a “luxury’ item”. We think
consumer sentiment may affect the purchase of the houses in a higher price tier more.
Because while people have to purchase necessary items all the time, sentiment gives
people more incentive to buy luxury items they otherwise are reluctant in buying.
Hence, the following hypothesis is made:
Hypothesis 3: Consumer sentiment explains the change in the price of houses
within higher price tier better.
We have discussed the role of consumer sentiment on house price change in
detail. We need to point out that consumer sentiment captures people’s optimism
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in buying, but not in buying a house in particular. This makes us wonder, can we
construct a housing specific consumer sentiment index, which gives more weight on
people’s opinions on the housing market?
Moreover, while our focus has been consumer sentiment through this thesis,
when thinking of the housing market, we think some professional opinions/sentiment
can also provide some extra value. Consumers are potential home buyers. On the
contrary, home sellers (or builders)’ opinions would reflect the demand of the housing
market and the supply of the housing market. Therefore, builders’ sentiment is also
important. Similar to consumer sentiment, builders’ sentiment shows the builders’
view on the housing market. If their sentiment is high, it implies that they feel they
are going to sell more houses and make more money, which means the demand is
going up and the house price is likely to go up accordingly.
In addition, realtors, or real estate brokers, are agents who create a bridge be-
tween consumers and builders.They are people who represent sellers or buyers of real
estate or real property. As professionals, their sentiment should reflect the demand
and supply of the housing market quite well. As a result, realtors’ sentiment should
also be very useful in determining house price.
Finally, the demand of the housing market is affected by the lenders, or mortgage
providers. Therefore, their opinions also provide unique information in determining
house price.
Fortunately, the data that represent sentiment of builders, lenders and realtors
are accessible. By combining the opinions of consumers, builders, lenders and re-
altors, we think we can construc a new sentiment index that is more valuable and
informative in determining house price change.
In summary, we are aiming at answering the following research questions:
1. Whether and to what extent does consumer sentiment affect house price, when
other economic variables are controlled for?
2. How does consumer sentiment within different income, age and region sub-
groups work differently on house price?
3. How does consumer sentiment work differently for different house price tiers?
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Figure 4.1
Factors Determining House Price
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4. Can we construct a housing specific sentiment index from survey data? Will
it work better in explaining house price change?
Through thorough data analyses and novel approaches, we can better understand
the nature of the relationship between sentiment and house price. We believe our
findings will provide valuable insights to both researchers and practitioners.
4.2 Literature
4.2.1 Determinants of House Price
As we discussed before, house price is determined by the demand and supply factors.
Higher demand and lower supply lead to higher house price.
Tejvan Pettinger summarised the factors determining house price in Figure 4.1.
In this sub-section, we discuss the major findings on the determinants of the
housing market. We will focus on the roles of economic variables. We first discuss
intuitively whether and how it affects the demand or the supply side of the housing
market, then list the findings in literature.
gross domestic product (GDP)
Not surprisingly, GDP is an important determinant of home price, because it is
associated with income. Higher GDP leads to higher purchasing ability, which leads
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to higher house price. Therefore, there is positive relationship between GDP and
house price. The strong relationship between GDP and home price has been widely
studied in literature.
The strong relationship between GDP, income and the housing market has been
examined in the literature. Iacoviello and Neri (2008) examine the response of GDP
to housing market fluctuations and Mikhed and Zemcik (2009) concluded that in
USA a decline in home prices affected negatively the consumption and GDP. Adams
and Fss (2010) noticed that the GDP growth has an increasing impact on the housing
market. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) using data from 17 industrialized countries and
through variance decomposition concluded that the long-term contribution of GDP
doesn’t exceed the 10% of the total variation of housing price. Many studies (Davis
and Heathcote, 2003; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Madsen, 2012) agree that a
strong short-term relationship exist between housing market and GDP. However
Madsen (2012) indicates that in the long term this nexus becomes weak. Turning
on the Greek economy, Merikas et al (2010) found a bidirectional causality with a
strong impact of housing investment on the economy growth.
Inflation
The relationship of inflation and house price is complicated. On one hand, while
the real house value might stay the same, the “face value” of the house increases as
the inflation rate increases. On the contrary, inflation may lead to lower purchasing
power and lower house price. At the same time, indirectly, when inflation increases,
interest rates tend to increase with it. This increases mortgage and reduces demand
and hence lowers house price. Yet on the other hand, some people think buying a
house is a good investment in the time of high inflation. Therefore, higher inflation
also leads to the increase in demand and house price.
On the supplier side, when inflation rates rise, the cost of building new homes
does too, resulting in less new constructions and therefore reducing the supply of
homes, which in turn will push up the prices of existing homes.
In summary, inflation has mixed effects on house price. Empirically, there has
always been a strong correlation between inflation and house prices, usually resulting
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in them rising.
Kearl (1979) examined the inflationary environment and concluded that in the
case of false anticipation relative housing prices are affected. Similarly, Follain (1981)
and Feldstein (1992) infer this negative effect of inflation on demand and on hous-
ing investments while Andrews (2010) detect upward trends of housing prices after
change of inflation in both directions. On the other hand, Nielsen and Sorensen
(1994) find that an increasing inflation generates housing investment motives be-
cause of the decreasing real user cost after taxes. All in all, there are discordant
views concerning the actual effect of inflation on housing market (Manchester, 1987;
Berkovec and Fullerton, 1989; Madsen, 2012; Apergis and Rezitis, 2003; Tsatsaronis
and Zhu, 2004; Bork and Muller, 2012).
Interest Rate
The interest rate is related to the mortgage rate, which determines the monthly
repayment amount when one buys a house. Therefore, the higher the interest rate,
the less affordable the house becomes, the lower the demand, and finally the lower
the house price. Meanwhile, the higher the interest, the more willingly people want
to save money, which also leads to lower demand and lower house price. However,
conversely, a decline in interest rates is usually accompanied by an increase in in-
flation, which also leads to lower purchasing power and lower house price in the
long run. In summary, interest rate has a mixed effect on house price. However,
researchers find that the relationship between interest rate and house price is often
negative.
When the interest rate is rising, the cost of borrowing is also rising and the
potential buyers are getting discouraged. As a result housing demand is falling. On
the contrary, when the interest rates are on the decrease, e.g. because of money
supply growth, then the user cost of housing is going down and the demand for
housing is rising (Apergis and Rezitis, 2003; Igan et al, 2011). Andrews (2010)
argues that the correlation between house prices and the loan interest rate is negative
and depends on the degree of competition in the banking sector.Frederic (2007)
detects six direct and indirect ways in which the rate is affecting the housing market:
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directly on the user cost of capital, on the expectations for the future movements
of prices and on the housing supply; indirectly through housing wealth changes and
credit-channel effects on consumption and on demand. Jud and Winkler (2002) and
Painter and Redfearn (2002) argue that the influence of houses prices on interest
rates is of minor importance while others that the interest rate is one of the most
crucial macroeconomic factors of housing (Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach, 2008; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Pavan, 2011; Goodhart
and Hofmann, 2008; Zan and Wang, 2012).
Unemployment Rate
Obviously, unemployment rate is also an important determinant of house price.
The higher the unemployment rate, the less the number of people who can afford a
house, which leads to less demand and lower house price. Therefore, the relationship
between unemployment rate and house price is clearly negative.
Employment and household income are important factors (see Lerbs 2011; Gius-
sani et al, 1992; Baffoe-Bonnie, 1998). Smith and Tesarek (1991) examined the
effect of a real estate activity decrease and found that the latter leads to a decreased
employment growth rate. Schnure (2005) concludes that an unemployment rate
percentage increase of one unit leads to housing price decrease of 1%. Blanchflower
and Oswald (2013) and Oswald (1999) connect the labour mobility and the home
ownership rate and find evidence of negative externalities of the housing market on
the labour market. They argue that a home-ownership rate increase affects labour
mobility and leads to an unemployment rise.
4.2.2 Effects of Consumer Sentiment
When consumer sentiment index was first constructed in the 1950s, the initial goal
was to better predicting durable expenditures. Therefore, not surprisingly, the ma-
jority of the literature on consumer confidence have focused on its implications and
predictive powers on expenditures and other related economic or financial variables.
Okun (1960) studied the value of ICS in forecasting National Product from cross-
section data. He decomposed the index to the attitude component and the buying
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plan component, and concluded that attitude other than buying plan was not signifi-
cant in predicting National Product. On the other hand, Mueller (1963) reached the
opposite conclusion. By analysing the quarterly ICS data from 1952 to 1961 by time
series regression, he concluded that attitude contains unique information in terms
of forecasting spending. Similarly, Adams (1964) also supported this view. By ex-
amining the disintegrated information from ICS, he concluded that attitudes make
a significant contribution in forecasting durable expenditures, while the expected
business condition in short-term component is the most important one. However,
when more variables were considered, the conclusion seemed to be questionable
again. in the previous studies, only a couple of control variables were included in
the model, sometimes disposable income alone. Friend and Adams (1964) added
stock prices and other non-attitudinal variables to the regression model, and found
that stock prices and non-attitudinal variables such as the length of the work week,
share the predictive ability of consumer attitude. Juster et al. (1972) expended the
findings to nondurables. They found that consumer attitude not only was of signif-
icance in forecasting models for durable spendings, but interestingly, also explained
expenditures on nondurables.
Garner (1991) argued that confidence surveys were seldom useful in forecast-
ing economic performance, except for exceptional instances such as the Gulf War.
Throop (1992) agreed with this argument. He had a thorough study on the effects
of consumer sentiment by applying new methods such as vector error correction to
avoid spurious regression results. He found out that sentiment change caused spend-
ing change. However, sentiment did not have much predictive power on spending,
as it generally did not provide additional information. But at times of an unusual
event, it did provide unique information.
Fuhrer (1993) applied VAR model to study the role consumer sentiment plays
in the US macroeconomy, and he concluded that its forecasting value is statistical,
but not economic significant. Similarly, Emerson and Hendry (1994) used the VAR
technique to show that in general, leading indicators do not have any additional
information in forecasting. Oppositely, Acemoglu and Scott (1994) analysed UK
data on consumer confidence by VAR model, Granger Causality test and exclusion
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tests, and reached the conclusion that confidence is useful in predicting consumption.
They were also a supporter of the precautionary effect view on consumer confidence.
In addition to consumer spending, researchers also studied consumer confidence’s
effects on other variables, such as stock price, unemployment rate, etc. In particular,
Leeper (1992) studied the predictive power of consumer confidence on industrial
production and unemployment. He separated the confidence index to two parts: one
corresponds to economic information, and one corresponds to non-economic events,
and studied the role of the second part of confidence index on the two dependent
variables, industrial production and unemployment in a VAR model. He concluded
that confidence index did not have predictive value when other variables were added
to the model. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) found that
confidence granger caused GNP change. David Gulley and Sultan (1998) studied
the effect of consumer confidence on the financial market using a GARCH model,
and concluded that consumer confidence only influences the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, but not bond or other stock indexes.
Previous studies were almost always based on ICS, researchers started to pay
attention to other consumer confidence indexes, and some comparisons between in-
dexes became available. Huth et al. (1994) compared the performance of ICS and
CCI in forecasting expenditures, business activities and economic activities, and
concluded that while they were both useful, ICS outperforms CCI when predicting
durable expenditures, whereas the reverse is true for general economic activity. Bram
and Ludvigson (1998) also compared the predictive power of ICS and CCI. In addi-
tion to the indexes, they also compared the expectation components, and broader
sentiment measures. They concluded that CCI and CCI’s expectation component
have a better predictive power on more categories of household expenditures, except
for automobile expenditures. Lovell and Tien (1999a) compared ICS with Economic
Discomfort Index (EDI), which was defined as unemployment plus annual rate of
inflation. They concluded that EDI contains similar information to ICS. Lemmon
and Portniaguina (2006) studied the relationship between consumer confidence and
asset prices, by using consumer confidence as a measure of investor optimism. They
rejected sentiment’s prediction value. On the other hand, Bollen et al. (2011) found
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that sentiment that is implied by Twitter mood predicts the stock market.
Some researchers further processed the consumer confidence data. Desroches
and Gosselin (2002) studied the usefulness of consumer confidence indexes. The
uniqueness of their work is that they claim only large variations of confidence can
affect spending. By analysing the filtered data using a threshold, they observed that
“consumer confidence is a statistically important determinant of consumption in
periods of high uncertainty”. Souleles (2004) the first to use micro data (household
data) underlying ICS to study its relationship with consumption. He found that
the results change with time, and group of households. He also reported results
that were consistent with precautionary motives, which contradicts the results from
several macro level studies Chatterjee and Dinda (2015). Michis (2010) claimed that
the denoised ICS can forecast GDP efficiently.
In summary, while most researchers agree that sentiment and economic output
(such as consumer expenditures, stock returns, and GNP) are positively correlated
(Berry and Davey, 2004; Friend and Adams, 1964; Fuhrer, 1993; Jansen and Nahuis,
2003; Leone and Kamakura, 1983; Matsusaka and Sbordone, 1995; Throop, 1992),
there is disagreement on whether this is merely because they are determined by the
same economic variables, or sentiment is indeed an independent variable with some
predictive power.
The discrepancy in the results is mainly due to different control variables and
different data analysis approaches. Recent studies have applied more econometric
tools (such as the Granger causality test, in-sample and out-of-sample analyses) or
further examine the data (for example, utilising household-level demographic data
or individual answers gathered from the questionnaire) to avoid spurious results.
However, the literature still offers conflicting evidence. Hence, more research effort
is needed to better interpreting the effects of sentiment.
4.2.3 Sentiment’s role on House Price and House Price Volatil-
ity
When consumer sentiment’s role is studied, more focus has been given to its role
on the stock market and other financial markets. On the other hand, the research
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in the determinants of housing market performance gives more weight to the roles
of economic variables and other factors. However, there are still some papers that
study the relationship between consumer sentiment and the housing market.
The paper that is most closely related to our focus is Ling et al. (2015). This
paper used a VAR model to study the effect of sentiment on house price. It consid-
ered “sentiment” of three major agents in the U.S. housing market: potential home
buyers, home builders, and residential mortgage lenders. It found that all three
types of sentiment had a positive effect on house price.
In the paper, the authors constructed a consumer sentiment measure, based on
the answer to one question from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.
They also used answers to one question in Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices as a proxy for lender sentiment.
After obtaining the sentiment measures, these survey-based sentiment measures
are orthogonalised against a wide range of fundamental variable. And then, a com-
posite sentiment index is constructed by taking the first principal component of
the three orthogonalised indices. They also included another variable, a proxy for
market liquidity, in the model. They analysed the VAR model and did various
robustness tests.
The limitations of the paper include the following: since lenders’ sentiment data
were only quarterly available, the authors convert all other monthly data to quarterly
one, by using March, June, Sept, and Dec’s data. There were barely 82 data points.
A lot of information might have been lost due to this data processing approach,
since we all know sentiment data and house price data fluctuate frequently.
This paper inspired our Hypothesis 4. And we make our own contributions
by considering another important agents’ sentiment; constructing a much better
housing specific consumer sentiment; and providing a thorough comparison within
income/house-price tiers, age subgroups and regions.
Another piece of literature that is closely linked with our focus is Johnson (2010).
In Chapter 3 of his Thesis, Johnson (2010) used a VAR model to study the effect
of consumer sentiment on home prices and home sales. It found that consumer
sentiment does impact home prices and home sales. It also compared the results for
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different age groups. And also used a panel VAR model to take regional difference
into consideration.
Four variables were considered in his VAR equation: consumer confidence (either
national, or age group specific), house price, house sales, and 30 year conventional
mortgage rate (newly included). He used Granger causality results to find the direc-
tions of the relationships. he found that sentiment did affect home price and home
sales.
In his model, no or just one control variable was included. The VAR model
was extremely simple. Hence, It could not rule out the possibility that other major
microeconomic variables (which influence ICS) were causing this relationship. In
addition, It did not compare or discuss regional difference. Moreover, some inter-
pretations of the results were not very convincing.
Clayton et al. (2009) investigated the role of fundamentals and investor sentiment
in commercial real estate valuation. In real estate markets, heterogeneous proper-
ties trade in illiquid, highly segmented and informationally inefficient local markets.
Moreover, the inability to short sell private real estate restricts the ability of sophis-
ticated traders to enter the market and eliminate mispricing. These characteristics
would seem to render private real estate markets highly susceptible to sentiment-
induced mispricing. Using error correction models to carefully model potential lags
in the adjustment process, this paper extends previous work on cap rate dynam-
ics by examining the extent to which fundamentals and investor sentiment help to
explain the time-series variation in national-level cap rates. We find evidence that
investor sentiment impacts pricing, even after controlling for changes in expected
rental growth, equity risk premiums, T-bond yields, and lagged adjustments from
long run equilibrium.
On the contrary, Dua (2008) analysed the determinants of consumers’ percep-
tions of buying conditions for houses. He used the answer to one question from the
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers as a proxy for measuring consumers’
home buying perceptions. He then found that variables such as house prices, mort-
gage rates, wealth, employment and income levels have an impact on consumers’
attitudes, by using a VAR model. In other words, in his research, house buying
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specific consumer sentiment is the dependent variable, and the economic variables
are the determinants.
4.3 Data
In this section, we list the sources or constructions of all the variables that will
be used in our data analyses. We also explain why we make these choices. In
additional, we plot these series, and make some initial observations. Finally, we list
their summary of statistics.
4.3.1 Consumer, Builder, Lender and Realtor Sentiment
Sentiment of Consumers (ICS)
The survey results from the Survey of Consumers by University of Michigan are used
in this study. In particular, Consumer Sentiment Index (ICS) is used as a proxy
for US consumer sentiment. In Chapter 1, we have already explained in detail how
ICS is constructed and calculated from five survey questions. Here, we discuss the
reasons why we only focus on this index:
Firstly, ICS is the most widely used proxy for consumer confidence in literature.
It is the first survey based index that aims at measuring consumer confidence, and
has been proven useful in serving this goal.
Secondly, it has a pretty long time range. The monthly data are available from
as early as 1978. The more than 40 years of monthly data allow us to study the
relationship between sentiment and house price in the long run. The only other index
that measures sentiment/confidence that has a similar time range is the Conference
Board’s Consumer Confidence Index. There is another sentiment index that is
specifically designed for the housing market, The Home Purchase Sentiment Index
by Fannie Mae. However, that series only provides data for the last ten years.
Lastly, all the survey results from the Survey of Consumers are freely accessible.
Not only the result of each single survey question, but also the answers by demo-
graphic subgroups, are available for download. This gives us freedom to dig into
the survey answers and extract more information. In particular, we are interested
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Figure 4.2
ICS within different income tiers
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in comparing the roles of ICS within different age groups, income tiers, and regions.
Fortunately, ICS within three income tiers (top, middle and bottom), three age
groups (34 and below, 35 to 54, and 55 and above), and four regions (East, West,
North East, and Midwest), are all available. Their graphs are shown in Figures 4.2,
4.3 and 4.4. We can observe that people with higher income tends to have higher
sentiment than people with lower income. Similarly, younger people tends to have
higher sentiment than older people. On the other hand, ICS within different regions
are quite easily comparable.
Sentiment of Builders (IBS)
We use the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index as a proxy for builders’ senti-
ment. This index is based on a monthly survey of NAHB (i.e, National Association
of Home Builders) members designed to take the pulse of the single-family hous-
ing market. The survey asks respondents to rate market conditions for the sale of
new homes at the present time and in the next six months as well as the traffic of
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Figure 4.3
ICS within different age subgroups
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
M
ay
-9
6
N
ov
-9
6
M
ay
-9
7
N
ov
-9
7
M
ay
-9
8
N
ov
-9
8
M
ay
-9
9
N
ov
-9
9
M
ay
-0
0
N
ov
-0
0
M
ay
-0
1
N
ov
-0
1
M
ay
-0
2
N
ov
-0
2
M
ay
-0
3
N
ov
-0
3
M
ay
-0
4
N
ov
-0
4
M
ay
-0
5
N
ov
-0
5
M
ay
-0
6
N
ov
-0
6
M
ay
-0
7
N
ov
-0
7
M
ay
-0
8
N
ov
-0
8
M
ay
-0
9
N
ov
-0
9
M
ay
-1
0
N
ov
-1
0
M
ay
-1
1
N
ov
-1
1
M
ay
-1
2
N
ov
-1
2
M
ay
-1
3
N
ov
-1
3
M
ay
-1
4
N
ov
-1
4
M
ay
-1
5
N
ov
-1
5
M
ay
-1
6
N
ov
-1
6
M
ay
-1
7
N
ov
-1
7
M
ay
-1
8
N
ov
-1
8
ICS within Different Age Subgroups
Age 34- Age 35-54 Age 54+
Figure 4.4
ICS within different regions
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prospective buyers of new homes. It is monthly available since 1985.
Sentiment of Realtors (IRS)
We use NAR’s Realtors Confidence Index (6-month outlook) as a proxy for real state
agents’ sentiment. National Association of Realtors (NAR) send monthly survey to
over 50,000 real estate practitioners. Practitioners are asked about their expec-
tations for home sales, prices and market conditions. Realtors Confidence Index
(6-month outlook) is based on their answers to a particular question in the survey,
and is a good representation of realtors’ sentiment on housing market strength. The
index is monthly available since 2008.
Sentiment of Lenders (ILS)
To estimate lenders’ sentiment, we follow the approach in Ling et al. (2015). We
estimate the lenders’ sentiment from one survey question in Federal Reserve Board’s
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. The survey is con-
ducted quarterly, and questions cover changes in the standards and terms of the
banks’ lending and the state of business and household demand for loans. The par-
ticular question we focus on is: “Over the past 3 months, how have your bank’s
credit standards for approving applications from individuals for mortgage loans to
purchase homes changed?” We calculate the net percentage of positive answers, i.e,
the percentage answered “eased somewhat” or “eased considerably” minus percent-
age answered “tightened considerably” or “tightened somewhat”. In words, this net
percentage shows how easy the home purchase mortgage application is getting ap-
proved. Clearly, it is a good indication for lenders’ sentiment. The data is quarterly
available since 1997. We convert it to monthly data by assuming the same index
applies for all the 3 months in that quarter.
The Consumers’, Builders’, Realtors’ and Lenders’ sentiment indices from 2008
to now are shown in Figure 4.5. We can clearly see that they share some similarities
(in general, sentiment has an increasing trend since 2008), but each series also has
some uniqueness.
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Figure 4.5
Consumers’, Builders’, Realtors’ and Lenders’ sentiment
(a) Consumer Sentiment (ICS)
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(b) Builder Sentiment (IBS)
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(c) Realtor Sentiment (IRS)
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(d) Lender Sentiment (ILS)
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4.3.2 House Price
There are several widely used US house price indices. For example, the US Federal
Housing Finance Agency publishes the HPI index, a quarterly broad measure of the
movement of single-family house prices. On the other hand, The Case-Shiller house
price index is monthly available, but has a long lag time (2 months). They are both
based on weighted-repeat sales methodology (see Case and Shiller (1988)).
However, we choose Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) as the proxy for house
price in our study. The advantage of ZHVI is that it overcomes a major problem in
existing indices: their inability to deal with the changing composition of properties
sold in one time period versus another time period. Both a median sale price index
and a repeat sales index are vulnerable to such biases. The other reasons why we
choose this index are as follows:
Firstly, ZHVI is widely recognised in literature. Secondly, it also has a pretty
long time range. It is monthly available since 1996, which gives us more than 270
data points.
Lastly, in additional to the general ZHVI, Zillow also divides the house values
to three price tiers (top, middle or bottom tier), and provides us with tier specific
ZHVI’s. The thresholds for the price tiers vary from metro to metro and are deter-
mined by the distribution of home values in each metro. We think it is interesting
to compare sentiment’s role in the top price tier versus in the bottom one. ZHVI
allows us to do this comparing analysis easily.
The general ZHVI, as well as the Top and Bottom Tiered ZHVI data are shown
in Figure 4.6. We can see that the price indices have a similar increasing trend.
Their percentage change are shown in Figure 4.7. It clearly shows that although the
percentage change of the top-tiered price and the percentage change of the bottom-
tiered price share a similar trend, the latter seems to have bigger volatility, especially
in certain periods.
In Figure 4.8, we rescaled the ICS and the percentage change in ZHVI data to
[0, 1], and plot the new time series on the same graph. The plot clearly shows that
ICS and ZHVI move in a very similar trend. It is consistent with our hypothesis.
However, it is hard to tell directly the change of which leads to the change of
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Figure 4.6
House Price Index, ZHVI (General/Top-Tier/Bottom-Tier)
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Figure 4.7
Percentage Change in House Price Index, ZHVI (General/Top-Tier/Bottom-Tier)
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Figure 4.8
Rescaled ICS and Percentage Change in ZHVI
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the other. Hence, a thorough data analysis is needed to further examine their
relationship.
4.3.3 Control Variables
As discussed in the Literature Review section, we understand that interest rate,
unemployment rate, change in GDP, and inflation are all important determinants
of home price. Therefore, we include these four microeconomic variables as control
variables in our model. All these variables are downloadable from Datastream and
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (fred.stlouisfed.org).
• Industrial Production Index (IPI): monthly data that measures the real pro-
duction output of manufacturing, mining, and utilities. It can be used as a
proxy for gross domestic product (GDP), which is only available quarterly.
• Consumer Price Index (CPI): monthly data that measures changes in the
price level of a market basket of consumer goods and services purchased by
households. Its first difference denotes inflation rate (INF).
• Interest Rate (INT): monthly data of the 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate.
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• Unemployment Rate (UNE): monthly data that measures percentage in labour
force that are unemployed.
Similar to what we discussed in Chapter 1, we process these data first, based
on the meanings of the variables, and stationarity test results. Our decisions are
as follows: for IPI, its percentage difference is used. We should note that this is
very similar to its first differences in its logged values, which was what we used in
Chapter 1. For CPI, we take the first differences. In other words, inflation rate INF
is used. For the other two variables, INT and UNE, we just use the levels of these
variables directly.
We plot the time series for all the processed control variables in Figure 4.9. We
can see that the processed series do not seem to be autocorrelated, have a monotonic
trend, or be nonstationary. Compared this figure with Figure 4.8, we can clearly see
that each control variable follow unique moving trend. Unlike ICS, their trends are
quite distinct with the moving trend of the percentage change in ZHVI. However,
it is still possible that a linear combination of these control variables explains the
large part of the percentage change in ZHVI. It is still worth including these control
variables in our model, and study the extra explanatory power of ICS.
In summary, our basic model includes the following variables:
• Dependent variable: percentage difference in ZHVI. To simplify the notation,
we will denoted as ∆ZHVI.
• Main independent variable: ICS.
• Control variables: INF (i.e., ∆CPI), percentage difference in IPI (denoted as
∆IPI), INT, and UNE.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics for all these series for the time period May 1996 to Apr 2019
(IRS is only available from Jan 2008) are reported in Table 4.1. We can see that
difference sentiment indices have different ranges, due to different constructions
calculation methods. For example, The builders’ sentiment ranges from 8 to 78,
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Figure 4.9
Time Series for all the Control Variables
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while the lenders’ sentiment ranges from -74 to 18.3. The landers’ sentiment also has
high Kurtosis value, indicating the data has heavy tails. For the control variables,
the percentage change in IPI also has a very high Kurtosis value, indicating that
there are “outliers”. Other data have much lower Kurtosis values.
We can also observe the range of ∆ZHVI is from -1.02 to +1.04. The lowest
value (meaning the biggest percentage drop in house price between the current
month and the previous one) happens in June, 2008, around the start of the 2008
Financial Crisis. The highest value (meaning the biggest percentage increas in house
price between the current month and the previous one) happened in July 2004. On
the other hand, ICS ranges from 55.3 to 112. The smallest value takes place in Nov
2008, during the 2008 Financial Crisis. The largest value takes place in Jan 2000.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Basic Model
Our objective is to test our hypotheses 1, 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 3. In other words, We
aim at examining the relationship between consumer sentiment (overall or within a
June 22, 2020
4.4. Methodology 129
Table 4.1
Summary Statistics
∆ZHVI ICS IBS ILS IRS ∆IPI INF INT UNE
Mean 0.30 88.19 50.32 -2.84 56.58 0.36 0.13 2.14 5.76
Median 0.46 90.95 58.00 0.00 61.00 0.39 0.17 1.58 5.20
Maximum 1.04 112.00 78.00 18.30 82.00 2.70 2.05 6.17 10.00
Minimum -1.02 55.30 8.00 -74.00 26.00 -3.84 -4.34 0.01 3.60
Std. Dev. 0.47 13.08 19.73 17.56 15.76 0.57 0.65 2.04 1.71
Skewness -1.23 -0.49 -0.81 -2.37 -0.35 -1.56 -1.73 0.48 1.09
Kurtosis 3.57 2.58 2.22 8.75 1.69 15.21 12.23 1.64 3.05
Observations 276 276 276 276 136 276 276 276 276
Note: ∆ZHVI = percentage change in Zillow Home Value Index. ICS = Index of Consumer
Sentiment for US by University of Michigan. IBS = Index of Builder Sentiment. ILS = Index of
Lender Sentiment. IRS = Index of Realtor Sentiment. ∆IPI = percentage change in Industrial
Production Index. INF = inflation rate, or first difference of Consumer Price Index (CPI). INT =
3-Month interest rate. UNE = unemployment rate. All are monthly data from May 1996 to April
2019, except for IRS, which is from Jan 2008.
subgroup) and house price change (overall or within a price-tier). In this section,
we explain the complete data analysis procedure we shall take in search for the
empirical evidence, which includes calculation of correlation, regression analysis, and
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model analysis. Under the VAR model, we performed
granger causality tests, impulse response analysis, and variance decomposition. Our
choices of approaches were based on the characteristics of the data and the existing
literature. The approach is identical to the one we used in Chapter 1.
Clearly, based on our objective, the two main variables we study are ICS (con-
sumer sentiment, either overall or within a subgroup) and ∆ZHVI (percentage
change in house price, either overall or within a price-tier). In order to eliminate the
possibility that the effect of ICS on ∆ZHVI is already covered by other economic
variables, we also need to include a set of control variables (CONTROLS = {∆IPI,
INF, INT, UNE}) in our model.
Correlation
We first calculate the correlation matrix for all the variables (ICS, ∆ZHVI CON-
TROLS). We are especially interested in the correlation between two main variables,
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corr(ICS, ∆ZHVI). Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect their correlation to be large
and significantly positive. Moreover, based on Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 3,
we expect their correlation to be slightly different for different subgroups of data.
The correlation does not tell us the relationship between lagged values of the
variables, hence can not provide any causality information. Nor can it tell us the
extra explanatory power of ICS on ∆ZHVI given CONTROLS. Therefore, at the
next step, we move to a regression model.
Regression Model
We then focus on the following regression model in Equation 4.4.1. In the equa-
tion, t denotes the time period (monthly), and T ∗ denotes the optimal number of
lags according to Akaike information criterion (with maximal number of lags for
consideration being 10).
∆ZHVIt = α +
T ∗∑
i=1
βiICSt−i + γCONTROLt−1 + ε (4.4.1)
We are interested in the sign of the coefficients of the lagged values of ICS, or∑T ∗
i=1 βi. We expect it to be positive and significant. We are also interested in the
(extra) explanatory power of ICS. To do this, we further consider the following two
regression equations:
∆ZHVIt = α + γCONTROLt−1 + ε (4.4.2)
∆ZHVIt = α +
T ∗∑
i=1
βiICSt−i + ε (4.4.3)
We will calculate the change in adj-R2 from Model 4.4.2 to Model 4.4.1, and
this value shows the extra explanatory power of ICS on ∆ZHVI. We will also record
adj-R2 of Model 4.4.3, which implies how much variance of ∆ZHVI can ICS alone
explain.
The regression models help us test our hypothesis in several angles. It verifies
the sign of the relationship between ∆ZHVI and lagged values of ICS. Furthermore,
it not only checks the explanatory power of ICS on ∆ZHVI, but also checks its extra
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explanatory power when CONTROLS are included in the model. However, there
are several limitations: firstly, they suffer from autocorrelation problem. Secondly,
they do not tell us whether the relationship is causal. Thirdly, they do not allow
us to check when there is a shock in ICS, how ∆ZHVI would respond to it. These
limitations can be overcome by a vector autoregression model. Therefore, we proceed
to the vector autoregression model.
Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model
Our VAR model is similar to the regression model. We regard all variables (∆ZHVI,
ICS and CONTROLS) as endogenous variables. The model has the following format:
Yt = A0 +
T ∗∑
i=1
AiYt−i + ut,
where Yt denotes the endogenous variable vector, ut denotes the error vector that
satisfies certain criteria, Ai denotes the coefficient vector, and T
∗ denotes the optimal
number of lags. In particular, we consider the following three models: Model (1):
Y = {∆ZHVI, ICS,CONTROLS}. Model (2): Y = {∆ZHVI,CONTROLS}. And
Model (3): Y = {∆ZHVI,CONTROLS}. Under the VAR model, we first record
coefficient and adj-R2 values just as in the regression model.
Once we have estimated a VAR model, we are also able to analyse its properties
using structural analysis, which includes three interdependent approaches. The first
approach is the Granger causality test. We do both pairwise Granger causality
test between the main variables, and Granger causality test for the complete model
(with control variables). In particular, to test whether ICS pairwise Granger causes
∆ZHVI, we consider the following model:
∆ZHVIt = a0(1) +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i +
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)ICSt−i + ut(1). (4.4.4)
And to test whether ICS Granger causes∆ZHVI in the complete model, we consider
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the following model:
∆ZHVIt = a0(1)+
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 1)yt−i+
T ∗∑
i=1
ai(1, 2)ICSt−i+
T ∗∑
i=1
Bi(1)CONTROLt−i+ut(1).
(4.4.5)
In both cases, we test the joint hypothesis:
a1(1, 2) = a2(1, 2) = ... = aT ∗(1, 2) = 0,
with Null hypothesis being ICS does not Granger cause ∆ZHVI.
After the causality tests are done, under the VAR model, we also obtain the
impulse response functions (IRF). The IRF gives the jth-period response when the
system is shocked by a one-standard-deviation shock. We are interested in tracing
the dynamics of ∆ZHVI to a shock to ICS. We expect that a shock to ICS causes
∆ZHVI to change positively temporarily.
Finally, we perform variance decomposition. While impulse response functions
trace the effects of a shock to one endogenous variable on to the other variables in
the VAR, variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable
into the component shocks to the VAR. Thus, the variance decomposition provides
information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting
the variables in the VAR. In particular, we focus on the decomposition of ∆ZHVI.
The variance decomposition results tell us in the short run (for example, at the 2nd
month) and in the long run (say, in 60 months, or 5 years), shock to ICS accounts
for how much variation of the fluctuation in ∆ZHVI. We expect that part of the
variance of∆ZHVI is explained by ICS.
Summary
In summary, Hypothesis 1 has several implications: the correlation between ICS
and ∆ZHVI should be positive. ICS should have a significant and (extra) positive
explanatory power over ∆ZHVI in the regression model, even when CONTROLS
are included. In a VAR model containing both ICS and ∆ZHVI, the former should
Granger Cause the latter. The impulse response results should show a positive
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relationship between ICS and∆ZHVI, where the former leads the latter. And finally,
the variance decomposition results should show that part of the variance of ∆ZHVI
is explained by ICS.
Hypotheses 2(a)-(c) and Hypothesis 3 have the following implications: the pos-
itive relationship we discussed above is bigger and more significant for consumers
with higher income, for middle-aged consumers, and on higher price-tiered houses.
Moreover, the positive relationship we discussed above is slightly different for con-
sumers from different regions.
4.4.2 Constructing Housing Specific Consumer Sentiment
Index
As explained in Chapter 1, ICS is generated based on consumers’ responses to five
survey questions listed below.
Q6 = “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.
Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse
off financially than you were a year ago?”
Q8 = “Now looking ahead–do you think that a year from now you (and your
family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the
same as now?”
Q28 = “Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole–do you think
that during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad
times, or what?”
Q29 = “Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely–that in the country
as a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so,
or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or
what?”
Q35 = “About the big things people buy for their homes–such as furniture, a
refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you
think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items?”
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Note that the indices of the questions (such as 6, 8, 28, 29, 35) represent the
actual question numbers in the survey. ICS is calculated by taking the average of
the answers to these five questions.
We can clearly see that the questions are not housing market specific. However,
there are actually questions on house selling/buying conditions in the same survey
(University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers). These questions and some other
questions could potentially be more useful in reflecting housing related sentiment.
By using the replies to these questions to construct a new sentiment index, we may be
able to provide a housing specific sentiment measure, that works better in explaining
house price change. In short, our objective is to choose a new group of survey
questions from Survey of Consumers, and construct a new “index of housing-specific
consumer sentiment” (IHCS) based on consumers’ responses to these questions.
In order to achieve this goal, we take several steps. Our approach is based on
Cai et al. (2015), but additional steps are taken to validate the choice of questions
in a more reliable way.
The first step is to pre-select some survey questions that are intuitively more
related to house price. The survey includes as many as 42 questions, divided to the
following 7 subgroups: “Personal Finances”, “Savings and Retirement”, “Economic
Conditions”, “Unemployment, Interest Rates, Prices, Government Expectations”,
“Household Durables Buying Conditions”, “Vehicle Buying Conditions”, and “Home
Buying and Selling Conditions”. Obviously some are more related to housing market
than others. Also, some question answers have very similar trends. Hence, we should
both consider the statistical results and the implications of the questions. Therefore,
we don’t want to include all the questions, but to pre-select a subgroup of questions.
Based on the discussed principal, we pre-select the following questions:
• Five questions that are used to generate ICS, including questions about per-
sonal finances (Q6 and Q8), economic conditions (Q28 and Q29), and buying
conditions (Q35).
• All the 3 main questions on home buying and selling conditions, including
buying conditions (Q41), selling conditions (Q43), and house value (Q45). And
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one extra question on “Reasons for Opinions About House Buying Conditions”
(Q42).
• Two questions on unemployment (Q30) and interest rate (Q31).
• Two other questions, including news about economic conditions (Q23), and
economic condition in the past (Q25).
In additional to the five questions used to generate ICS, the new questions are
as follows:
Q23 = “During the last few months, have you heard of any favourable or un-
favourable changes in business conditions?”
Q25 = “Would you say that at the present time business conditions are better or
worse than they were a year ago?”
Q30 = “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months ?? do you
think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or
less?”
Q31 = “”No one can say for sure, but what do you think will happen to interest
rates for borrowing money during the next 12 months ?? will they go up, stay
the same, or go down?”
Q41 = “Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or bad time to buy
a house?”
Q42 = “Why do you say so? (Choices include: Good time to buy : Prices won’t
go down; are going higher. etc)”
Q43 = “Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to sell
a house?”
Q45 = “Do you think the current value of your home? I mean, what it would
bring if you sold it today? has it increased compared with a year ago, has it
decreased compared with a year ago, or has it remained about the same?”
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In total, there are 13 questions that are pre-selected. The responses to these 13
questions give us 13 candidate variables, which we denote as A6, ..., A45.
The second step is to choose a subset of variables, and to calculate housing
specific consumer sentiment accordingly. To do this, we do a Stepwise Regression,
while ∆ZHVI is the dependent variable, and all the 13 candidate variables are search
regressors. We perform forward stepwise regression with p−value set as 0.05. It will
result in a subset of variables that are accepted in the stepwise regression result.
We calculate its set specific “sentiment” (denoted by IHCS1) by taking the average
value of the variables within the set. Note that the reason why we take the average
of these question answers, but not the weighted average, is that this approach is
consistent with how ICS is calculated.
On the other hand, in Cai et al. (2015), based on stepwise regression results and
meanings of the questions, the authors chose five questions (Q6, Q30, Q31, Q41
and Q43) to calculate a housing related sentiment by taking the average value of
the responses. In particular, let’s denote their sentiment as IHCS2, then IHCS2 =
(A6+A30+A31+A41+A43)/5. We will also calculate this index at Step 2. Both
IHCS1 and IHCS2 are considered as candidate proxies for IHCS.
The third step is to compare the performance of three candidate IHCS series:
IHCS1, IHCS2, and the original ICS. We use two approaches to do so. Firstly,
we compare the results of a simple regression model. In the model, ∆ZHVI is the
dependent variable, and one of the IHCS candidate is the only independent variable.
We record the R2 value, which implies how well the IHCS candidate is able to explain
∆ZHVI.
Secondly, we do a pairwise Granger Causality Test across ∆ZHVI, .IHCS1, IHCS2
and ICS. The sentiment variable that Granger causes other variables is preferred.
Based on the regression and Granger Causality Test results, we finalise our choice.
Having obtained IHCS, we can repeat the steps in our Basic Model, and compare
the results with ICS.
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4.4.3 Constructing Composite Housing Sentiment Index
In the previous sections, only the consumers’ opinions are considered. However, in
addition to consumers (on the demand side, whose sentiment is denoted as ICS),
other groups of people, such as builders (on the supply side, whose sentiment is
denoted as IBS), realtors (intermediary between demand and supply sides, whose
sentiment is denoted as IRS), and lenders(as credit suppliers, whose sentiment is
denoted as ILS), are also directly linked with the housing market. To capture
sentiment information from these different sources, in this section, we explain how
to construct a composite Index of Housing Sentiment (IHS) from the four variables
ICS, IBS, IRS, ILS. In other words, our objective is to combine consumers’, builders’,
realtors’ and lenders’ sentiment into a single “housing sentiment index”.
To do this, we apply principal component analysis (PCA) on the four variables
ICS, IBS, IRS, ILS. And we use the first component of the PCA result as the
composite index. The reasons why we use PCA instead of taking the average of the
four variables are as follows: Different sentiment indices have different methodologies
and different data ranges, which makes taking the average unfair. PCA is a useful
dimension-reduction tool. By using the first component, it gives us different weights
to different variables, which makes more sense. In the previous section, IHCS is
calculated by taking the average of the responses to five questions. This is because
the answers to the five questions have the same range, and are extremely comparable
(answered by the same group of people).
Having obtained IHS, we can also repeat the steps in our Basic Model, and
compare the results with ICS.
4.5 Results and Discussions
4.5.1 Relationship Between Consumer Sentiment and House
Price
In this section, we follow the steps introduced in the Methodology - Basic Model
section to study the role of overall ICS on ∆ZHVI.
June 22, 2020
4.5. Results and Discussions 138
Correlation
Table 4.2
Correlation Matrices
Correlation ∆ZHVI ICS ∆IPI INF INT UNE
∆ZHVI 1
ICS 0.698 1
∆IPI 0.250 0.243 1
INF 0.013 0.024 0.056 1
INT 0.211 0.610 0.136 0.088 1
UNE -0.546 -0.760 -0.005 -0.049 -0.644 1
Note: Refer to Table 4.1 for variable notation.
Table 4.2 presents the correlations among all variables, including two main vari-
ables ICS and ∆ZHVI, and four control variables. The correlation between ICS and
∆ZHVI is +0.698 (with p−value 0.0000). As expected, it is positive and signifi-
cant. This implies that when ICS increases, ∆ZHVI tends to increase as well. It is
consistent with our Hypothesis 1. We can also observe that unemployment rate is
negatively correlated with ∆ZHVI, while interest rate is positively correlated with
∆ZHVI. On the other hand, the correlation between inflation rate and ∆ZHVI is
insignificant. These are consistent with what we discussed in the Literature Review
section.
Here we provide two possible explanations for the positive correlation:
1. ICS reflects current economic conditions, and the current economic conditions
influence ∆ZHVI.
2. ICS contains unique information that affects house price change (for example,
higher ICS may indicator higher intention to buy a house), and that con-
tributes to the positive correlation.
The first explanation implies that although ICS and ∆ZHVI may be highly
correlated, the information in ICS may already be embedded in other economic
variables (such as unemployment rate, IPI, etc). On the other hand, the second
explanation implies that ICS affects ∆ZHVI through a new channel, and even other
economic variables are included in the model, ICS should still have some additional
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explanatory power. To study which one is the case, we move on to the regression
model. By adding economic and financial variables as control variables, we are able
to check the additional explanatory power of ICS.
Regression
The regression results are summarised in Table 4.3. The regression results show
that
∑T ∗
i=1 βi in Model 4.4.1 is 0.035 (obtained at T
∗ = 5), and it is significant at
5% level. According to the regression equation, when ICS increases by 10, ∆ZHVI
increases by 0.35. The influence is quite significant. Adj-R2 of Models 4.4.1 and
4.4.2 are 0.609 and 0.378, respectively. By adding one explanatory variable ICS,
adj-R2 increases by 61%. . ICS alone is able to generate adj-R2 of 0.487 (obtained
at T ∗ = 3). These results imply that ICS alone can explain ∆ZHVI quite well.Even
taking other control variables into account, ICS has good additional explanatory
power on ∆ZHVI. The results indicate that the second explanation we discussed in
the previous section is likely to hold. ICS is not just a reflection of fundamentals.
They contain unique information that is extremely useful in explaining house price
change.
Table 4.3
Influence of ICS on ∆ZHVI from Regression Results
With ICS only With Z only With ICS and Z Incremental
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
regression 0.487 0.026 0.00 0.378 0.609 0.035 0.00 0.231 (61%)
Note: Models (1) - (3) are as follows, respectively:
∆ZHVIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiICSt−i + γZt−1 + ε
∆ZHVIt = α+ γZt−1 + ε
∆ZHVIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiICSt−i + ε
Here, T ∗ is chosen by Akaike information criterion. T ∗ = 5 for Model (1), and T ∗ = 3 for model
(3). Z = {∆IPI, INF,∆(INT),UNE}. Refer to Table 4.1 for variable notation.
VAR Model
The results from the VAR models are summarised in Table 4.4. The optimal numbers
of lags according to Akaike information criterion is 2. Since lagged ∆ZHVI values
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are added, R2 is quite high for all the models, and the additional explanatory power
by adding ICS is small. However, the results still confirm a positive relationship with
∆ZHVI (i.e., positive
∑
βi values) and a small additional explanatory power. The
results are consistent with our expectations. In the next few subsections, we interpret
the VAR model by three approaches, which can not be done in the regression model.
Table 4.4
Influence of ICS on ∆ZHVI from VAR Results
With ICS only With Z only With ICS and Z Incremental
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
VAR 0.956 0.0005 – 0.956 0.957 0.0027 – 0.001
Note: Refer to Table 4.1 for variable notation. Models (1) - (3) have the following form:
yt = c+A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 + · · ·+AT∗yt−T∗ + et
For Model (1), y = {∆ZHVI, ICS,Z}, where Z is defined in Table 4.3.
For Model (2), y = {∆ZHVI, Z}. For Model (3), y = {∆ZHVI, ICS}.
Here, T ∗ is the optimal number of lags chosen by Akaike information criterion. T ∗ = 2 for model
(1) and T ∗ = 1 for model (3).
Granger Causality
The Granger Causality results are summarised in Table 4.5. It shows that at test
critical value 5%, for the complete model, ICS and ∆ZHVI Granger cause each other.
And for pairwise model, ICS Granger causes ∆ZHVI, but ∆ZHVI does not Granger
cause ICS. This implies that the lagged values of ICSs have extra explanatory power
on ∆ZHVI given its own lagged values, but not the other way around. The result is
consistent with our hypothesis. The change in ICS leads the change in house price
changing rate.
There are a few explanations for this. On the one hand, ICS may imply the
current business condition, which may cause change in housing market performance.
On the other hand, as a psychological factor, ICS may change people’s willingness
to buy/sell a house, and influence housing market performance.
In contrast, change in ∆ZHVI might also lead ICS. When the housing market
becomes turbulent, people may become more pessimistic. This part is supported by
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the Granger Causality result for the complete model.
Table 4.5
Granger Causality Results
Panel A: Pairwise Granger Causality
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
ICS does not Granger Cause ∆ZHVI 2.41 0.0096
∆ZHVI does not Granger Cause ICS 1.34 0.2075
Panel B: Granger Causality for the Complete VAR Model
Dependent Variable Excluded Chi-sq Prob.
∆ZHVI ICS 7.49 0.0236
ICS ∆ZHVI 6.48 0.0392
Note: Refer to Table 4.1 for variable notation. for Panel A, lag number 10 is used. For Panel B,
optimal number of lags from model (1) is used.
Impulse Response Functions
Figure 4.10 shows the impulse responses between ICS and ∆ZHVI. When there is a
one standard-deviation shock in ∆ZHVI, ICS has a positive response in a couple of
months, and the shock is absorbed slowly. The biggest increase in ICS is around 1
point. By around 30 months, the influence is completely gone. Cumulatively, it has
a positive impact for at least 5 years. On the other hand, when there is a shock in
ICS, ∆ZHVI has a positive response immediately, and the shock is absorbed slowly.
The influence is gone in less than 20 months. The biggest increase in ∆ZHVI is
around 0.04. This number is quite big, considering it is the monthly percentage
change in house price. Cumulatively, it has a positive impact in the short run and
the impact is gone in 40 months. The results show that ICS and ∆ZHVI do have a
positive relationship, and also, ∆ZHVI seems to respond to the shock in ICS more
quickly and more significantly. which are consistent with our hypothesis and the
previous results.
The impact of shocks in the short run and the long run can be further analysed
by variance decomposition, which is discussed in the next subsection.
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Figure 4.10
Impulse Response Results
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Variance Decomposition
Table 4.6 shows the variance decomposition results. In the short run (i.e., at the
second month), a shock in ICS explains about 0.45% of the variance in ∆ZHVI,
largest among all the variables except for ∆ZHVI itself. In the long run (i.e., af-
ter 100 months), a shock in ICS explains about 19% of the variance in ∆ZHVI.
Meanwhile, ∆ZHVI’s own shock still accounts for 73% of its variance. This result
indicates the amount of information ICS contributes to ∆ZHVI in the autoregression
is noticeable. It is consistent with our hypothesis.
In the table, we also list the variance decomposition results for ICS. Comparing
the results for ICS and ∆ZHVI. From these results, we can clearly see that comparing
with the effects of the control variables, two main variables, ICS and ∆ZHVI, are
relatively important in affecting each other.
Table 4.6
Variance Decomposition Results
Panel A: Variance Decomposition Results for ∆ZHVI
Period S.E. ∆ZHVI ICS ∆IPI INF INT UNE
1 0.10 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.14 99.46 0.45 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
3 0.17 98.58 1.31 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02
... ......
100 0.49 72.86 19.22 0.86 0.57 4.26 2.24
Panel B: Variance Decomposition Results for ICS
Period S.E. ∆ZHVI ICS ∆IPI INF INT UNE
1 0.10 0.07 91.52 0.12 1.51 4.44 2.34
2 0.14 0.48 87.89 0.53 3.84 4.73 2.52
3 0.17 0.96 85.90 1.28 4.34 4.64 2.89
... ......
100 0.49 41.44 48.15 1.55 2.11 3.99 2.76
Note: Cholesky Ordering: ∆ZHVI ICS ∆IPI INF INT UNE.
4.5.2 Comparing the Relationship within Subgroups
In this section, we redo the same analyses as the previous section, by replacing ICS
with subgroup specific values, and by replacing ∆ZHVI with the value within a
certain price tier. The objective is to compare the relationship of ICS and ∆ZHVI
June 22, 2020
4.5. Results and Discussions 144
among people in different income tiers, age groups, and regions, and among houses
within different price tiers. In other words, in this section, we check the validity of
our Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 3.
In particular, for consumer sentiment index, in addition to the overall ICS, we
can also obtain consumer sentiment indices within certain demographic subgroups.
In our study, we make use of the following variables:
• ICSi1: ICS of people with bottom tiered income;
• ICSi2: ICS of people with middle tiered income;
• ICSi3: ICS of people with top tiered income.
• ICSa1: ICS of people with age 34 and below;
• ICSa2: ICS of people with age 35 to 54;
• ICSa3: ICS of people with age 55 and above.
• ICSr1: ICS of people living in the Midwest region;
• ICSr2: ICS of people living in the North East region;
• ICSr3: ICS of people living in the South region;
• ICSr4: ICS of people living in the West region.
• ∆ZHVI1: ∆ZHVI for houses whose price are in the bottom tier on local market;
• ∆ZHVI3: ∆ZHVI for houses whose price are in the top tier on local market.
Among ICS series within three income tiers, we have found that they have slightly
different explanatory powers on house price change. In the VAR model, R2 is 0.9592,
0.9611, 0.9597, for people aged 34 and below, aged 35-54, and aged 55 and above,
respectively. Quite clearly, middle aged people’s sentiment is the best at explaining
house price change. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2(a). The results are intu-
itive. People in a very young age group are less likely to be potential home buyers.
Hence, their sentiment may not affect house price as much as middle-aged people
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do. On the other hand, very old people are less likely to buy a new house as well,
which also makes their sentiment less important than middle-aged people?s one in
determining house price.
Among ICS series within three age subgroups, we have found that they also have
slightly different explanatory powers on house price change. In the VAR model, R2 is
0.9600, 0.9595, 0.9605, for people with bottom-tiered income, middle-tiered income,
and top-tiered income, respectively. Marginally, people whose income are in the
top tier have sentiment that is the best at explaining house price change. This is
consistent with Hypothesis 2(b). Consumers with higher income are more likely to
be potential home buyers, and they tend to be more knowledgeable on the financial
market. Hence, their sentiment is likely to play a more important role in determining
house price change.
Among ICS series within four regions, again, the explanatory powers on house
price change are region specific. In the VAR model, R2 is 0.9606, 0.9594, 0.9595
and 0.9593, for people living in the Midwest, Northeast, South and West regions,
respectively. Marginally, sentiment of people who live in Midwest is the best at
explaining house price change. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2(c). There are
clearly regional differences in house price, income levels, population, etc. These and
other factors can all contribute to the difference in the results.
Among ∆ZHVI series within three price tiers, we have found that ICS can explain
slightly different percentages of their variance. In the VAR model, R2 is 0.956, 0.960,
0.968, for bottom-tiered houses, overall houses, and top-tiered houses, respectively.
Apparently, ICS explains the top tier price change the best. This is consistent with
Hypothesis 3. The possible explanation is that higher valued houses may be more of
an “luxury item” and hence sentiment plays a larger role in its buying and selling.
Here, we only summarise the most important VAR results. The detailed analyses
are included in the Online Appendix. From the thorough analyses, we find evidence
that support our Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 3.
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Table 4.7
Correlation Matrices
ICS ICSa1 ICSa2 ICSa3 ICSi1 ICSi2 ICSi3 ICSr1 ICSr2 ICSr3 ICSr4
∆ZHVI 0.698 0.684 0.695 0.661 0.646 0.684 0.699 0.667 0.646 0.690 0.694
∆ZHVI1 0.714 0.701 0.713 0.683 0.654 0.703 0.717 0.682 0.666 0.704 0.707
∆ZHVI3 0.632 0.631 0.628 0.584 0.582 0.617 0.638 0.596 0.584 0.628 0.633
Correlation
Table 4.7 presents the correlations of the two (sub-grouped) main variables. As ex-
pected, when we replace the overall index with the index within a certain subgroup,
the correlations of the two main variables are still positive and significant.
However, there are also some differences among different subgroups. They allow
us to make some interesting observations.
Firstly, we compare different columns. Among different age subgroups, the sen-
timent indices by the mid-aged subgroup almost always have the largest correlation
with house price change. For the overall house price change, the correlation is 0.695,
larger than the one for the younger group, 0.684, and the one for the older group,
0.661. For the bottom tiered house price change, the correlation is 0.713, larger than
the one for the younger group, 0.714, and the one for the older group, 0.713. For
the top tiered house price change, the correlation is 0.628, only slightly smaller than
the one for the younger group, 0.631, and larger than the one for the older group,
0.584. On the other hand, the older people (over 55 years old)’s sentiment always
has the smallest correlation with house price change.
The results are easy to interpret. The middle aged group (from 35 to 54 years
old) is the main player in the housing market. The younger people (who are less
than 34 years old) may not have earned and saved enough deposit to buy a house.
And the older people (who are more than 55 years old) may have already bought
a house and no longer interested in buying a new one, and may have been the
least interested in the housing market. As a result, the middle aged people are
more interested and more knowledgeable about the housing market and house price
change. Therefore, their sentiment reflects house price change better. This result
also implies that sentiment is not generated out of nowhere. It is not just instinct.
It is actually generated based on people’s knowledge, based on things such as the
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news they read, the events that recently take place, etc. When people pay more
attention and invest more time, they have a better understanding on the issue, and
hence their sentiment is more valuable in reflecting reality.
Similarly, among income subgroups, an observation that does not surprise us is
that the sentiment of people with higher income has higher correlation with house
price change. Specifically, the correlation between overall house price change and
the sentiment of people in the top income tier is 0.699, higher than the one with
middle-tiered income, 0.684, which is higher than the one for bottom-tiered income,
0.646. For top-tiered house price change, the correlations are 0.717, 0.703, 0.654, for
people under top, middle and bottom income tiers, respectively. The correlations
also show a decreasing trend. Same is true for the top-tiered house price change.
The correlations are 0.638, 0.617 and 0.582, for people under top, middle and bottom
income tiers, respectively.
This is consistent with our previous discussion - sentiment reflects people’s knowl-
edge. People with higher income tend to have more money to buy a house, and hence
more interested and more knowledgeable in the housing market. Their views are
more valuable in reflecting real house price change.
The results also show a regional difference. The correlations between sentiment
and house price change always show a decreasing trend for sentiment of people in the
West Region, South Region, Midwest Region, and North East region, respectively.
No matter this is for over all price change, top-tiered price change or bottom-tiered
price change.
Secondly, we compare the correlations of different rows. It seems that the values
in the second row (for bottom-tiered price changes) are always larger than that in
the first row (for over all price changes). And the values in the first row are always
larger than the ones in the third row (for top-tiered price changes). This result
implies that people’s sentiment reflects house price change better, for lower priced
houses. One possible explanation is that lower priced houses are more affordable.
Therefore, larger number of people are interested and knowledgeable about their
price trend. And in return, their sentiment reflects their price better. On the other
hand, higher priced houses only interest a smaller pool of people. Therefore, their
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prices tend to be less predictable by general customers.
Regression
The regression results for all the subgroups are summarised in Table 4.8. Across
different age groups, the extra explanatory power of sentiment on house price change
is the biggest for the middle aged group, for overall house price change (at 0.229),
bottom-tier price change (at 0.182), and top-tier price change (at 0.211). On the
other hand, the extra explanatory power is the smallest for the oldest age group, ,
for overall house price change (at 0.172), bottom-tier price change (at 0.129), and
top-tier price change (at 0.151). The results are similar to the correlation results in
the previous section. It supports our hypothesis that the middle aged group (aged
35 to 54), as the main player in the housing market, have better knowledge about
information on house price change, and hence their sentiment is the most useful in
n explaining house price change for various price tiers. And the older group (aged
55 and above) tend to be less interested in the housing market, and their sentiment
is less powerful in explaining house price change.
Across different income tiers, the extra explanatory power of sentiment on house
price change is the bigger when the in
Across different price tiers, we can see that the control variables have higher
explanatory power on the house price change for cheaper houses (the adjusted R2
is 0.523, 0.378, and 0.256, for bottom-tier, overall, and top-tier price change, re-
spectively). And the extra explanatory power of sentiment tends to be smaller for
cheaper houses. In other words,
4.5.3 The Construction of IHCS
As explained in Methodology Section, we start with 13 candidate questions. Then
Forward Stepwise Regression is performed with p−value = 0.05. The following
variables have survived in the model: Q45, Q30, Q06, Q41, Q25, and Q28.
Therefore, our first candidate IHCS proxy is calculated as follows:
IHCS1 = (A6+A25+A28+A30+A41+A45)/6.
On the other hand, the second candidate from Cai et al. (2015) is:
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Table 4.8
Influence of ICS on ∆ZHVI from Regression Results
With ICS only w/ Z only With ICS and Z Incremental
(3) (2) (1) [(1)-(2)]
Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2 Adj-R2
∑
βi p Adj-R
2
regression 0.487 0.026 0.00 0.378 0.609 0.035 0.00 0.231 (61%)
(ICSa1, ∆ZHVI) 0.482 0.029 0.00 0.378 0.582 0.032 0.00 0.204 (54%)
(ICSa2, ∆ZHVI) 0.498 0.026 0.00 0.378 0.607 0.033 0.00 0.229 (61%)
(ICSa3, ∆ZHVI) 0.450 0.027 0.00 0.378 0.550 0.031 0.00 0.172 (46%)
(ICSi1, ∆ZHVI) 0.453 0.029 0.00 0.378 0.557 0.031 0.00 0.179 (47%)
(ICSi2, ∆ZHVI) 0.477 0.024 0.00 0.378 0.599 0.032 0.00 0.221 (59%)
(ICSi3, ∆ZHVI) 0.487 0.024 0.00 0.378 0.615 0.033 0.00 0.237 (63%)
(ICSr1, ∆ZHVI) 0.469 0.026 0.00 0.378 0.575 0.029 0.00 0.197 (52%)
(ICSr2, ∆ZHVI) 0.438 0.025 0.00 0.378 0.538 0.026 0.00 0.160 (42%)
(ICSr3, ∆ZHVI) 0.476 0.025 0.00 0.378 0.595 0.034 0.00 0.217 (58%)
(ICSr4, ∆ZHVI) 0.496 0.026 0.00 0.378 0.658 0.040 0.00 0.280 (74%)
(ICS, ∆ZHVI1) 0.518 0.036 0.00 0.523 0.701 0.040 0.00 0.178 (34%)
(ICSa1, ∆ZHVI1) 0.532 0.040 0.00 0.523 0.701 0.039 0.00 0.178 (34%)
(ICSa2, ∆ZHVI1) 0.534 0.036 0.00 0.523 0.705 0.039 0.00 0.182 (35%)
(ICSa3, ∆ZHVI1) 0.483 0.037 0.00 0.523 0.652 0.035 0.00 0.129 (25%)
(ICSi1, ∆ZHVI1) 0.470 0.039 0.00 0.523 0.652 0.035 0.00 0.129 (25%)
(ICSi2, ∆ZHVI1) 0.515 0.033 0.00 0.523 0.700 0.038 0.00 0.177 (34%)
(ICSi3, ∆ZHVI1) 0.522 0.033 0.00 0.523 0.713 0.039 0.00 0.190 (36%)
(ICSr1, ∆ZHVI1) 0.506 0.035 0.00 0.523 0.684 0.035 0.00 0.161 (31%)
(ICSr2, ∆ZHVI1) 0.481 0.034 0.00 0.523 0.657 0.031 0.00 0.134 (26%)
(ICSr3, ∆ZHVI1) 0.500 0.034 0.00 0.523 0.674 0.038 0.00 0.150 (29%)
(ICSr4, ∆ZHVI1) 0.528 0.036 0.00 0.523 0.752 0.047 0.00 0.229 (44%)
(ICS, ∆ZHVI3) 0.398 0.023 0.00 0.256 0.477 0.034 0.00 0.221 (86%)
(ICSa1, ∆ZHVI3) 0.405 0.026 0.00 0.256 0.463 0.032 0.00 0.207 (81%)
(ICSa2, ∆ZHVI3) 0.401 0.023 0.00 0.256 0.467 0.032 0.00 0.211 (82%)
(ICSa3, ∆ZHVI3) 0.353 0.024 0.00 0.256 0.407 0.030 0.00 0.151 (59%)
(ICSi1, ∆ZHVI3) 0.369 0.026 0.00 0.256 0.428 0.030 0.00 0.172 (67%)
(ICSi2, ∆ZHVI3) 0.386 0.021 0.00 0.256 0.464 0.031 0.00 0.208 (81%)
(ICSi3, ∆ZHVI3) 0.402 0.021 0.00 0.256 0.488 0.033 0.00 0.232 (91%)
(ICSr1, ∆ZHVI3) 0.373 0.023 0.00 0.256 0.431 0.028 0.00 0.175 (68%)
(ICSr2, ∆ZHVI3) 0.358 0.022 0.00 0.256 0.409 0.025 0.00 0.153 (60%)
(ICSr3, ∆ZHVI3) 0.392 0.022 0.00 0.256 0.477 0.035 0.00 0.221 (86%)
(ICSr4, ∆ZHVI3) 0.410 0.024 0.00 0.256 0.527 0.039 0.00 0.271 (106%)
Note: Models (1) - (3) are as follows, respectively:
∆ZHVIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiICSt−i + γZt−1 + ε
∆ZHVIt = α+ γZt−1 + ε
∆ZHVIt = α+
∑T∗
i=1 βiICSt−i + ε
Here, T ∗ is chosen by Akaike information criterion. T ∗ = 3 for both model (1) and model (3).
Z = {∆IPI, INF,∆(INT),UNE}. Refer to Table 4.1 for variable notation.
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IHCS2 = (A6+A30+A31+A41+A43)/5.
We consider the simple regression model ∆ZHVI = αX + β, where X is ICS,
IHCS1 , or IHCS2 . The resulting R
2 is 0.49, 0.60, or 0.64, respectively. The values
0.6 and 0.64 are much bigger than 0.49. This implies that both constructed indices
IHCS1 and IHCS2 explain a significantly larger part of the variance in ∆ZHVI than
the original ICS does. Within these two constructed indices, IHCS2 performs slightly
better than IHCS1 (as 0.64 is slightly larger than 0.60).
Finally, we perform pairwise Granger Causality Test on these three variables
and ∆ZHVI. The results are listed in Table 4.9. The results are quite interesting.
At p-value = 0.10, ICS, IHCS1 and IHCS2 all Granger causes ∆ZHVI, but ∆ZHVI
only Granger causes IHCS1. Within the three sentiment measures, both IHCS1
and IHCS2 Granger cause ICS, but not the other way around. And finally, IHCS2
Granger causes IHCS1, but not the other way around. The results imply that IHCS2
seems to be leading variable that change before other variables do.
Based on the regression and pairwise Granger Causality Test results. we decide
to use IHCS2 as our housing specific consumer sentiment index, i.e.,
IHCS = (A6+A30+A31+A41+A43)/5.
Questions 6, 30, 31, 41, and 43 are on the following issues, respectively: current
personal financial condition, unemployment rate prediction, interest rate prediction,
whether it is a good time to buy a house, and whether it is a good time to sell a
house. Clearly, the last two questions are directly related to house price, and not
surprisingly included in the model. Current personal financial condition implies the
money that is available, which is also directly linked with house purchase. Moreover,
unemployment rate prediction implies future income prediction, and interest rate
prediction is related to mortgage interest rate, and also the state of the economy. In
summary, the housing specific consumer sentiment index we constructed combined
information about consumers’ current financial situation, future financial situation
prediction, mortgage rate, and their direct opinions about current housing market.
It combines current condition and future expectations, and is more housing specific,
and hence could be better in predicting house price.
The time series of IHCS is plotted on Figure 4.11. From the figure, we can see
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Table 4.9
Pairwise Granger Causality
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.
ICS does not Granger Cause ∆ZHVI 2.40698 0.0096
∆ZHVI does not Granger Cause ICS 1.3441 0.2075
IHCS1 does not Granger Cause ∆ZHVI 2.98785 0.0014
∆ZHVI does not Granger Cause IHCS1 1.69508 0.0824
IHCS2 does not Granger Cause ∆ZHVI 1.80991 0.0594
∆ZHVI does not Granger Cause IHCS2 1.16302 0.3165
IHCS1 does not Granger Cause ICS 2.24039 0.0162
ICS does not Granger Cause IHCS1 1.04051 0.4099
IHCS2 does not Granger Cause ICS 1.86014 0.0514
ICS does not Granger Cause IHCS2 0.49188 0.8945
IHCS2 does not Granger Cause IHCS1 1.73368 0.0739
IHCS1 does not Granger Cause IHCS2 0.54504 0.857
that the housing specific consumer sentiment that we constructed has share a similar
trend with ICS, but also has some differences, especially in some time periods, such
as from year 2012, and between 2002 and 2006. Interestingly, ∆ZHVI also share
the same trend during these time periods. This is especially true for the period
between 2012 and 2014 when ∆ZHVI diverts from ICS. However, from 2016 to
2019, ∆ZHVI diverts from IHCS and follows a similar trend as ICS. Nonetheless, it
is worth studying the explanatory power of IHCS on ∆ZHVI, and compare it with
the previous results for ICS.
We redo the VAR analysis by replacing ICS with IHCS. We find R2 = 0.960,
which is very similar to the previous results for ICS. This indicates IHCS has very
similar explanatory power to ICS. The result reconfirms that ICS already works
pretty well in explaining house price changes.
We also find that IHCS granger causes ICS, and several ICS subgroup variables,
but not the other way around. The results implies that IHCS works marginally
better and seems to have a more leading role. Therefore, it is still worth using IHCS
as the sentiment proxy.
4.5.4 The Construction of IHS
The first component from Principal Component Analysis result is as follows:
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Figure 4.11
Time Series for IHCS, ICS and ∆ZHVI from May 1996
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IHS = 0.53 IHCS + 0.44 ILS + 0.50 IRS + 0.52 IBS.
The consumer sentiment, lender sentiment, realtor sentiment and builder sen-
timent happen to have similar weights, indicating that the four variables are all
important in providing unique information.
We redo the VAR analysis by replacing ICS with IHS. We find R2 increases from
0.96 to 0.97. The result implies that by combining sentiment from four sources
(demand side, supply side, intermediary agent and credit suppliers), the composite
sentiment works much better than consumer confidence alone in explaining house
price changes. We also found that IHS Granger causes IBS, and IRS Granger causes
IHS. However, due to the shorter time range, the causality results are not very
reliable.
We plot IHS, IHCS, ICS and ∆ZHVI together on Figure 4.12. We can observe
that there is a very high correlation between ∆ZHVI and IHS, especially for the last
five years of data. The advantage of IHS in explaining ∆ZHVI is clearly demon-
strated by the graph. However, since IRS is only available since 2008, our composite
sentiment index is also available since 2008. It is hard to know whether or not our
constructed sentiment index always works well in explaining ∆ZHVI.
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Figure 4.12
Time Series for IHS, IHCS, ICS and ∆ZHVI from Jan 2008
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4.6 Future Research
In the future, we are planning to do robustness study for sentiment and house price
measures, and we can also study the role of EPU on house price. These results will
further support our findings in this chapter.
4.6.1 Robustness Test
Robustness on Consumer Sentiment Measure
We can replace ICS by Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), and
redo the analyses discussed in Basic Model section. We expect to find that the
results are very similar and completely consistent. This will imply that our results
are not restricted to one particular consumer sentiment measure. It can represent
general consumer sentiment.
Robustness on House Price Measure
We may replace ZHVI by S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, and
also redo the analyses discussed in Basic Model section. We expect to find that the
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results are very similar and completely consistent, as well. This will reply that our
results are not restricted to one particular house price measure. It can represent
general house price change.
4.6.2 The Role of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU)
in Chapter 1, we found that EPU was a determinant of ICS. However, intuitively,
ICS is more directly linked with house price than EPU. So we may study whether
EPU has extra explanatory power or not, when ICS is already included in the model.
The results should show that EPU does not have much extra explanatory power.
Hence, our model in the previous sections is good enough. We expect that the part
of sentiment that is not related to economic policy uncertainty affects house price.
4.7 Conclusions
In Chapter 3, we used a VAR model to study the dynamics of consumer sentiment
and house price. We focused on the role of sentiment on house price change, when
economic factors are controlled for. We found that consumer sentiment is very pow-
erful in explaining the percentage change in house price. It has big extra explanatory
power on house price change, even when unemployment rate, interest rate, inflation
rate and GDP change are all included in the model. We also found that consumer
sentiment Granger causes house price change, which makes it a leading variable that
might be very useful in predicting future house price change rate.
We went a step further by studying and comparing consumer sentiment within
different income tiers, age groups, and regions. We found that the sentiment by mid-
aged people, people with higher income, and people who live in Midwest, has the
biggest explanatory power on house price change. it seemed that the sentiment of
people with better knowledge and experience in housing market was more valuable
in predicting house price change. This lead us to wonder: in addition to consumer
sentiment, by adding sentiment by professionals who work in the housing market, we
might be able to find a better sentiment proxy that could have better explanatory
power on house price change.
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Therefore, we proposed a two-step approach to achieve this goal. The first step
was to construct a better consumer sentiment index, that is housing specific. We
looked into the survey questions by University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers,
and started with the questions that better represent peoples’ sentiment on housing
market. We then did a Stepwise Regression to select the set of variables that were
able to explain the most variance on house price. Afterwards, we finalised our choice
of questions by Stepwise Granger Causality test results. We used the responses of
these questions to construct a housing specific consumer sentiment.
Our second step is to construct a sentiment of people who are the centre in
the housing market. What kind of people are more related to the housing market?
Consumers are one of them. They are potential house buyers. On the other side,
builders are also important players. They influence the supplies of houses. And
apparently, realtors, who work as intermediary between consumers and builders,
have a central position on the housing market as well. Finally, the lenders who
handle mortgage applications influence the buying and selling of houses indirectly
but significantly. Hence, we aim at providing a sentiment measure that combines
consumer sentiment (using the housing specific one we constructed), builder senti-
ment, realtor sentiment, and lender sentiment. Principal Component Analysis was
used for the construction of the sentiment measure. And the measure turned out to
be very successful in explaining house price change, compared with other sentiment
measures.
In summary, we provide a thorough study on the role of sentiment on house price
change and had some interesting results. Our findings should be valuable for both
researchers and practitioners.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we focused on monthly consumer sentiment (or confidence) index
(ICS), and studied its determinants, interactions, and implications. Chapter 1 pro-
vided an Introduction to the problems we focused on. And the next three chapters
focused on each of the three problems, determinants, interactions, and implications,
respectively.
In Chapter 2, we provided empirical evidence on the role economic policy un-
certainty (EPU) plays on consumer confidence through thorough data analyses. We
not only studied the impact of economic policy uncertainty on consumer confidence
without or with the presence of major economic variables, but also their dynamics
through VAR models. We showed that higher economic policy uncertainty leads to
lower consumer confidence, even when the other economic variables are controlled
for. We also found that the EPU for US can explain consumer confidence bet-
ter than Europe, but the additional explanatory power of EPU on ICS is actually
smaller for the US than for Europe, adding the control variables. Moreover, we did
four additional tests to further examine the relationship between economic policy
uncertainty and consumer confidence. The additional tests were also useful in show-
ing that (1) uncertainty implies lower confidence (through the analysis on “unsure”
answers) and (2) confidence measures income expectation (through the analyses on
categorised EPUs).
From all the results, we suggested that economic policy uncertainty affects con-
sumer confidence through two channels. The first channel is that economic policy
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uncertainty implies current business conditions, and current business conditions af-
fect consumers’ income expectations, and therefore affect consumer confidence. On
the other hand, the second channel is that economic policy uncertainty causes con-
sumers’ uncertainty about their income expectations, and hence affect consumer
confidence.
We found that for the US, economic policy uncertainty mainly affects consumer
confidence through the first channel. Therefore, its additional explanatory power
is small. However, we also found evidence on the existence of the second channel.
For example, economic policy uncertainty Granger causes other variables, and it
explains the expected component of consumer confidence better. On the contrary,
we found that for Europe, economic policy uncertainty mainly affects consumer
confidence through the second channel. It has very large additional explanatory
power on consumer confidence, compared with other economic variables.
However, unlike the US, economic policy uncertainty together with economic
variables only explain a smaller portion of the variance in European consumer confi-
dence. From the results, and the shapes of the consumer confidence times series for
the US and Europe, we suspect that the consumer confidence in Europe may also
be influenced by US confidence or variables. In the next chapter, we will study the
transactions/spillover effects of consumer confidence across different regions.
In Chapter 3, we studied the transmission of consumer confidence around the
globe. In particular, we focused on the G6 countries, and studied two problems: the
directional spillover of consumer confidence, and the total spillover. The former fo-
cused on the “direction” of the relationship. We were able to identify each country’s
role - who are the receivers, and who are the contributors, and why. We found that
US has by far the largest influence on the spillover of consumer confidence. This
is not surprising, given it being the largest economy in the world. We have found
that European countries, due to the close economic and geographic relationships,
also influence each other frequently. But each country’s role is time dependent, and
is worth further study.
The second problem focused on the “magnitude” of the relationship, and its
applications. We found that spillover is the highest at the beginning of a financial
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crises. Therefore, it has some predictory power on economic activities and economic
turning points. This is because a large drop in consumer confidence in one country
often leads large drops in consumer confidence in other countries, which in turn is
a warning sign to world economy.
In this chapter, our research was motivated by theories and findings in the area of
social psychology. Our research findings verified these findings, and hence provided
some proof on what consumer confidence measures - consumer attitude.
In Chapter 4, we moved from what influences ICS, to what ICS influences. we
used a VAR model to study the dynamics of consumer sentiment and house price.
We focused on the role of sentiment on house price change, when economic factors are
controlled for. We found that consumer sentiment is very powerful in explaining the
percentage change in house price. It has big extra explanatory power on house price
change, even when unemployment rate, interest rate, inflation rate and GDP change
are all included in the model. We also found that consumer sentiment Granger causes
house price change, which makes it a leading variable that might be very useful in
predicting future house price change rate.
We went a step further by studying and comparing consumer sentiment within
different income tiers, age groups, and regions. We found that the sentiment by mid-
aged people, people with higher income, and people who live in Midwest, has the
biggest explanatory power on house price change. it seemed that the sentiment of
people with better knowledge and experience in housing market was more valuable
in predicting house price change. This lead us to wonder: in addition to consumer
sentiment, by adding sentiment by professionals who work in the housing market, we
might be able to find a better sentiment proxy that could have better explanatory
power on house price change.
Therefore, we proposed a two-step approach to achieve this goal. The first step
was to construct a better consumer sentiment index, that is housing specific. We
looked into the survey questions by University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers,
and started with the questions that better represent peoples’ sentiment on housing
market. We then did a Stepwise Regression to select the set of variables that were
able to explain the most variance on house price. Afterwards, we finalised our choice
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of questions by Stepwise Granger Causality test results. We used the responses of
these questions to construct a housing specific consumer sentiment.
Our second step was to construct a sentiment of people who are the centre in
the housing market. What kind of people are more related to the housing market?
Consumers are one of them. They are potential house buyers. On the other side,
builders are also important players. They influence the supplies of houses. And
apparently, realtors, who work as intermediary between consumers and builders,
have a central position on the housing market as well. Finally, the lenders who
handle mortgage applications influence the buying and selling of houses indirectly
but significantly. Hence, we aimed at providing a sentiment measure that combines
consumer sentiment (using the housing specific one we constructed), builder senti-
ment, realtor sentiment, and lender sentiment. Principal Component Analysis was
used for the construction of the sentiment measure. And the measure turned out to
be very successful in explaining house price change, compared with other sentiment
measures. In summary, we provided a thorough study on the role of sentiment on
house price change and had some interesting results.
Our research was closely linked with existing literature, such as Chau and Dee-
somsak (2014); Diebold and Yilmaz (2012); Ludvigson (2004); Ling et al. (2015).
Nonetheless, we proposed many innovative approaches to studying consumer senti-
ment thoroughly, and and provided some interesting insights and interpretations on
the variable. Our findings should be valuable for both researchers and practitioners.
Throughout the thesis, we have discussed several topics that we are interested
in doing in our future research. Unfortunately they could not be done due to the
time constraint and the scales of the problems. But we look forward to untangling
them in the near future.
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Appendix A
Introduction to Consumer
Confidence Indexes
Consumer confidence indexes are used to measure consumer confidence. Here, we
give a detailed explanation on its constructions and comparisons.
A.1 Construction of the Three Major Indexes
Here we list three major indexes that aim to capture consumer confidence informa-
tion. The information was gathered from their official sites.
• The US Consumer Sentiment Index (ICS)
The Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) by the Survey Research Centre at
University of Michigan is the first index of its kind, and is most widely studied
in research papers. It was first introduced in 1946 and provided annually. It
became quarterly available from 1952 to 1977, and monthly available since
1978.
The index has been generated each month based on at least 500 consumers’
phone responses to questions about current and expected personal/overall eco-
nomic conditions.
Fifty core questions are asked in the phone interview. But only five are used
to calculate ICS. The questions are listed as follows:
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– Q1 (current buying condition) Do you think now is a good or bad time
for people to buy major household items?
– Q2 (current personal finance) Would you say that you (and your family
living there) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year
ago?
– Q3 (expected business condition) do you think that during the next twelve
months, well have good times financially or bad times or what?
– Q4 (expected long-term business condition) which would you say is more
likelythat in the country as a whole well have continuous good times
during the next five years or so or that well have periods of widespread
unemployment or depression, or what?
– Q5 (expected personal finance) do you think that a year from now, you
(and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off,
or just about the same as now?
• The US Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)
The Conference Board issues the monthly US Consumer Confidence Index
(CCI) since 1967 based on mailed survey responses, and also received some
research attention. The approximate sample size is 3500, while the exact
number of responses is unknown. Since 1977, it moved from quarterly data to
monthly ones.
It is also calculated from the answers to five core questions. Here is a summary
of the five questions:
– Q1 (current business condition) How would you rate present general busi-
ness conditions in your area?
– Q2 (current employment condition) What would you say about available
jobs in your area right now?
– Q3 (expected business condition) Six months from now, do you think
business conditions in your area will be?
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– Q4 (expected employment condition) Six months from now, do you think
there will be [more/same/fewer] jobs available in your area?
– Q5 (expected personal finance) How would you guess your total family
income to be six months from now?
• The UK Consumer Confidence Barometer (CCB)
The UK Consumer Confidence Barometer is conducted by GfK on behalf of
the EU. This survey has been conducted via a nationally representative online
survey, amongst a sample of 2000 individuals. It has been running since 1974,
and monthly data have been provided. Similar surveys are conducted in each
European country.
The five questions of the CCB survey are as follows:
– Q1 (current buying condition) In view of the general economic situation,
do you think now is the right time for people to make major purchases
such as furniture or electrical goods?
Q2 (current business condition) How do you think the general economic
situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?
– Q3 (current personal finance) How has the financial situation of your
household changed over the last 12 months?
– Q4 (expected business condition) How do you expect the general eco-
nomic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months?
– Q5 (expected personal finance) How do you expect the financial position
of your household to change over the next 12 months?
A.2 Comparison of the Three Major Indexes
Clearly, there are similarities and differences among the construction of the three
indexes. Their major similarities are summarised below:
• The goal is to measure public confidence in the economy;
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• The index is calculated based on the answers to five questions (as part of a
larger survey);
• Each question is given equal weight;
• The questions can be categorised to two components: current condition com-
ponent, and an expectation component;
• They all ask questions about (1) the current personal finance condition, (2) the
expected personal finance condition, and (3) the expected business condition.
Their main differences are summarised as follows:
• For ICS and CCI, two questions are used to assess the current condition; while
for CCB, three are used;
• For ICS and CCB, the current buying plan is asked directly; while for CCB,
no such question is asked;
• For CCB, the current and expected employment condition are asked directly;
while for the other two, no such questions are asked;
• For ICS, two questions about the expected business condition are asked, one
for the short-term and one for the long-term; while the other two only ask one
short-term question;
• They have different sample sizes and survey formats.
Due to the similarities, these indexes should be highly correlated. On the other
hand, the question designs are distinct. For example, CCB puts more weight to
current conditions, CCI is more closely tied to labour market conditions, and ICS
focuses more on economic condition overlook. This may lead to systematical differ-
ence in responses. It could be an interesting question in our study to compare the
performance of the different indexes.
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The Conference Board Leading
Economic Index
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index is an American economic leading
indicator intended to forecast future economic activity. It is calculated by The Con-
ference Board, a non-governmental organization, which determines the value of the
index from the values of ten key variables. These variables have historically turned
downward before a recession and upward before an expansion. The single index
value composed from these ten variables has generally proved capable of predicting
recessions over the past 50 years, but in most cases it has been known to falsely
predict recessions which did not occur.
• Average weekly hours (manufacturing) - Adjustments to the working hours of
existing employees are usually made in advance of new hires or layoffs, which
is why the measure of average weekly hours is a leading indicator for changes
in unemployment.
• Average weekly jobless claims for unemployment insurance - The CB reverses
the value of this component from positive to negative because a positive read-
ing indicates a loss in jobs. The initial jobless-claims data is more sensitive to
business conditions than other measures of unemployment, and as such leads
the monthly unemployment data released by the Department of Labor.
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• Manufacturer’s new orders for consumer goods/materials - This component is
considered a leading indicator because increases in new orders for consumer
goods and materials usually mean positive changes in actual production. The
new orders decrease inventory and contribute to unfilled orders, a precursor
to future revenue.
• Vendor performance (slower deliveries diffusion index) - This component mea-
sures the time it takes to deliver orders to industrial companies. Vendor per-
formance leads the business cycle because an increase in delivery time can
indicate rising demand for manufacturing supplies. Vendor performance is
measured by a monthly survey from the National Association of Purchasing
Managers (NAPM). This diffusion index measures one-half of the respondents
reporting no change and all respondents reporting slower deliveries.
• Manufacturer’s new orders for non-defense capital goods - As stated above,
new orders lead the business cycle because increases in orders usually mean
positive changes in actual production and perhaps rising demand. This mea-
sure is the producer’s counterpart of new orders for consumer goods/materials
component.
• Building permits for new private housing units - Building permits mean fu-
ture construction, and construction moves ahead of other types of production,
making this a leading indicator.
• The Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index - The S&P 500 is considered a leading
indicator because changes in stock prices reflect investor’s expectations for the
future of the economy and interest rates. The S&P 500 is a good measure of
stock price as it incorporates the 500 largest companies in the United States.
• Money Supply (M2) - The money supply measures demand deposits, trav-
eler’s checks, savings deposits, currency, money market accounts and small-
denomination time deposits. Here, M2 is adjusted for inflation by means of the
deflator published by the federal government in the GDP report. Bank lend-
ing, a factor contributing to account deposits, usually declines when inflation
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increases faster than the money supply, which can make economic expansion
more difficult. Thus, an increase in demand deposits will indicate expectations
that inflation will rise, resulting in a decrease in bank lending and an increase
in savings.
• Interest rate spread (10-year Treasury vs. Federal Funds target) - The interest
rate spread is often referred to as the yield curve and implies the expected
direction of short-, medium- and long-term interest rates. Changes in the yield
curve have been the most accurate predictors of downturns in the economic
cycle. This is particularly true when the curve becomes inverted, that is, when
the longer-term returns are expected to be less than the short rates.
• Index of consumer expectations - This is the only component of the leading
indicators that is based solely on expectations. This component leads the
business cycle because consumer expectations can indicate future consumer
spending or tightening. The data for this component comes from the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s Survey Research Center, and is released once a month.
The information is obtained from Investopedia.
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